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ABSTRACT
Democracy is a form of governance that allows for the flourishing of human
potentiality. Unfortunately, democracy has become less of a means of governance and
more of a rhetorical device to secure the consent of the people to be ruled by the elite
few. Thus the current study seeks to disrupt this hegemonic means of control through an
explication of authentic governance and democracy in order to demonstrate that the
current manifestations of governance associated with democracy are inauthentic. To
begin, authentic democracy –direct or as it is constituted here, rhetorical democracy– can
foster a citizenry of active and empowered participants who express their public wills
through rhetorical engagements so as to generate a collective will productive of a
collectively binding decision that is reflective of a societal common good. To achieve this
end, the foundation of the communicative process is set up as being inherently rhetorical
and fundamental for the establishment and continuance of the symbolic orders generative
of society’s macro- and micro-cultures. Next, engagement of these symbolic orders
through democratic rhetoric is necessary for authentic governance to be actualized.
Democratic rhetoric posits a new way of understanding and employing invention for
rhetorical engagements concerning public problems, as well as constructing a new notion
of rhetorical accountability. It is in one’s participation in the collectively binding
decision-making process of a rhetorical democracy, which necessitates inventing through
ii

the symbolic orders of others, that the educative and transformative power of rhetoric is
facilitated and realized. Additionally, this study reconceptualizes ideology as primarily a
sense-making system that provides a method for critical ideological analysis of both
Athenian democracy and American governance. Democratic rhetoric hinges upon the
citizenry’s ability to participate as empowered, functional equals – core ideological
constructs of Athenian democracy – in the collectively binding decision-making process.
Finally, to facilitate the possibility of democratic rhetoric within governance the current
research constructs the possible means, functions and structures, for enacting a rhetorical
democracy within the contemporary political context. The implications of this
investigation into meaningful symbol systems, culture, rhetoric, ideology, and democracy
and the subsequent theory building will prove to be fruitful within the contexts discussed
here and in many others.
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I think by far the most important bill in our whole code is that for the diffusion of
knowledge among the people. No other sure foundation can be devised, for the
preservation of freedom and happiness.
…Preach, my dear Sir, a crusade against ignorance; establish & improve the law
for educating the common people.
Let our countrymen know … that the tax which will be paid for this purpose is not
more than the thousandth part of what will be paid to kings, priests & nobles who
will rise up among us if we leave the people in ignorance
–Jefferson (1786), Thomas Jefferson: Writings

1

CHAPTER ONE: AMERICAN DEMOCRACY?

We claim to be the greatest democratic people in the world, and democracy
means, first of all, that we can govern ourselves.
–Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of
the Presidents
Democracy in America is a mirage…
Just like a mirage shimmering on the horizon of a hot, dry desert promises the
relief of cool waters, democracy in America extends the hope of sovereignty, liberty, and
equality; empowering the people to embrace life and pursue happiness through self-rule:


A mirage provides direction and structures action, but it never fulfills
expectations.



A mirage is unsatisfying in that while it “appears real or possible”1 it is
merely an illusion.



A mirage ends in disillusionment.

And yet an actual pool of cool water does revive a weary and thirsty traveler just as the
authentic “object” of democracy empowers, enlightens, transforms, and activates a
citizenry to embody a way of life that “materialize[s]” the “creation of … human
being[s]” who “exists and lives in and through the unity of … the love and ‘practice’ of
1

Oxford American Desk Dictionary and Thesaurus, 3rd ed., s.v. “Mirage.”
2

beauty, the love and ‘practice’ of wisdom, the care and responsibility for the common
good.”2 Behind the illusion of the mirage is the actuality of what it appears to be.
Democracy was a practice of the American people prior to the American
Revolution; a practice interrupted by the process of securing ratification of the
Constitution. During this interruption the Federalists, framers of the Constitution, excited
“a passion of jealousy in the People against themselves,”3 so that they became “dupes of
artful manoeuvres, & made for a moment to be willing instruments in forging chains for
themselves.”4 Bound by chains the people believed that they could not truly govern
themselves and accepted an argument John Adams articulated well in 1776 that “the first
necessary step” to govern an “extensive country” should be to “depute power from the
many to a few of the most wise and good.”5 Following the establishment of the Union the
people awoke from their jealousy to the ideas, ideals, and merits of democracy as if from
a deep slumber and “demophilia, the love of the demos,”6 –the people– reemerged on the
American political stage, driving alterations to Federal and State governance.

2

Cornelius Castoriadis, Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy: Essays in political
philosophy, ed. David Ames (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 123.
3

Plain Truth [pseud.], “On Democracy,” The Independent Chronicle, July18,

1803.
4

Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson: Writings (New York: Library of America,
1984), 1064.
5

John Adams, The Portable John Adams, ed. John Patrick Diggins (New York:
Penguin Books, 2004), 235.
6

Jeremy Engels, “Demophilia: A Discursive Counter to Demophilia in the Early
Republic,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 97, no. 2 (May 2011): 132.
3

Ever since, woven throughout the words of the Presidents, democracy and its
ideals have been employed symbolically to win and maintain the consent of the people.
With Thomas Jefferson begins a parade of presidential associations with democracy: “We
of the United States … are constitutionally and conscientiously democrats.”7 Over and
over again the presidents have inculcated in the people the belief, as John Quincy Adams
(1825-1829) stated in his inaugural address, that “our political creed is … that the will of
the people is the source and the happiness of the people, the end of all legitimate
government upon earth”;8 or as William Henry Harrison (1841) declared that because
“the broad foundation upon which our Constitution rests being the people – a breath of
theirs having made, as a breath can unmake, change, or modify it – it can be assigned to
none of the great divisions of government but to that of democracy”;9 or in the august
language of Abraham Lincoln (1861-1865), “government of the people, by the people,
for the people.”10

7

Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson: Writings, 1385.

8

John Quincy Adams, “Inaugural Address,” in A Compilation of the Messages
and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 2, ed. James Daniel Richardson (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1897), 862.
9

William Henry Harrison, Inaugural Address “Inaugural Address,” in A
Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 4, ed. James Daniel
Richardson (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1897), 1861.
10

Abraham Lincoln, “Facsimile – Lincoln’s Original Draft of Gettysburg
Address,” in A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 7, ed.
James Daniel Richardson (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of National Literature and Art,
1897), 3401.
4

Not only has the American government been continually portrayed as democratic,
even as “…the sample democracy of the world,”11 –Woodrow Wilson (1913-1921)– but
the values and ideals of democracy are said to be American as well. For “a great
democracy like ours,” claimed Theodore Roosevelt (1901-1909), “a democracy based
upon the principles of orderly liberty, can be perpetuated only if in the heart of ordinary
citizens there dwells a keen sense of righteousness, and justice.”12 The nation,
admonished Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933-1945), “continue[s] to offer” citizens “hope,
liberty and justice which have always prevailed in this great democracy of ours.”13
America is a nation in “search for freedom”14 –Jimmy Carter (1977-1981)– and which
Ronald Reagan (1981-1989) argued “champions peace that enshrines liberty, democratic
rights, and dignity for every individual.”15 While democracy, which John F. Kennedy
(1961-1963) said is founded upon “the right to fair representation and to have each vote
11

Woodrow Wilson, “Eighth Annual Address,” in A Compilation of the Messages
and Papers of the Presidents, vol. 27, ed. James Daniel Richardson (Washington, D.C.:
Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1897), 8883.
12

Theodore Roosevelt, “Proclamation 776 - Thanksgiving Day,” in The American
Presidency Project, eds. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? pid=72436&st=democracy&st1=#axzz1NDyjLU52 (accessed on
20 July, 2013).
13

Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Greeting to New Citizens,” in The American
Presidency Project, eds. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15953 (accessed on 20 July, 2013).
14

Jimmy Carter, “Address to the Nation on Energy and National Goals: ‘The
Malaise Speech’,” in The American Presidency Project, eds. John T. Woolley and
Gerhard Peters, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=32596 (accessed on 20 July,
2013).
15

Ronald Reagan, “Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State
of the Union,” in The American Presidency Project, eds. John T. Woolley and Gerhard
Peters, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38069 (accessed on 20 July, 2013).
5

count equally,”16 is perpetually posited to define and describe the American political
system, George W. Bush (2001-2009) claimed it is also essential for identification as a
citizen: “What makes us Americans is a shared belief in democracy and liberty.”17 The
American ideology of democracy is so well established and accepted that when Barrack
Obama (2009-present) claims that “power rests not with those of us in elected office, but
with the people we have the privilege to serve”18 American citizens believe that the claim
is justified. The long socio-historical legacy inculcated by Presidents, Federal and State
politicians, educators, and the common citizen confirms that America is rhetorically
constructed as a government that was originally framed and continues to embody
democratic ideals. And who could blame the American citizenry since ideologically
democracy is American, even if in American governance democracy is only a mirage.
The rich rhetoric of the Presidents provides a glimpse into the ideological links
that comprise the American articulation of democracy: The will of the people is
represented through elected officials, who derive their power from the people, in order to
ensure that citizens’ rights to liberty, justice, and equality as established in the
Constitution of the United States are protected. Left out of this conspectus of American

16

John F. Kennedy, “The President's News Conference,” in The American
Presidency Project, eds. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8573 (accessed on 20 July, 2013).
17

George Bush, “President Bush Delivers Commencement Address at Miami
Dade College,” in The White House: President George W. Bush, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/04/20070428-3.html (accessed on 20 July,
2013).
18

Barrak Obama, “Press Conference by the President,” in The White House:
President Barack Obama, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/11/03/pressconference-pre, (accessed on 20 July, 2013).
6

democratic ideology is an orientation rooted deeply in the revolutionary and the
Constitutional periods of American history that has strongly influenced the rhetoric of the
Presidents. Andrew Jackson (1829-1837), identified this orientation during his inaugural
address when he asserted that “our Government” is “worth defending” when “it secures
… the rights of person and of property.”19 One hundred and thirty four years later, while
addressing the Free University of Berlin, John F. Kennedy explicitly made the same
linkage when he stated: “economic well-being and democracy must go hand in hand.”20
Consequently, the ideal of protecting property or securing economic well-being is an
important characteristic of American governance.
Democracy is a not just an idea, it is a composite of ideas, sentiments, values,
material practices, institutions, and artifacts. Democracy is an ideology and the
ideological rhetoric of democracy calls forth for a certain structuring of individual and
collective life. As an ideology, democracy is constitutive of individual identities, subject
positions, practices, institutions, and even life pursuits. The rhetoric of democracy veils
the nature of governance in America, convincing the people that in America it is they
who self-govern: obviously this is an assertion fraught with strong implications for how
the American citizenry can engage the system of governance through which society is
ruled. While it is important to make this assertion clear to position the foundational
perspective related to what is to follow, in order to problematize democracy in America it
19

Andrew Jackson, “Inaugural Address,” in The American Presidency Project,
eds. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=
25810 (accessed on 20 July, 2013).
20

John F. Kennedy, “Address at the Free University of Berlin,” in The American
Presidency Project, eds. John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=9310 (accessed on 20 July, 2013).
7

is not necessary to hold that it is a mirage or even a veil that is productive of the power of
the few over the many. For the fact that democracy is perceived as being “thin”21 and is
experienced by the citizenry as inauthentic provides sufficient grounds from which to
launch an inquiry into democracy and American governance.
Authentic Democracy and Democratic Inauthenticity: A Sketch
Under every view of the subject, it seems indispensable that the Mass of Citizens
should not be without a voice, in making the laws which they are to obey.
–James Madison, The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention
Debates
Today democracy is plagued by a crisis of meaning. Even understanding why
democracy is experienced as inauthentic is an exercise in near futility due to the many
various forms of governments that have claimed it as a label to legitimize their right to
rule. In the current climate in which democracy has lost its coherence by becoming
“wonderfully elastic”;22 to understand it when it has come to mean anything, as noted by
Robert Dahl, “yet a term that means anything means nothing. And so it has become with
‘democracy,’ which nowadays is not so much a term of restricted and specific meaning as
a vague endorsement of a popular idea”23 it is necessary to briefly define authentic
democracy to understand why people, even though, as Susan Pharr, Robert Putnam and
21

Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 132.
22

Ellen Meiksin Wood, “Democracy: An idea of ambiguous ancestry,” in
Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy, eds. J. Peter
Euben, John R. Wallach, and Josiah Ober (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 66.
23

Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press,

1989), 2.
8

Russell Dalton claim, their belief in its values and aspirations is “higher than ever,”24 are
experiencing it as inauthentic.
Authenticity, according to Martin Heidegger, is to “take hold of [one’s self] in its
own way”;25 or in other words, to live the truth of one’s essential being, which includes
realizing the possibilities of one’s potentialities.26 Translating and applying Heidegger’s
idea of authentic being to an authentic experience of democracy would dictate that
democratic governance needs to actualize an experience of its essential ideological
implications. When actualities violate these constitutive and generative implications,
those living under the ideology experience dissonance and relate to the experience of the
ideology as inauthentic. Fundamentally democracy involves rhetoric as the primary
means for engaging with other citizens in consideration of how to self-rule (democratic
rhetoric) and necessitates institutional spaces in which the people enact rhetorically their
democratic power (rhetorical democracy). Democratic rhetoric historically flourished
first, more than two and a half millennia ago upon the shores of the Aegean Sea in the
rhetorical democracy of ancient Athens. Consequently, as democratic governance moves
away from the Athenian ideal –direct democracy– the people are not able to know if (1)
their will will frame the collectively binding decision-making agenda, (2) that their will is

24

Susan J. Pharr, Robert D. Putnam, and Russell J. Dalton, “Trouble in the
Advanced Democracies? A Quarter-Century of Declining Confidence,” Journal of
Democracy 11, no. 2 (April 2000): 9.
25

Martin Heidegger, Time and Being, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson (New York: HarperOne, 1962), 167.
26

Susan Zickmund, “Deliberation, Phronesis, and Authenticity: Heidegger’s
Early Conception of Rhetoric,” Philosophy and Rhetoric 40, no. 4 (December 2007):
407-408.
9

considered in the decision-making process, and (3) that their will will be constitutive of
laws that will be enforced. This lack of knowledge, generative of a lack of faith in the
democratic process, undermines the very foundations that legitimizes democratic rule.
Without this knowledge and faith the perception and experience of democracy as
inauthentic flourishes and the citizenry withdraws their commitment to the system and
practice of governance. The authenticity deficit of the democratic process is a result of a
power deficit of the people; due to their functional exclusion from the ongoing
collectively binding decision-making process. This power deficit is justified through a
lack of faith in the capacities of the people, which has led to a system of governance that
constrains the participation and power of the people to ensure the means of governance
avoids certain ends.
Democracy “at its core,” claims John Gastil, has not shifted from what it meant
for its first practitioners, the ancient Athenians, “self-rule, rule by all.”27 As a revered
word and political system for many in the world today, especially for those who believe
that its principles have been reified in their governing practices, not only does democracy
“promise that those who call upon the law and those whom the law calls upon are also its
authors” but it additionally, Darrin Hicks argues, “refers to a particular institutional
arrangement for making binding political decisions.”28 While democracy’s conceptual
core is the people’s ability and right to self-rule, it has fostered an ideology representative
of a web of related ideals, beliefs, values, practices and institutions. Certainly the
27

John Gastil, Political Communication and Deliberation (Los Angeles: Sage
Publication, 2008), 5.
28

Darrin Hicks, “The Promise(s) of Deliberative Democracy,” Rhetoric & Public
Affairs 5, no. 2 (June 2002): 229.
10

tradition of democracy, as Samuel Freeman states, assumes that its citizens are not only
free, equal, self-governing and “subject only to laws that they have accepted,” but that
society’s common good is pursued through public debate that opens the collectively
binding decision-making process to public scrutiny and criticism.29 Robert Dahl argues
that democracy exhibits characteristics that enables the citizenry, inclusive of society’s
adult members, means for “effective participation … voting equality … control of the
agenda” and produces within them an “enlightened understanding” of societal issues.30
Embedding these traditional concepts and distinguishing characteristics into the structure
of a governing apparatus certainly is necessary for democratic governance and yet they
are not sufficient for enlivening government to be democratic if the people are not
empowered, as engaged participants, for self-rule. Democracy is conceptually and
experientially inauthentic when a people are functionally without the power to self-rule;
be the authors of the laws under which they live.
Democratic governance fundamentally entails an institutionalization of a free
people’s power through equal participation in the decision-making processes that result
in cooperative acts necessary to resolve public problems. This empowerment is at the
heart of that which is denied the people through the institutional arrangements of
contemporary systems of democratic governance. Chantal Mouffe makes this point when
she claims that “the dominant tendency” for “envisaging democracy” today considers

29

Samuel Freeman, Deliberative Democracy: A sympathetic comment,
Philosophy & Public Affairs 29, no. 4 (October 2000): 417.
30

Robert A Dahl, On Democracy, 37-38.
11

“popular sovereignty … to be obsolete”31 even though without it a government denies
that which is “central” to the “democratic imaginary.”32 The belief that “popular assent”33
is the qualitative equivalency to democratic self-rule instills a false sense of
empowerment in the people when their public institutions actually entail a process that
has less to do with the people ruling and more with whom shall rule over them.
Consequently, even though the people are the admitted source of political power it is
often forgotten that since they entrust their power to a select few –representatives– their
power and right to self-rule has been delegated to those they have authorized to govern in
their place.
In consideration of this question about democratic inauthenticity Sheldon Wolin
points to the affects of institutionalization. He argues that what “mark[s] the attenuation
of democracy” is the moment when governance “become[s] specialized, regularized, and
administrative in character and quality.”34 Institutionalization embeds “routinization,
professionalization, and the loss of spontaneity”35 and therefore it “depends on the
ritualization of the behavior of both rulers and ruled to enable the formal functions of the
31

Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), 3-4.

32

Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, 4.

33

Stephen Macedo, Democracy at Risk: How political choices undermine citizen
participation and what we can do about it (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution
Press, 2005), 13.
34

Sheldon S. Wolin, “Fugitive Democracy,” in Democracy and Difference:
Contesting the Boundaries of the Political, ed. Seyla Benhabib (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996), 39.
35

Sheldon S. Wolin, “Norm and Form: The Constitutionalizing of Democracy,”
in Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy, eds. J. P.
Euben, John R. Wallach, and Josiah Ober (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 36.
12

state … to be conducted on a continuing basis.”36 The problem with his argument is that
it is not that institutionalization concretizes certain ritualized behaviors as much as it is
the behaviors that the current manifestations of democracy institutionalize. In spite of this
concern, the insights of Wolin are productive regarding the institutional arrangements of
representative democracy in two ways. First, to be successful within a field heavily
dominated by routine an individual has to master its ins and outs and in doing so systemic
innovation has to be suppressed. Allowing innovation to flourish introduces
unfamiliarity, dislodges the routine and thereby diminishes the power and position
attained by those who have acquired superior system knowledge and skills. Second, as
the institutions of representative democracy have become more administrative and
professionalized, collectively binding decision-making migrates from the local context
and the “vagaries of local preferences” where substantial differences can emerge across
the national landscape to centralized spaces so that, as Michael Sandel argues, the
collectively binding decisions are made effective for all of those ruled.37 When this
happens the people, typically distant from the decision-making process in both place and
power, experience a “sense of powerlessness” as they are left outside of the political
process.38 In other words, contemporary democratic governance privileges individual
citizens who have knowledge of and power within a government that is fundamentally
and functionally set apart from the people. As such, attempts by the people to assert their

36

Wolin, Norm and Form, 36.

37

Michael J. Sandel, “The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self,”
Political Theory 12, no. 1 (February 1984): 94.
38
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power and right to self-rule is filtered through a form of democratic governance that is
institutionally aligned to mitigate their ability to rule. Therefore, due to the seductive
influence of institutional power, even when the people are desirous of significant change
in the political realm, the status quo is perpetuated by the political elite. When the status
quo is maintained it demonstrates the power of the institutional elites and impotency of
the people’s power for actual self-governance.
The ideology of governance that drives representative democracies and its
institutions is one that results in either the people not being the authors of or not
participating in authoring society’s laws. Referring to nations that exhibit the current
institutional arrangements commonly associated with democracy, Iris Marion Young
contends that they are “for the most part only thinly democratic.”39 In representative
forms of democratic governance the power of the people has been restricted to their
occasional acts of voting. As Hannah Arendt argues, “the old adage, ‘All power resides in
the people,’ is true only for the day of election.”40 Yet, even this claim is misleading as
the power of the people’s vote is limited within the governing apparatuses of
representative democracy. At one level the infrequency of this political expression and its
ineffectualness for producing both desired collectively binding decisions and systemic
changes serves to convince the people that their votes typically only alters political actors
instead of the political acts those actors repeatedly (re)produce. These recurrent results
lead the people to withdraw from the public realm, since, as Morris Rosenberg has

39

Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 5.
40

Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin Books, 1963), 240.
14

shown, “people tend to be motivated to action only if they feel that this action leads to the
desired goal.”41 If the desired goal is viewed as unlikely, then “the individual feels that
even if he were active, the political results he desires would probably not come to pass”
and “there is consequently no point in doing anything.”42 Therefore Benjamin Barber’s
claim that the people “are apathetic because they are powerless, not powerless because
they are apathetic”43 becomes a powerful indictment of the current means of American
democratic governance.
The institutions of governance in representative democracies constrain, if not
effectively eradicate, the spaces in which the people can meaningfully participate in the
public realm where collectively binding decision-making transpires. Arendt claims that
through the Constitution the people were “given all power” even though “there was no
space established for them” to be “citizens.”44 Relegated to occasional acts of simply
casting votes “citizens,” as Young states, “never need to leave their own private and
parochial pursuits and recognize their fellows in a public setting to address one another
about their collective.”45 In this political arrangement, Arendt posits that, citizens can be
citizens without “an opportunity to engage in those activities of ‘expressing, discussing
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and deciding’ which in a positive sense are the activities of freedom.”46 Instead of having
to rhetorically engage in deliberate forums, over a public problem with those likeminded
or not, a citizen can simply vote, “regardless of how ignorant or selfish [s/he] may be in
casting [his or her] ballots in the privacy of the ballot box.”47 Without a space in which
the people collectively decide what cooperative act(s) will lead to the common good,
following Carroll Arnold insights, the citizenry does not have to “stand with”48 their
“symbolic acts” and thereby risk their community standing by:
declar[ing], clarify[ing], obscur[ing], or otherwise signal[ing] to those who see
and/or hear, [their] intelligence, … intentions toward those to whom [they are]
relating … integrity …capacity to relate … to others, … or … want of these.49
Certainly people speak their opinions, but typically they speak into forums in which their
words have little or no meaning. Speaking past each other they do not have to respond to
the content of what anyone else has said because the impetus to have to actually engage
others through a democratic rhetoric is nonexistent.
In the end, the people have no reason to either listen to or learn about how their
proposed solutions will impact the lives of fellow societal members. In other words, the
secrecy of the voting booth deprives the people of the opportunity to and necessity of
troubling their own personal preferences by considering the preferences of others through
a direct, embodied and empowered contestation of their ideas. Their opinions and
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arguments, supportive of their preferences, need not be tested nor refined for they have
neither the space where their words and reputations are risked through meaningful
deliberation with oppositional voices nor the space where their power is personal,
immediate and effective. Lacking such a space to enact their power for self-rule –to
discuss/debate, decide and do– the people withdraw from the process of self-governance.
Democracy in principle and practice, must afford the people, the citizenry of
society, an institutionalized agonal space in which they can participate in the “political
struggles”50 of society. For citizens to be motivated to act in the democratic process their
voices must “have authoritative standing” so that, as Mark Warren contends, they can
“speak on behalf of their own experiences and interests” and offer “responses to the
cognitive content of claims, challenges, and arguments of others.”51 In other words, for
decision-making processes that intend collectively binding decisions to be perceived as
fair and authentic the voice of those affected by the decisions must be, not only heard, but
viewed as having an equal influence on the process. Robert Folger and his associates
have referred to this phenomenon as the voice effect.52 According to Folger and his
colleagues, the opportunity to express one’s voice is advantageous for a couple of
reasons. On one hand, when people are able to communicate their experiences,
knowledge, thoughts, and opinions –voice– into a decision-making process the procedure
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and resulting decision are more likely to be superior to decisions arrived at through a
process that does not allow for participant contributions.53 The decision-making process
consequently, is enhanced through an increase of information that is brought to bear upon
the decision. In addition, by having a voice in the process the procedure is judged to be
fairer by a participant since s/he “at least has a chance to defend his/her position and
present his/her side of the issue.”54 Thus, when individuals have the opportunity to speak
into and have equal influence on a decision-making process they typically deem that
process and its outcomes to be more legitimate.
The ability to have a voice in the decision-making process has even further
reaching consequences. Not only does the voice effect relate to the perception that
decision-making outcomes are fairer, in that participants “believe that voice will help
them control … outcomes,” but, Allan Lind, Ruth Kaufer and Christopher Earley argue,
it also stimulates the view that they “are valued, full-fledged members of the group
enacting the procedure.”55 In other words, as Darrin Hicks and his associates found, the
voice effect positively impacts a participant’s perspective of the process, arrived at
outcomes –or “structural conditions”– and how s/he experiences the process –or
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“relational judgments.”56 This in turn has positive effects on participation –individuals
are more apt to contribute to the process57– and the implementation of the decision.58
While the voice effect leads to positive fairness judgments regarding the decisionmaking processes and outcomes the inverse has also been shown to be true. There is an
interrelationship between “deficits in … structural conditions” and “negative relational
judgments”59 in that when participants perceive that either is true the other is held as well.
When this occurs people are denied their voice in a decision-making process, which leads
the participants to “perceive the process as [being] unfair.”60 For instance, Hicks and his
colleagues found that individuals, who believe that their participation in a decisionmaking process is being exploited through manipulation by those in authority or
influential positions, are liable to withdraw from the process.61
Democratic inauthenticity exhibits a pattern wherein the citizenry, denied a space
for rhetorical engagement, is not able to embody their power for self-rule through voicing
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their positions equally and effectively within the democratic decision-making process.
The people, who have the right to produce collectively binding agreements that lead to
cooperative actions they are ultimately responsible for, need spaces within the political
sphere to interact, decide and act with their equals. Through ideological implications,
productive of systemic, procedural limitations embedded into the heart of representative
democracy, the positive consequences of voice effects are diminished and/or lost.
Deficient of meaningful spaces for the people to actually embody citizenship and their
power to self-rule, the democratic process is judged to be unfair, which in turn facilitates
the people’s withdrawal from the very spaces that afford them with limited opportunities
to speak into governance. When citizens believe that their voice is denied or has limited
affects, they abandon the democratic process, which results in democracy losing its
legitimacy –authenticity– as a means of governance.
To reinvigorate democracy, governance needs to provide citizens with
opportunities for direct participation within the collectively binding decision-making
process. To do so, the institutions of governance need to incorporate spaces where,
harkening back to democracy’s conceptual core of self-rule, the people can actually
engage with one another to formulate solutions to public problems that are then
implemented for the good of their communities. By looking back to the ancient
Athenians, it is possible to imagine the imperative institutional frameworks necessary to
deepen and make more authentic the democratic experience. Athenian democracy,
referred to today as a direct democracy, while considered to be the birthplace of
democratic ideology and governance, has not and is not considered as a feasible model
for governance. As such, numerous scholars and political actors, past and current, have
20

directed a number of potent criticisms toward direct democracy. Before proceeding to
arguments for the necessity of democratic rhetoric, institutionalized in rhetorical
democracy, that provides spaces for direct, collective decision-making these critiques
must be addressed.
Critiquing the Critiques of Direct Democracy
Democracy that calls for the direct participation of the citizenry, like that found in
ancient Athens, has suffered a number of criticisms about its functional and ethical
practicability. Thomas Paine noted that “as … democracies increased in population, and
the territory extended, the simple democratical form became unwieldy and
impracticable.”62 Contemporary criticisms of direct democracy still acknowledge these
functional disadvantages and have added a number of others. Two further functional
concerns holding direct democracy as untenable involve time costs and a lack of
sufficient infrastructure. Time costs posit that the duration needed to conduct an assembly
–gathering of citizens to make collectively binding decisions– is too demanding for
contemporary, modern societies.63 The infrastructure concern, building from Paine’s
argument, claims that due to large populations and high urban density it is not feasible to
provide the necessary functional space to allow all to participate in a face-to-face
context.64 These practical concerns led Young to claim: “Democratic politics must
respond to this scale, and thus must involve millions of people related to one another
62
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through democratic institutions.”65 The ethical critiques claim that time costs could
impinge upon a citizens’ freedom to be a nonparticipant;66 that direct democratic
procedures and participation favor extroverts over introverts;67 that citizenship in
previous direct democracies were narrowly exclusive68 and that their homologous societal
composition is not translatable to today’s heterogeneous society;69 and that direct
democratic processes might produce faulty collectively binding agreements, built upon
poor justifications.70
Pushing Beyond Limitations of Nature and Structure
It is the opinion of the greatest writers, that a very extensive country cannot be
governed on democratical principles.
–Centinel, The Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates
While full answers to a number of these critiques will emerge throughout the
development of the arguments for democratic rhetoric and rhetorical democracy, initial
responses are warranted. Creative institutional programming and design has the
potentiality to rectify population, scope and infrastructure limitations. To pare away the
functional concern related to time cost and its ethical correlative requires a two part
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answer. Functionally time is finite and thus one’s various pursuits present a person with
competing life concerns. Ethically the time commitment necessary for participation in an
assembly could interfere with the earning, production, and distribution potential of
participants.71 Functionally, the effects of time costs can be mitigated by distributing
participation across the spectrum of the citizenry, which would equalize its effects on the
private potential of societal members as well as the democratic benefits. Regarding the
ethical concern it should be noted that it rests upon a particular notion of citizenship that
essentially constricts equality to the private realm and includes a freedom from politics.72
An alternative perspective that shatters this divide that privileges the few over the many
holds that to be a citizen is implicative of empowered participation within the collectively
binding decision-making process. In this view, citizenship obligates its members to
actively engage in the democratic process. Being empowered to act –to have ownership
of their own self-rule– citizens are responsible for their public and collective wellbeing.
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Being too Fearful to Rule
Courage … does not gratify our individual sense of vitality but is demanded of us
by the very nature of the public realm. …Courage liberates men from their worry
about life for the freedom of the world.73
–Hannah Arendt, The Portable Hannah Arendt
In a direct democracy it is certainly true, as Majid Behrouzi contends, that public
communication apprehension or even introversion “could have disempowering and
alienating effects”74 and yet this perspective offers a narrow view on the opportunities
afforded one by direct participation in the democratic process. The value of participation
is not limited to the possibility of a personal public address, as it also empowers citizens
to learn, listen and influence familiar others. For instance, by being an engaged citizen,
empowered to participate in collectively binding decision-making processes, individuals
at the minimum benefit from the experience of direct democracy by: (1) the learning that
occurs through exposure to expert knowledge throughout the preparation and deliberation
phases; (2) the listening skills they develop as they process the arguments presented for
or against a proposed policy during the deliberative phase, which in turn enlarges the
participants understanding of the issue and the lived experiences of others; and (3) the
possibility for improved influential engagements with familiar others before and after
participating in an assembly, as being participants better equips these citizens to support
their positions persuasively through the focused learning they glean from the expert
knowledge made available and experiential understanding gained through their direct
73

Arendt, The Portable Hannah Arendt, 448.

74

Behrouzi, Democracy as the Political Empowerment of the Citizen, 158.
24

participation. In addition, throughout the process an introvert can discuss the subject they
are to assist in deciding with those others with whom they are comfortable.
To act in the public realm politically, no matter one’s level of communication
apprehension involves the virtue of courage. Being empowered to engage in collectively
binding decision-making processes that will affect the good of one’s community, which
“existed before us and is meant to outlast our lives in it,” requires “by the very nature of
the public realm,” according the Arendt, a citizen who pushes through one’s personal fear
and worry.75 For individuals who experience elevated apprehension through their
participation as a citizen their engagement requires an act of courage. Courage is also
needed for an extrovert to appear before one’s community to publically propose a
solution to a public problem, which exposes him or her to “the widest possible
publicity”76 and consequently means that s/he risks his or her own reputation in speaking.
With “the world at stake,”77 the cost of citizenship in democracy obliges citizens, those
affected by public decisions that lead to public acts which respond to public problems, to
fulfill their duty and roles by contributing the knowledge they have gained through their
lived experiences. Acting in an assembly requires all types of individuals who can enact
differing roles and ultimately strengthen the decision-making process through their own
unique life experiences and learning. As a consequence, both introverts and extroverts are
necessary and significant for arriving at collective decisions most likely to lead to a
satisfactory end. By making the process meaningful through providing institutional space
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for all citizens, introverts and extroverts, to enact their power to self-rule through one
participatory means or another, will only serve to strengthen, not only the democratic
experience and governance, but also each community member’s courage to be and act as
citizens.
Difference Necessitates a Place for Public Appearance
When you are with Athenians, it’s easy to praise Athenians, but not when you are
with Lacedaemonians.
–Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives
The ethical critique concerning exclusion centers on the constricted scope of
citizenship found in direct democracies like ancient Athens. A simple response is that
while contemporary democracies “are more generous and respectful”78 when judged
according to contemporary values of inclusivity, this argument is “counterproductive” as
a means to invalidate the benefits of direct democracy79 since the very American
constitutional securities honored by most and “fundamental to modern democracy,” as
Josiah Ober argues, would suffer under this critique as they too were composed prior to
the “abolition of slavery and women’s suffrage.”80 Robert Dahl notes, “only two
‘democratic’ countries – New Zealand and Australia – had extended the suffrage to
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woman in national elections before the 1920s.” 81 The value of full inclusivity, which still
allows for limited exclusions, has been a very recent political development.82 As such,
exclusions to citizenships, from Athens to America, are based on societal and political
norms that are generative of determinations for the legal statuses that define a citizen.
How narrow or broad citizenship is constructed then is not predicated on the system of
governance, but on the societal values that drive its framing.
The more potentially potent argument, derived from the exclusivity of Athenian
direct democracy, is that by restricting who is empowered to participate in governance its
decisional space is made more agonal due to its homogeneity and therefore making it less
functional for a heterogeneous society. In an agonal political arena, homologous citizens,
sharing similar “morals,” aspire to “excellence” as they appear among “peers” to
“compet[e] for recognition, precedence and acclaim.”83 In the “essentially porous” and
plural nature of today’s political context the “public space”84 seems to be more
heterogeneous then the public space in which the direct democracies of the past thrived.
In a heterogeneous political context, instead of seeking excellence, actors pursue victory
for their private interests or the consolidation of their support base.
Consideration of Athens’ homogeneity is based on their cultural similarity, which
served as a common ground for facilitating the formulation of satisfying solutions to
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address public problems. While Athens did exclude “the majority of the population –
women, slaves, and resident aliens,” it could not really be classified as homologous –
sharing similar characteristics, perspectives, and principles– as its public space for
political decision-making was accepting and productive of difference. For instance,
Athens incorporated difference through the varied economic standing of its actual
participators. This means that the property exclusion that largely defined American
criteria for citizenship at its founding, which was thought to ensure the values influential
within the collectively binding decision-making process, were non-existent.85 Plato gives
a glimpse into the diversity of the Athenian Assembly, writing that “a builder or equally
well a blacksmith or a shoemaker, merchant or ship owner, rich or poor, of good family
or none”86 all participated in addressing their fellow citizens and in deciding solutions to
public problems. Each standpoint, representative of differing societal groups, as will be
argued later, is productive of distinct perspectives. Athenians believed that all citizens, no
matter their means of livelihood were “competent to make political judgments.”87
Considering the previous response alongside the fact that ten percent or more of the
Athenian population88 was empowered as citizens who could truly influence the agendasetting, policy making and administration of the polity and that an assembly generally
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contained upwards of six thousand plus decision-makers for each round of collectively
binding decisions made89 the homogeneity argument loses much of its strength.90
Heterogeneity, even more than homogeneity, necessitates the “‘associational’”
space afforded by democracy so that the citizenry can congregate publically with their
differences to participate in a way productive of power, freedom and transformation.91
The problem is that one space, considered to be predominately similar, is where
difference is allowed to flourish and made productive through engaged participation and
the other space features difference that drives a perceived need to secure public, political
decision-making from the possible volatility of the citizenry, arising from their
conflicting private interests. “All human activities,” Arendt reminds, “are conditioned by
the fact that men live together”92 and yet when a citizenry is allowed to develop public
opinions in private, within their private circles, there is a tendency for them to only bring
their private “moods”93 or interests to bear on public problems. By “ventur[ing] into the
public realm,” that the engaged participation of direct democracy provides, “one exposes
oneself to the light of the public.”94 In such an arena, the pressure of public exposure
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pushes one to justify his or her private interests. John Stuart Mill argues that “the
participation of the private citizen … in public functions” moves one
to weigh interest not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by
another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and
maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good.95
When a citizen transitions out of the private realm into the public realm to present his or
her claims, s/he “is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever is for their
benefit to be for his benefit.”96 An environment that fosters ongoing “active exposure to
public forms of deliberation” in which one’s reputation is risked, Niewenburg claims,
“may sustain a sincere concern for the common good.”97 Individuals who have to appear
in public, with other citizens, to deliberate over common public concerns, are motivated
to transform their appeals supporting their proposals from private interests into public
ones to which the public will respond.
Such a political space can only be found in democratic institutions inclusive of a
citizenry who are equally empowered and free to fully act in the creation of public
policies. Building from Arendt’s contention that, “freedom always implies freedom of
dissent,”98 it could be proposed that a political space that values freedom is also a space
that is productive of substantial political difference. One only has to peruse the debates
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that transpired in the Athenian Assembly over the course of its history to appreciate its
lack of homogeneity during its deliberations and its accommodation of difference.
Democracies whose citizens are not empowered to act upon public problems within a
public decisional space are the ones in which its constituents typically “have… lost much
of their power”99 and suffer a deficit of participation. Consequently, a porous and plural
democracy needs, not only an associational arena, but also an agonal one where the
democratic practice of an empowered, inclusive citizenry actualizes freedom through
their pursuit of common goods, mutuality, and provisional collectively binding decisions.
Democratic Dangers: Athenian Judgment Nearly Gone Awry
Give people some significant power and they will quickly appreciate the need for
knowledge, but foist knowledge on them without giving them responsibility and
they will display only indifference.
–Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age
An initial reply to the concern regarding poor decisions and justifications
acknowledges that history is replete with governments of all dispositions and forms
making unjust decisions based on faulty reasoning. A more productive response, counters
the reasoning the critique is based on. Opponents of direct democracy argue that citizens
should submit to a protective guardianship of individuals who have superior deliberative
capacities and knowledge even though such a political arrangement voids the people’s
individual equality, liberty and power. In addition to depriving the people of their
inalienable rights for self-rule, this argument does not fully appreciate the value of
situated reasoning and judgment required in the decisional process that governance
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entails. Instead it contends that since the decisions made through public deliberations
based on a lack of or low quality knowledge and resulting in those decisions likely being
judged as being unjust, governance should be relegated to those citizens deemed to have
superior knowledge. A rebuttal of this critique begins with an examination of a particular
instance found in the history of Athens’ Assembly.
During the Peloponnesian War between the Spartans and Athenians, a dire
judgment was arrived at by the Athenians concerning a rogue ally. The story originates
with a sentence of death; a sentence that had to be a heavy weight to carry. It had to be
even more so since the messengers had to row a warship, or trireme, one hundred and
eighty-five miles to deliver the orders100. After the Athenians suppressed the elite led
Mytilenaean rebellion on the island of Lebos the citizens of Athens assembled to decide
the fate of the rebels. With “6,000 to 7,000 voters crammed onto the rocky Pynx”101 the
Athenians decided “in their state of anger” to kill “every adult male …and to enslave the
children and women”102 of Mytilene. Once the decision was arrived at the trireme was
launched to deliver the verdict.
Thucydides’ account of these events does not end there, as the very next day the
Athenians hesitated in their decision. Once the popular sentiment of the people was
known, another Assembly was held in which their previous collectively binding decision
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was debated. In the end the Athenians, listening to the arguments of Diodotus, decided to
rescind the previous day’s verdict and order, mandating that the general populace of
Mytilene was to be spared.103 Rowing day and night, rotating their eating and sleeping
along the way, a second Athenian trireme arrived at Mytilene just in time to avert “the
slaughter.”104 The initial decision is the very type of unjust outcome, arrived at through a
knowledge deficit, that demonstrates the concerns opponents raise to dismiss the self-rule
of the people. The answer to the critique though is also found, in part, here as well.
During his speech, Diodotus, argued:
I have no criticism of those who have proposed a review of our decision about the
Mytilenaens, and no sympathy with those who object to multiple debates on
issues of major importance. … Anyone who contends that words should not be
the school of action is either a fool or an interested party – a fool, if he thinks
there can be any other way of elucidating a future which is not self-evident.105
In this portion of his speech he defends the people’s prudence in calling for a second
Assembly to revisit the previous day’s decision. His opposition, voiced by Cleon,
desirous of the execution order being carried out, attempted first to challenge the wisdom
of even meeting again. Out of Diodotus’ rebuttal to this opposition emerged three means
for responding to the current critique that the people are not knowledgeable enough to
rule. In his words they are:
1.

elucidating a future which is not self-evident

2.

multiple debates on issues

3.

proposed … review of … [a] decision
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or in contemporary terms
1.

decision-makers need superior knowledge to account for the contingency
of the future

2.

collectively binding decisions are provisional

3.

decisions are subjected to oversight by an umpire body

The fact is that every system of governance has to demonstrate that the knowledge it
draws from is sufficient for making just and effective or satisfactory decisions. It is only
in direct democracy that the citizenry actually provides the knowledge that guides
decisions about what will best serve their own collective interests and common good. It is
also, in part, through superior knowledge known and constituted by the people that their
right to govern themselves is justified.
The People as a Repository of Superior Knowledge
For the many, of whom each individual is but an ordinary person, when they meet
together may very likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually
but collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is better than a dinner
provided out of a single purse.
–Aristotle, Politics
While governance involves the execution of collectively binding decisions and a
process for determining whether or not those decisions are just, its central function is
found in deliberation and legislation of collective actions that end in societal goods. As
the ancient Athenians knew, the legislation leading to cooperative acts is not grounded in
certainty, but probability, since human knowledge is unable to guarantee future
outcomes. The best that the citizenry can hope to obtain through its collectively binding
decision-making process are judgments, productive of decisions that adhere to a morality
of justice and result in the desired ends. In spite of its inadequacy, it is knowledge that
34

provides the resources upon which the decision-making process of governance is
dependent. To possess superior knowledge would allow one to account for the widest
range of variables impinging upon a public problem in order to guide the decisionmaking process to a policy that would most likely produce a just and satisfactory
collectively binding decision. Consequently, a claim emerges that those citizens endowed
with superior knowledge should be afforded an authoritative position within the creation
of collectively binding decisions; a claim to which democracy responds with the
collected, distributive knowledge of the people.
The debate between Cleon and Diodotus provides a historical reference, from
which to judge if it is possible for a people, as citizens, to meet the knowledge
requirements for governing well. Gathered together, the Athenians made a judgment, not
about the guilt of the Mylitenes, for that was confirmed through the act of rebellion, but
about what course of action they should take in response to best secure their continuing
preeminence and ability to rule over their empire. After the decision was initially made,
the resolve of their anger faded and they were faced with a decision that had not
adequately weighed possible future consequences resulting from such ill-treatment of an
ally lead into revolt by a few. In effect, they awoke to the realization and concern that, as
Benjamin Barber claims, collectively binding decisions address “those realms where truth
is not – or is not yet – known”106 in that they had not deliberated sufficiently to project
how this public action would be interpreted across their empire. Their deliberations then
needed to evaluate not only their own State’s instrumental capabilities but also which
means would most likely result in a desirable end, productive of their common good. The
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quality of their reasoning together and their judgments depended upon their knowledge of
both their means and what the citizenry would accept as a satisfactory end. It is this need
for knowledge necessary for arriving at just political judgments that drives the antidemocratic concern and critique about whether or not the citizenry has the requisite
knowledge to make such judgments. Without this knowledge the self-rule of the people in
general cannot be justified.
The “anti-democratic” claim, that the one or few possess superior knowledge
“relevant to all spheres of activity which make up the larger political sphere of a society,”
fuels the critique that select individuals, acting as society’s guardians, are the only ones
who “should rule.”107 In support of this argument some advocates for a system of
governance other than democracy fashion their critique too strongly and thus open it up
to a simple response. For instance, when Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson argue that
a “direct assembly” might not produce the “best laws,” “public policies” or “deliberative
justifications”108 their contention is undeniable, simply because it is true that any
collectively binding decision-making body is susceptible to such errors. The question
really centers on if the people actually possess the political knowledge collectively
binding decision-making requires so that, as Thomas Cronin argues, “the quality of our
laws and constitutions … [do not] suffer.”109 Without knowing the necessary requisite
information, having focused attention and demonstrating a capacity to “understand [the]
107
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technical issues” involved, too many of the citizenry would “simply be confused”110 to
generate quality decisions.
In addressing this criticism, Michael Saward argues that the knowledge necessary
for producing quality collectively binding decisions “requires a mix” of superior
“knowledge of both means and ends”111 or what he refers to as contingent and noncontingent knowledge. When proposals to remedy a public problem are innovative,
before making a collectively binding decision the participants need to know if the
differing proposals can feasibly be attained. On the other hand proposals founded on
existing solutions can potentially lead to further decisions about the best means to bring
those proposals to fruition. In both cases, “contingent superior knowledge,” which
concerns the “technical means to a given end,”112 is necessary. In the instance of the
Athenian’s first ruling on the Mytilenaean insurrection the Assembly might have
requested deliberation about the best means to deliver the order, how to carry out the
execution order and who would sell the women and children and profit from the
transaction. Or perhaps, the trierarchs –captains– of several triremes might have been
called in, to provide the Assembly with the information needed for the citizens to make a
determination as to which ship and crew was most prepared and rested to undertake the
arduous task of speedily rowing to Mytilene in order to rescind the decree of execution
and slavery. As captains of their own ships their specific and specialized expertise could
inform the Athenian Assembly of the likely success or failure of the new decree reaching
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Mytilene in time. Consequently, an individual with contingent superior knowledge has
expertise in a particular field of specialization, affording its possessor a level of authority
to posit whether or not an end is achievable. Expertise, limited to a particular field, then
allows one to “only make limited claims”113 regarding “what is the most effective way to
realize [a] particular goal.”114 In other words, an individual with superior contingent
knowledge realistically can only authoritatively advise an assembly regarding the “limited
sphere of conduct” in which his or her “body of knowledge is appropriate.”115 Superior
knowledge that is contingent upon technical expertise then “is widely accepted and
acceptable” when restricted to “how to achieve a certain state of affairs that are given as
desirable,”116 but is not sufficient to wrest away from the people their power for self-rule.
Beyond the inadequacy that the limitations of specialization creates for superior
contingent knowledge, Kenneth Burke, notes that the motives of technical experts
provides an impediment to any claim that they could provide a primary basis for
collectively binding decisions.117 Concerned with how to accomplish a task an expert is
not motivated to consider how the accomplishment will be a “participant in a wider
contexts of motives.”118 The “morality” of a “technical expert requires only that he apply
himself to his task as effectively as possible” without regard as to “what the new force
113
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might mean, as released into a social texture emotionally and intellectually.”119 Even
when the affect on a particular social texture is considered, the depths of a technical
expert’s inquiry likely will extend only so far as to develop reasoning that justify the
endeavor. Still lacking would be an investigation into how the implications of a pursued
end would infiltrate and link to the lives and livelihood of others within society and
beyond. In other words, these experts seek to complete tasks without asking how the
outcome relates to and impacts societal members in general. So while collectively
binding decisions typically warrant inclusion of superior contingent knowledge for
ascertaining the means to an innovative end or the application of a previously employed
end to a new context it is not the primary knowledge necessary for governance.
In linking collectively binding decisions to the morality of motives Burke
provides a window into the knowledge upon which the decision-making process in
governance –the political arena of the public realm– fundamentally rests. Political
decisions, involve, as Mark Warren contends, “factual issues [that] are intermingled with
normative and expressive issues,”120 and therefore should be informed by contingent
knowledge, but ultimately are formed through what Saward calls non-contingent
knowledge. This knowledge, according to Benjamin Barber, flows out of a particular
“context of history and experience” that provides the ground from which decisions about
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“a future realm of common action”121 are made. Saward frames this knowledge as “a type
of moral knowledge” that identifies “the right end to pursue.”122 Morality is implicated in
public problems, for they pose public questions about what end has the greatest potential
to actualize the community good –what is the good for the community.
The debate between Diodotus and Cleon during the second Assembly, over the
fate of the Mytilenaeans, demonstrates the differing moral ground that formed their
respective opposing interests and arguments. Cleon, concerned that to change course
would “display a weakness which spells danger,” held that the true and good principles to
follow were of “domination based on force”123 and retributive justice based on
“vengeance.”124 Certainly Cleon shared Diodotus’ motivation to formulate a path that
resulted in “the good of [the] … city” being realized, but Diodotus desired to achieve the
Athenian’s “future security” through an “opposite conclusion” that maximized their
“practical advantage.”125 For Diodotus a policy that punished rebels, whether they
surrender early or late, with such a penalty would only strengthen the resolve of any
future revolutionaries. With no hope of mercy, they would “make thorough preparations”
and “hold out to the very last under siege.”126 In doing so, the Athenians’ financial
expenditures would increase due to the extended reclamation campaign, their victory
121

Barber, Strong Democracy, 169.

122

Saward, The Terms of Democracy, 26.

123

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 146.

124

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 149.

125

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 151.

126

Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, 152.
40

would return a vanquished and “ruined city” and as such they would “los[e] all
subsequent revenue from”127 future reparations and tribute its people would have
provided. Further, Diodotus argued that by judging the innocent –the common people–
the same as the guilty –the oligarchy– the Athenians would force common people to
wholeheartedly embrace elite led rebellions as their only hope for survival.128
Preservation of financial solvency and the utility of “tolerat[ing] injustice”129 to secure
future strategic ends provided the moral grounds upon which he built his arguments that
supported a reprieve for the common people of Mytilene. These “moral choices,”130
expressed through the judgments and arguments of Cleon and Diodutus, are reflective, as
well as productive, of their conflicting interests.
While a citizenry typically shares in a common cultural context their lived
experiences facilitate different shades of morality and interests “dependent upon [their]
social understandings” and “social interests.”131 These interests, Saward suggests, are
constituted and vary according to societal members’ “distinct sphere[s] of activity.”132
Each individual, never occupying just a single sphere, exhibiting “a bundle of
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overlapping and sometimes conflicting concerns,”133 put under the necessity of choice
negotiates his or her interlocking interests in order to judge which should be privileged in
the decision-making process. The importance and necessity of this insight is captured in
Montaigne’s aphorism that “the birth, increase, and augmentation of every thing, is the
alteration and corruption of another.”134 In other words, public decisions commit societal
resources and obligate its members to particular collective actions, directing those
resources and members away from their other interests and potentialities. A collectively
binding decision institutionalizes through choice, action and the application of
community resources certain interests, privileging and validating them over others. Those
interests passed over therefore are deemed less significant in the particular instance and
possibly for future public problems. Consequently, the knowledge required to make and
justify a collectively binding decision needs to account for the varied interests of
society’s distinct spheres, the individual processes that influence interest selection and
relevant technical expertise.
The finite knowledge of a person, even those with superior capacities, is not able
to sufficiently comprehend the breadth of perspectives encompassed by citizens to justify
ruling over or in place of the people. A single individual’s knowledge of the “world in its
full reality” is inadequate since “the world only shows and reveals itself” through a
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“standpoint” that “corresponds to” and “determine[s]” his or her “perspective.”135
Knowledge of the world, Arendt contends, begins with a recognition that it is:
something shared by many people, lies between them, separates and links them,
showing itself differently to each and comprehensible only to the extent that many
people can talk about it and exchange their opinions and perspectives with one
another, over against one another.136
The world as constituted and construed through the complexity of human spheres of
activities and individual standpoints then is a phenomenon that stands against the
capacity of an individual or a select few to know what a citizenry will deem as an
appropriate end that addresses even a particular public problem. As a result, without this
knowledge the rule of the one or the few cannot be justified. It is only the citizens,
collectively constituting the non-contingent knowledge of appropriate ends necessary to
judge between conflicting proposals for collectively binding decisions, deliberating
concurrently together, who are endowed with means to most effectively rule justly.137
Not only are the people, collectively deliberating, the only true source for superior
non-contingent knowledge, but it is through their empowered engagement in the
collectively binding decision-making process that the quality of contingent and noncontingent knowledge is enhanced. Regarding contingent knowledge, technical expertise
about advocated means is furthered when users can relate their experience with similar
previous endeavors or their perspectives on the functionality of innovative proposals.
Aristotle argued this point persuasively through three simple examples:
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the knowledge of the house is not limited to the builder only; the user … of the
house will even be a better judge than the builder, just as the pilot will judge
better of a rudder than the carpenter, and the guest will judge better of a feast than
the cook.138
To extend Aristotle’s insight through the contribution of Burke, previously noted, a
technical expert can become focused on making an innovation functional within the
narrow parameters of its operative design without considering its applicability once put
into play in a context that can include instruments, variables, or uses outside its posited
constraints. Citizens, who have to live through the means gestating the end and the end
once birthed, in democracy are empowered to convey to those with superior contingent
knowledge how, when, and where their means might suffer from an oversight or a lack of
contextual knowledge.
Both contingent and non-contingent knowledge are strengthened through the
empowered participation of the citizenry due to the flattening of the political power
hierarchy. In a democratic assembly individual citizens are equal peers in regards to their
rights, responsibilities and privileges. Warren argues that when an institutional design
employs a multilayered hierarchy in which greater power is held by those individuals in
privileged positions “the incentive for subordinates to use their information
strategically”139 is intensified. In equalizing the power relations between citizens,
democracy “encourage[s] cooperative relations” and “enhances flows of reliable
information.”140 With the advantage of withholding relevant information mitigated
decision-makers, confronted with a public problem, necessitating a public response
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through collective, cooperative behaviors will be more likely to make collectively
binding decisions that reflect the full extent of the collective knowledge existent within
the actual, affected community.
The non-contingent knowledge of the people, expressive of multiple perspectives
revealed through their “speaking with one another”141 strengthens the decision-making
process. At a practical level, the space of a democratic assembly in which participants are
allowed to freely express and exchange information, Warren states, “can serve” as a place
“to pool information, and pooled information should result in better decisions.”142 Even
more significant, Arendt argues, is that through addressing others over against one
another “the world ... emerge[s]”143 as individuals conceive of their embedded
experiences; thereby revealing, constituting and transforming their knowledge of a
particular context. By publicizing one’s knowledge and interests about a particular
problem, citizens who operate from a differing sphere of activity add to their
understanding of the world in general and the affects of a current or proposed collectively
binding decision. Additionally, if knowledge is authored in a past then and there to be
applied to a future then and there and that knowledge is not commonly known, it is
through the process of talking publically –turning focused attention on to an unattended
then and there– that calls forth the knowledge and transforms it into an attended to here
and now. In talking to others knowledge of the world does emerge for its participants and
as it emerges empowered citizens can (re)shape it through their communication and the
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collective acts that they sanction. Consequently, what is deemed an appropriate end to a
particular, public problem is not just known more thoroughly by the people; knowledge
about just and sufficient means and ends is generated through their coming together to
talk as empowered citizens.
The dynamic nature of collectively binding decisions that address public problems
through future cooperative acts are best informed by the knowledge of the people. Yet
even in a democracy that empowers the people as citizens for self-rule cannot draw upon
sufficient knowledge to guarantee future outcomes. As Thomas Jefferson claimed, the
people cannot “be all, and always, well informed.”144 To ensure the capacity of the
people to make good decisions and correct poor ones that led to negative outcomes
Jefferson argued that the people simply needed to be “inform[ed] of their discretion by
education.”145 The best means of educating the citizenry for any knowledge they lack
about a particular problem or concerning governance in general is best supplied through
actual participation in the decision-making process. For Jefferson there was no substitute
for actual engaged participation, as he noted that for himself “forty years of experience in
government [was] worth a century of book-reading.”146 Experience teaches participants
what they should and need to know, allowing them to focus their attention and concern
on areas that will yield productive results and while avoiding wasteful diversions. By
including the citizenry in the sphere of activity of self-rule, following Saward and Burke,
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their interests and motives will change to include a pursuit of knowledge relevant for
engaged participation as well. Benjamin Barber makes this claim, stating that
“knowledge and the quest for knowledge tend to follow rather than precede political
engagement.”147 Therefore the best way to educate the people, in matters even in which
their knowledge is lacking, is through their empowered and engaged participation in
actually making collectively binding decisions.
Without the public, political space necessitated by direct democracy there should
be no surprise in the people’s indifference and knowledge deficit. This claim is not new
or novel, for even Plato, a witness of the Athenian Assembly, argued that “the soul
acquires knowledge and is kept going and improved by learning and practice” and that
through “inactivity, dullness, and neglect of exercise, it learns nothing and forgets what it
has learned.”148 The ignorance of the people then is not a deficit that empowers the few to
wrest governance away from the people, but indicates a deficit by the government in the
discharge of its duties to ensure the public good.149 Governing society requires
knowledge of the means (contingent) and ends (non-contingent) to justly and
satisfactorily address public problems. This knowledge can be either acquired by the
people through consultation with those who have relevant, specialized expertise or is
constituted, secured and applied most thoroughly when the collected, distributive
knowledge (non-contingent) of the people emerges through a collectively binding
147
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decision-making process. When the people are empowered to self-rule they are motivated
to be well informed and when well informed, Jefferson argued, “they can be trusted with
their own government; that, whenever things get so far wrong as to attract their notice,
they may be relied on to set them to rights.”150 Consequently, it is the knowledge of the
people that is sufficient for self-rule and arguments that contend that the one or the few
have superior knowledge, which should elevate their authority within the governance of
society, are arguments that are ultimately meant to only maintain the rule of the one or
the few over the many.
The Impermanency of Democratic Decisions
Democracy is for the living, and the living are always democratically empowered
to change their founding democratic constitution.
–Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age
Another justification for direct democracy is that the collectively binding
decisions making process of an assembly that generates policies are or should be
considered provisional. Extolling the merits of democracy, Josiah Ober, pointed out that
“among democracy’s virtues is revisability – the potential of the political regime to
rethink and to reform itself.”151 For instance, due to the dynamic nature of political
contexts, a decision reached through deliberation that was justifiable at one point in time
might lose it backing in the future or might be deemed untenable and unjust once
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enacted.152 The story about Mytilene portrays this need well when the Athenians,
recognizing the weight of their previous decision, choose to revisit its value. Certainly,
the “aim” of an assembly’s deliberation rightly should be “a justifiable decision”; yet this
goal “does not presuppose that the decision … will in fact be justified.”153 In advocating
for deliberative democracy, Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, contend that
democratic decision-making should be revisable and consequently its moral principles
and political policies should be held as provisional.154
“Provisionality – openness to change over time –”155 is founded in reasoning that
entails two arguments about political policymaking. First, as was highlighted in the
response to the criticism about knowledge, political decision-making is imperfect in that
it addresses possibilities entangled with future exigencies. Also, due to the conflictual
nature of political decision-making most collectively binding decisions are not likely to
be consensual and therefore those citizens who advocate for an alternative policy will be
“more likely to accept [the ruling] if they believe they have a chance to reverse or modify
it in the future.”156 These two reasons for a provisional principle indicate that a
democracy should be both morally provisional in that its principles invite revision in
response to new or new interpretations of philosophical insights or empirical
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discoveries157 and politically provisional since its policies should be “open to actual
reconsideration and revision at a future time.”158 Diodotus assumed both of these claims
during his speech before the Athenian Assembly. In his response to Cleon, who
advocated for total annihilation claimed “that imperfect laws kept valid give greater
strength to a city than good laws unenforced,”159 he argued that the decree should be
revised so as to not “judg[e] the offenders by the strict letter of the law” but by
“restrict[ing] the blame [for the rebellion] as narrowly as possible.”160 In doing so,
Diodotus contended for a particular moral interpretation of how to apply the law and for a
revision of the resolution to destroy the Mytilenaens.
Ober’s revisibility and Gutmann and Thompson’s provisionality, reflect what
John Dryzek, holds to be “at least part of what it means to be a democrat.”161 He argues
that “the practice of effective listening has to be central to any discursive democracy”162
and through listening to others a democratic citizenry should “be open to challenges of
[their] interpretations.”163 Democratic deliberation, according to Gutmann and
Thompson, much like could be found in an assembly, should engage in an ongoing
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interaction “in which citizens can criticize previous decisions and move ahead on the
basis of the criticism.”164 In Athens, claims Ober, “the willingness to contemplate change
may be regarded as an innate characteristic of democratic political culture.”165 It is upon
this “capacity for nondestructive political change”166 that the next response to the
criticisms of knowledge and justice rests.
Oversight of Democratic Decisions that is Accountable to the People
And therefore it is of the Law of Nature, That they that are at controversie, submit
their Right to the judgement of an Arbitrator.167
–Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or The Matter, Forme, & Power of a Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall or Civill
If a local assembly’s collectively binding decision is found to be wanting, as
demonstrated in the Athenian case, a higher order of functionary or a higher gradation of
authority would be able to determine that the policy should be reconsidered prior to
implementation. John Stuart Mill alludes to this contention, using the representative
model, when he contended that “experience is daily forcing upon the public a conviction
of the necessity of having at least inspectors appointed by the general government, to see
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that the local officers do their duty.”168 The general government or the greater republics,
in Jeffersonian terms, would therefore serve as an umpire for the elementary republics.
The idea of the umpire is instructive for initiating an instrumental means of constructing a
third response to criticism that direct democracy can lead to unjust policies. John Locke
claimed:
And thus all private judgement of every particular member being excluded, the
community comes to be umpire, by settled standing rules; indifferent, and the
same to all parties; and by men having authority from the community, for the
execution of those rules, decides all the differences that may happen between any
members of that society….169
Gerald Gaus, drawing from Hobbes, Locke, and Kant170 posits that when a decisionmaking process breaks down due to conflicting judgments based on private reasons about
a future course (policy), an umpire can provide a means to continue forward by applying
public reasoning.171 The umpire, working from laws established prior to the rendering of
a judgment,172 deliberates on the particular circumstance in order to arrive at a resolution.
The parties in conflict accept the umpire’s ruling “as being in authority, not an
authority.”173 Consequently, the conflicting parties’ agreement to abide by the umpire’s
decision does not imply that their private reasoning or belief was not valid in general, but
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was invalidated in the particular public case.174 If the members of the community/society
begin to suspect that the umpire continually makes rulings that seem to not follow the
pre-established laws the community can remove the umpire from his or her position.175
While this oversight function of the umpire, supposes an individual in the role of
“ARBITRATOR,”176 it does not necessarily have to fall to a single judge.
In the case of the Athenian Assembly’s initial judgment concerning the
Mytilenaens there was not necessarily a conventional political body to provide oversight.
Instead, after the decision was made and the first trireme was launched, the people acted
as an umpire body, calling for the Assembly to reevaluate the deadly decision. The
Athenians, acting in accord with their position as an empowered people, reconvened the
Assembly so that the decision could be weighed through additional deliberation and
debate. Fortunately for the people of Mytilene, the Athenian decision-making process
arrived at a different conclusion and the crew of the second trireme was able to deliver
the reprieve in time.
In contemporary terms, overlaying the umpire model of policy oversight onto
Jefferson’s system of republics, a higher gradation of authority could also fulfill this
function. The higher authority, deliberating on the decision would then determine and
publicize why and how the collectively binding decision of the assembly fell short. In
addition, if the ruling determined that the policy was unjust, the power vested in the
umpire body could only send the judgment back to the Assembly for reconsideration.
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These deliberations of the umpire body would produce two key benefits. First, the
deliberations could serve as intellectual, epistemological and generative resources for the
assembly to consider prior to and during the subsequent meeting(s) just as the
deliberations of that assembly could have been instructive to members of the umpire
body. The publicized public reasoning of the umpire body could function as a means of
expanding the scope of knowledge the assembly considers in its decision-making process,
thereby likely acting in a transformative, educational role for the community. In addition,
the decision to send back the Assembly’s initial policy would make visible the character
of the umpire body’s members and its individual members’ interpretation of the law. If an
assembly’s collectively binding decisions are continually invalidated, the people would
have empirical and epistemological evidence that the representatives of the umpire body
should be returned to the status of common citizen.
Conclusion
Singularly and in total these critiques of direct democracy have exerted a strong
influence over considerations of its viability as a means for contemporary governance.
For successive generations these criticisms have been employed to deny the people their
right to self-rule and preserve the few in positions of power. While the responses
provided here offer rebuttals to these arguments further reasoning still needs to be
presented to establish the need for incorporation of direct democracy into the institutional
structure of contemporary governance. In order to defend what many would consider to
be radical conceptual and institutional changes a number of arguments will need to be
explicated in the remaining chapters. The arguments presented will outline conceptual
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and institutional justifications for what will be referred to as democratic rhetoric and
democratic rhetoric.
Dissertation Chapter Summaries
In the following chapter, justifications for authentic democracy are given. For
governance to be considered authentic it must recognize and be derived from the nature
of human beings and society. In a state of nature individuals live according to the strength
of their capacities and inherently enjoy certain liberties. These capacities and liberties can
serve to separate and position human beings as opponents through the struggle for status
and power. Individual human beings experience a drive to close the space between them
through identifications that are made possible through the use of language. Coming
together individuals, seeking to secure their own goods and the good life, establishes
society, which then must be governed. Laying the foundational characteristics for
authentic governance through this line of exploration, it is concluded that authentic
democracy is the only form of governance able to meet these criteria.
Chapter Three develops the democratic rhetoric project. Building off of the
characteristics of human nature and society the core criteria of authentic governance and
democracy is explicated. The foundations of rhetoric are developed with particular
attention paid to the process of invention. As a communicative event the nature of
symbolic meaning and its architecture are explained through macro-culture as well as
through habitus and communication communities is explained. From these insights
characteristics of democratic rhetoric are generated, which is then followed by a
discussion of its outcomes.
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Chapter Four explicates ideology and a method for ideological analysis prior to
providing an application to ancient Athenian democratic ideology. Ideology as another
level of the cultural meaning system is defined and extended into a method for critical
analysis of different cultural phenomena. Ideologies are proposed to be useful as means
for distinguishing differences across macro- and micro-cultures. The method is then
employed to demarcate the core constructs of ancient Athenian democracy, which is
shown to provide a strong connection to the characteristics required by authentic
governance.
Chapter Five extends the ideological analysis by investigating the ideology of
American governance, particularly at the time of the founders and framers. As the
analysis is developed the distinctions from it and authentic governance are highlighted
establishing American governance as falling short of authenticity. The veil of democracy,
used to legitimize American governance is lifted and critiqued. The discussion then
continues and ends by addressing and critiquing contemporary scholarly accounts of
democracy.
The final chapter provides a brief review of authentic governance and democratic
rhetoric as a means to set up the criteria for the development of a rhetorical democracy.
The Athenian material manifestations –practices, performances, institutions, and
infrastructures– of their ideology of democracy are then developed as a model for
application into the contemporary urban setting. This model is then argued to be a
feasible means for providing the people –citizenry– with an authentic means of
governance.
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CHAPTER TWO: JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AUTHENTIC DEMOCRACY
Man’s outstanding characteristic, his distinguishing mark, is … his work. It is this
work, it is the system of human activities, which defines and determines the circle
of “humanity.” Language, myth, religion, art, science, history are the constituents,
the various sectors of this circle.
–Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man: An Introduction to a Philosophy of Human
Culture
Introduction: Justifications for Authentic Democracy
Philosophical musings about what form governance should take is deeply rooted
in perspectives about human nature and existence. The importance of this claim is found
in the reply of Glaucon to Socrates. Socrates stated that “governments vary as the
dispositions of men vary” to which Glaucon replied that “States are as the men are, they
grow out of human characters.”177 To effectively govern an individual, knowing his or
her nature informs the types of institutional designs necessary. Knowledge of character
and its influence is aptly summarized by Michael Sandel:
For to have character is to know that I move in a history I neither summon nor
command, which carries consequences nonetheless for my choices and conduct. It
draws me closer to some and more distant from others; it makes some aims more
appropriate, others less so.178
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Present day political philosophers have rich, historical resources to draw upon when they
conceptualize the character or nature of human beings. To posit the character of an
authentic democracy, it is necessary to develop an understanding of human nature and
existence as they relate to society, citizenship, and the decisional process in the public or
political realm.
Human Nature and Existence
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and John Locke (1632-1704) articulated a similar
ideology about the core of human nature and existence in relation to humanity’s
aspirations and need for common governance. Their base assumption is reflected in
Goethe’s poetic phrase: “Yet it is inborn in every man that his feeling should press
upward and forward.”179 In the Leviathan, Hobbes, contends that prior to common
governance humanity exists in a state of nature and in that state, “nature hath made men
… equall, in the faculties of body, and mind.”180 As such when two individuals realize
that they both desire the same thing, which cannot be mutually possessed, they end up
being adversaries.181 This state of equality imposes upon these two contestants, desirous
of the same end, a need to resort to “force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men [so
that one] can” in vain attempt “secure himselfe”182 and possessions. Having a nature,
shaped by fear, resulting from an inability to achieve a sense of security in one’s person
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and property, human beings become antagonistic, conditioned to be in a state of war.183
For Hobbes, this “nature of War” creates an incessant reality that forms within human
nature a “known disposition”184 that is predicated on “the naturall Passions of men.”185
Under the “continuall feare, and danger of violent death” two facts emerge. First, since
the possibility “for Industry” is impractical, the possibilities for “culture”, trade, large
scale infrastructure, scientific discovery, an “account of Time”, the “Arts … Letters …
[and] Society”186 are void. In addition, without society “nothing can be Unjust” and
therefore “the notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice have … no place.”187 To
survive, according to Hobbes, the virtues of “Force and Fraud” become virtuous.188 In
turn this inability of human beings who are unable to rise above their equality, fear, and
state of war suffer a life that is “solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.”189 Human
nature and existence then is defined by fear, a desire for security, and is malleable to the
state one is thrust into by contingency of birth.
Locke posits no less of a dire vision of human nature shaped by the state of
nature. Human beings possess “liberty” to pursue “whatsoever [one] thinks fit for the

183

Hobbes, Leviathan, 77.

184

Hobbes, Leviathan, 77.

185

Hobbes, Leviathan, 105.

186

Hobbes, Leviathan, 77.

187

Hobbes, Leviathan, 78.

188

Hobbes, Leviathan, 78.

189

Hobbes, Leviathan, 77.
59

preservation of himself and others.”190 This liberty or “law common to them all” unites
humanity into “one community,”191 a community that is fractured through the
“corruption, and viciousness of degenerate men.”192 Based on the common law to do as
each see fit, Locke argues that human beings hold another liberty, found in their “power
to punish … crimes committed against that law.”193 Human beings, in this account,
naturally seek the preservation of their own person and that of affiliated others. When the
common law is transgressed, individuals possess the power to remedy the situation
through punishing the violator(s). Human nature and existence is found in and the fear of
loss of the two liberties: (1) the power to pursue one’s desired ends and (2) the power to
punish degenerates who violate the first liberty.
While in Locke’s view, nature provides for a primal law that all humanity is
subject to and consequently establishes a basis from which to conceive of a notion of just
and unjust acts, he still presents a perspective of human nature and existence that
overlaps with the one offered by Hobbes. The picture of human nature and existence that
both have passed on is one in which human beings, being equal and constituting one
community, formed by the travails rendered in the state of nature and through a want for
security or the preservation of the liberty to pursue necessities, are divided from one
another driven by fear of loss at the hands of competitors or the corrupted. For Locke
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justice is obtained through the power to punish and even though in Hobbes’ formulation,
(in)justice cannot exist, humanity is ultimately compelled to create a common power in
order to establish a means to obtain justice.
A more positive conception of human nature and existence, that reaches back to
ancient Athens, challenges the primacy of the one presented by Hobbes and Locke. This
tradition, prominently brought forth in the work of Aristotle, also finds representation in
the words of Goethe: “it is only in ceaseless activity that man is himself.”194 Blaise Pascal
made a similar claim about human nature and existence when he wrote that “our nature
consists in movement; absolute rest is death.”195 To what end is this ceaseless activity or
movement oriented toward. For in truth, Goethe and Pascal could be alluding to the
dangerous inclinations that Hobbes and Locke claim define human nature and existence
and yet the point to focus on is that within human nature there is a proclivity for action.
Through the gift of nature, human beings are “endowed with … speech” and due
to this endowment they “set forth the expedient and inexpedient … the just and the
unjust.”196 Due to this capacity to communicate through language, people can come
together to decide upon pursuits that are conceived as advantageous for the individual
and common just goods. Upon this reasoning Aristotle claimed that human beings are “a
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political animal.”197 In other words, human nature and existence, through the power of
speech, is oriented towards an active creation of community.
Kenneth Burke seems to follow this line of thought as he constructs his idea of
human nature and existence. Humans, overlap fundamentally in that they exist as
individuated beings. He argues that due to the “‘principle of individuation’ … we are
born and die one by one, with certain pleasures and pains experienced immediately,
bodily, and not identically experienceable by others.”198 Division “is a universal fact” 199
that for all of humanity originates at conception and “is gradually developed during
gestation.”200 Through division humanity experiences physical and cognitive
separateness; meaning that one person cannot directly experience another’s sensations201
or even transfer one’s own thought through the mediation of communication into the
mind of another. In a state of division human beings are, reflecting Aristotle’s
metaphysics, dependent on the mediation of their gift of language and speech to narrow
the gaps between them. The first definition of human beings then, for Burke, is that they
are “symbol-using animals.”202 Instead of being driven by fear though, the state of
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division and the ability to communicate, provide individuals with a motivation and means
to rectify the state of “segregation” through acts of “congregation.”203 In order to
overcome their division, individuals rhetorically attempt to persuade other’s to join
together in some type of common affiliation. Consequently, as rhetoric is concerned with
rectifying division, it is through rhetoric that one attempts to influence others to bridge
the divide and find communion.204 The fountainhead of all rhetorical attempts then is
division and the remedy for division comes through a proclamation of the need for
“unity.”205
Division produces a deep sense of loss in people, so much so that individuals
suffer from a “yearning for unity”206 that is fulfilled through identifying with others.
What is at the center of this loss though? If the nature of human beings, in the first
instance and actual lived experience is division and individuation, then as the nature state,
what could be lost? To lose a thing implies previous possession. A possible response,
following Burke’s reasoning and yet contrary to his position that division begins at
conception, would be to acknowledge that at conception until birth, a mother and child
are united through a symbiotic relationship and that human existence within nature relies
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upon sexual union to produce its own continuation. In this formulation unity becomes the
first instance, division the actual lived experience, only occasionally interrupted in part
through congress between a man and woman and completely when sexual union is
productive of a new life.
In this formulation, division then, which is the natural state of lived existence for
individuals, is an unnatural state of being for any sort of congregation. Burke’s notions of
how to engender a sense of unity or congregation rest upon the rhetoric of identification.
When one person recognizes, acknowledges or assumes that s/he identifies with another
then s/he is persuaded to join together with another.207 The process of identification, at its
core, is to perceive about a belief, attitude, judgment, interest, and/or an act a point of
unity between two or more people. Being persuaded, the individual now shares a similar
motivation in regards to that which the two (or more) identify. This process of eliciting
identification rests upon Burke’s ideas about substance –one’s essence– and
consubstantiation, meaning to “unite in one common substance or nature.”208
“Consubstantiality” he argued, “either explicit or implicit, may be necessary to any way
of life,” because “substance … is an act; and a way of life is an acting-together; and in
acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that
make them consubstantial.”209 Consequently, since humanity is divided and yet driven to
rectify their separateness, men and women are attuned to acting-together through
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identification. The human drive to eliminate division, for Burke, then is a powerful
intrinsic human attribute and motivation. It is through both, division and identification,
which Burke’s notions of human nature and existence emerge and provides support for
Aristotle’s contention that human beings actively pursue cooperative and common
community.
Another characteristic of human nature and existence, framed by Goethe’s phrase,
ceaseless activity, alluded to in Burke’s definition of consubstantiality, is at the forefront
of thought in Hannah Arendt’s work. Through acting in and upon the world individuals
find a “treasure … that is composed of two interconnected parts.”210 Within an act people
remove “all masks” and “create … public space … between themselves where freedom
[can] appear.”211 These goods, the unveiling of self, creation of public space, and the
appearance of freedom come into play, due to “the fact that man is a being endowed with
the gift of action.”212 Arendt contends that there is a relationship between action,
ultimately realized in the realm of politics, and freedom. To be able to act and engage in
politics one must be free.213 Extending her argument, the nature of the relationship must
be reciprocal in that to be free one also must be able to act and therefore engage in the
political. Through this trinity of human “capabilities and potentialities,”214 a foundation
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upon human nature and existence is constructed that supports Aristotle’s claim that
human beings are political animals.
Human nature and existence in the negative conceptualizations of Hobbes and
Locke and in the positive, explicated through the ideas of Aristotle, Burke and Arendt,
should not be viewed as standing in opposition to each other. Instead, each makes
particular points about human nature and existence, their emphasis providing a basis from
which to build further claims about humanity, experience, and society. As will become
evident, to focus on the negative conception is productive of a certain vision and type of
society and its governance. The same holds true to the productive capabilities of the
positive conception. These claims seem to follow Glaucon’s assertion about the character
of the people of a State shaping its character, and yet it diverges from his claim in that it
is not the character of a State’s citizenry, but the assessment of the citizen’s nature and
existence by those with the power to influence the design and character of the State. To
move beyond this either/or, it is important to hold the implications of both.
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From Nature to Society
The way in which a society organizes the life of its members involves an initial
choice between historical alternatives which are determined by the inherited level
of the material and intellectual culture. The choice … anticipates specific modes
of transforming and utilizing man and nature and rejects other modes. It is one
‘project’ of realization among others. But once the project has become operative
in the basic institutions and relations, it tends to become exclusive and to
determine the development of the society as a whole. ...As the project unfolds, it
shapes the entire universe of discourse and action….
–Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced
Industrial Society
Progression from a brutish, solitary existence to one in which individuals join
together in a society of others occurs, according to Hobbes, when people recognize that
the only way to secure “their own preservation, and … a … more contented life” is to
submit to a “visible Power” that will “keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of
punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation of those Lawes of
Nature.”215 Necessary to instituting covenants that instigate the formation of a
“COMMON-WEALTH … that great LEVIATHAN,” is “to erect such a Common
Power” that protects people and possession from dispossession either through force or
deception.216 A common power, in which the people “conferre all the power and strength
… reduce all their Wills,” is established when a form of governance is chosen to wield
the collective power and will of those in society. Consequently, once empowered the
judgment of the one or few becomes the ground from which “Act[s] … concerne[d with]
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the Common Peace and Safetie”217 or “the Common Benefit”218 are justified and
“SOVERAIGNE.”219
Without this power the benefits of “Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in
summe) doing to others, as wee would be done to”220 and all the fruits of industry could
not be obtained, maintained, or made secure. Ruling through “the Sword” is required, in
Hobbes view, in order to limit the “naturall Passions” that lead to “Partiality, Pride,
Revenge, and the like.”221 Constrained by fear of punishment individuals, who under the
state of nature were able to resort to their “own strength and art”222 now must turn to the
covenant and the Sovereign for justice. For the preservation of society it is also important
that the common power respond to the internal threats of the ambitious, those who
“thinke themselves wiser … abler to govern, …[and] better than the rest,” because if not
checked they will “bring … Distraction and Civill warre.”223 The organization of society
then, is a scheme of self and communal protection by deputing power and submitting to
the will of the one or the few.
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Impellent of this construction is Hobbes’ view of human nature and existence that
primarily emphasized the equality, power, fear, and security of the individual. In the state
of society, individuals relinquish their equality, exhibited in their power and will,
imbuing one or the few with the right to rule over them through an “Artificiall”224
covenant. By doing so, the people transform their natural state in order to enable a
collective in which industry and its goods can flourish. This transformation from
freedom, secures their persons and possessions, at the cost of making them “Subjects” of
the ruler(s).225 The nature of society and common-wealth, consequently, is one that is also
defined by fear, power, security, and is composed a collective of individuals who
hierarchically are positioned as ruler(s) or subjects.
While Hobbes prioritizes equality and fear, Locke’s vision of the nature of society
rests upon liberty and fear. Individuals, in the state of nature, are the masters of their own
domain and yet they willing “part with freedom” and “give up [their] empire” to secure
their property –“lives, liberties, and estates.”226 Failing to do so subjects one’s property
and the “enjoyment of … [each] very uncertain and constantly exposed to the invasion of
others.”227 For Locke, the “chief end … [for] uniting into commonwealths … is the
preservation of [one’s] property.”228 In other words, motivating individuals toward
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forfeiture of their own self-rule, is the ruin or fear of losing the property gained in and
through nature’s liberty.
In uniting in a commonwealth people secure two distinct advantages. The first
remedies the lack endemic to the second liberty found in the state of nature. When
lacking sufficient “power”229 to punish the unjust, who violate the common “law of
nature” through self-interest or “ignoran[ce],” individuals desire “an established …law,
received and allowed by common consent”230 that can be enforced by “a known and
indifferent judge.”231 By consenting to an established law and yielding to an indifferent
judge, individuals gain a “sanctuary ... [for] the preservation of their property.”232
Instituting a law that the collective of individuals agree to also supplies reasoning for “the
original right and rise of both the legislature and executive power.”233 The judge, found
in the legislature and executive, are to be constrained by “standing laws, promulgated and
known to the people”234 and his, her, or their end is the preservation of “the peace, safety,
and public good of the people”235 or “the common good.”236 The collective, in which
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individual power and liberty are given up, also provides for the attainment and enjoyment
of the “many conveniences from the labour, assistance, and society of others”; secured by
the “whole strength”237 of the community. Thus, an individual motivated in large part
through fear, willing cedes a portion of his or her power and liberty, to shield the
remaining portion by consenting and assenting to the rule of others.
Stripping bare the nature of society from the particularities of Hobbes and
Locke’s visions, it is possible to posit a tentative essence of society. Both conceptualize
certain grounds and ends that serve as a lighthouse to guide the justifications for their
reasoning about society. Hobbes argues that society exists for the protection of persons
and possessions, while Locke claims that it primarily remedies a lack of power and
secures benefits. What lies behind these views is the belief that the impetus of society is
its ability to accomplish something beyond the scope of the power and ability of
individuated individuals. The nature or essence of society then is to secure an end beyond
the reach of the one that is made possible at the juncture of a collective of individuals and
their power to act in the world. Working from a difference in emphasis, society does not
necessarily have to build toward security driven by fear, but rather alternatively it can
prioritize human and societal potentiality through the power to act.
This second tradition begins to take shape through the words of Aristotle. “The
purpose of a state,” he claimed, is accomplished when individuals, who do not
necessarily “require one another’s help,” still “desire to live together” due to their
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“common interests” in reaching a “measure of well-being.”238 He also claimed that,
“every community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in
order to obtain that which they think good.”239 As such, community, society and its
necessary governance moves beyond the preservation of “life only” to the facilitation of
“a good life.”240 Just what a good life is, as Aristotle indicates, is an impetus for and is
contingent on the community and societal members’ deliberations. In order to deliberate
and make these types of decisions there must be a space for members to talk to each other
and in which they are empowered so that their talk is influential and effective.
Arendt, following this tradition, which was also inspirational for American
revolutionary thought and spirit, argues that societal members, to obtain a good life, must
have the means to realize their freedom or public happiness. Framing her notion of the
nature of society, germane to this tradition, was summarized well when she wrote:
…the actual content of political life – [consists] of the joy and the gratification
that arise out of being in company with our peers, out of acting together and
appearing in public, out of inserting ourselves into the world by word and deed,
thus acquiring and sustaining our personal identity and beginning something
entirely new.241
In this view, society is emergent from the potentiality inherent in human beings being
together, identifying with one another and their shared ends through their ability to
participate with each other in acts and communication. “To act, in its most general
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sense,” Arendt claims, “means to take an initiative.”242 Since human existence is typified
by an “otherness and distinction [that] become[s] uniqueness” initiating an act means that
an individual is acting within a “human plurality”243 that is embedded in a historical and
present “web of human relationships … woven by … deeds and words.”244 To realize this
human potential for action within society then also necessitates that members must be
empowered to act politically in order to freely form associations and governance.
Freedom, according to Arendt, is not limited to the liberty to do what one sees fit
in areas not constrained by the law, but also includes the means for the people to engage
in their “share of public business.”245 To participate in “the discussions, the deliberations,
and the making of decisions,”246 productive of the scope of governmental or “public
power,” does not only secure individual freedom, but it also fosters public happiness
individually and collectively.247 The liberty “to think and to speak” not only consent and
assent, but also “difference …[through] free discussion,” according to Jefferson, had the
power to transform public disturbances into a “horizon more bright and serene.”248
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“Every country,” in which there is such freedom of thought and discussion, is, as he
described America, a “happy country.”249
Thomas Jefferson learned the importance of public freedom or happiness from the
American experiences in self-rule prior to and during the revolution.250 The founders
certainly knew that happiness lay in the private domain, but they also learned, according
to Arendt, “that men ... could not be altogether ‘happy’ if their happiness was located and
enjoyed only in private life.”251 An expression of this knowledge is found in Jefferson’s
inclusion of the pursuit of happiness in the Declaration of Independence, in recognition
that happiness was to be found in the freedom and power to pursue both private and
public goods.252 Flying in the face of received “conventions,” the founders, in Arendt’s
reading, discounted the beliefs that participation in the government was “a burden” and
that “happiness was not located in the public realm.”253 Consequently, when John Adams
claimed that “the happiness of society is the end of government”254 the conclusion should
be that government must be restricted from infringing upon freedom and thereby
happiness in the private domain, as well as empowering the citizenry to be full
participators in the public or political domain.
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Before preceding two possible objections to this tradition need to be addressed.
The notion of happiness, private and public, is not one of a telos or a utilitarian objective
that justifies as just collectively binding decisions on the grounds that it is productive of
happiness. As in the enactment of liberty in the private realm, in which happiness results
from one’s choices and acting on opportunities to realize one’s private goals, public
freedom or happiness emerges out of being empowered and engaged in attending to one’s
share of public business. This happiness is intrinsic to the process and wells up in the
participants as they realize their identification with a community of others. Additionally,
this tradition diverges from a notion that society is merely a collective of individuals.
Instead it posits that through the power to act publically, societal members develop and
share in, not a collective pursuant of goals that prosper individual ends, but a community
which is formulative of individual and community identity and its ends are those that
realize both the private and public well-being of its members.
To be a participator in the public domain means that societal members who
engage in the “realm of politics” address “the ultimate political problem … of action.”255
As Benjamin Barber argues, “to be political is thus to be free with a vengeance – …under
an ineluctable pressure to act, and to act with deliberation and responsibility as well.”256
To be free involves being able to act politically. Accordingly, acting in freedom “must
ensue from forethought and deliberation, from free and conscious choice.”257 This
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necessitates opportunities to listen, discuss and debate with one another about the policy
options available in order for participates to know, understand, judge and decide between
the alternatives. The scope of actions that are within the purview of politics are those acts
“of we,”258 where the divided I finds that s/he can identify with another or even the many.
As such a political act should be constrained “to action that is both undertaken by a
public and intended to have public consequences.”259 What is public and what is private
are questions to which answers are contingent and should be delimited through the
political acts of an engaged and empowered participatory citizenry.260 Engagement at this
level with one’s community and society through the political means of “doing (or not
doing), making (or not making) …changes the environment, or affects the world in some
material way.”261 It also transforms the public space from “a way of life” into “a way of
living” that is constructive of “mutual advantage” and an “advantage of [societal
member’s] mutuality.”262 Living in community, when societal members are empowered
to participate through making choices about public acts, are able to sanction and carry out
those acts, is beneficial for the individual, as well as the community as a whole.
This can be seen when considering that a society, at a primary level, is a
community of people, not a collective of individuals, who want to live together to achieve
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their common interests. As such, citizens need to be able “to make credible commitments
to one another … for mutual gain.”263 In making credible commitments individual
“differences and conflicts”264 are not effaced, but are, in part, resources that draw the
community together as its members, transformed through the process into citizens,
partake in deciding how to meet those challenges. Association within a community is
primarily enabled through the capacity of human beings to communicate and since the
community is composed of individuals that approach life and governance from different
positions and perspectives, this plurality necessitates a particular type of communication.
According to Carolyn R. Miller, it is the “rhetorical dimension of speech-deliberation
about human actions” that engenders the possibility of “community life.”265 A “rhetorical
community,” embodied through “the continuing opportunity – the forum – for debate,
discussion, dialogue, dispute”266 provides the experience of “common rule-making and
negotiating procedures”267 through which the citizenry and community is constituted.
Society in this tradition is one that posits the community as being constituted and
constitutive. In this perspective societal members constitute their communities through
direct participation in the decision-making process and in turn deliberating with others is
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constitutive of the individual’s identity as a citizen.268 As a constitutive circle, in which
the individual is empowered to act and constitute the community and empowered
participation in the community influences the constitution of the individual, the
community then, according to Michael Sandel “describes not just what they have as
fellow citizens but also what they are, not a relationship they choose (as in a voluntary
association) but an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a constituent of
their identity.”269 The constitutive power of this relationship takes into account that the
self is a historical construct brought forth through unique encounters with the world and
others. Each citizen brings to the community an individuated point of reference, thereby
creating a dynamic tension between the influence of the individual uptake of experience
and the constitutive influence of his or her experience in a community of others. Instead
of remaining in a state of division, interrupted by private moments of identification, the
community then becomes a resource for working through division to produce ongoing
means for consubstantiality. From this perspective, the community is “both pluralist and
normative,” functioning through a “dynamic interaction” that is “mutually
constitutive”270 of community and its citizenry.
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Citizenship
I believe that the question of political identity is crucial and that the attempt to
construct ‘citizens’’ identities is one of the important tasks of democratic politics.
–Chantal Mouffe, The Return of the Political
An individual can be a member of a society or a community without being a
citizen. Citizenship moves a societal member from being a subject to that of an active
participant who is engaged in the workings of the political and thereby public realm.
Arendt argues that “the world” is what “lies between people” and this “in-between”271
has been severely diminished as people have withdrawn from the public realm. The
pulling back from the public realm she claims is due to the belief that freedom entails a
“freedom from politics.”272 By retreating from their role in politics, individuals have lost
one of their primary means of enacting the in-between, where an illumination of human
nature and existence, the nature of society, and the diversity, unity, and creativity that
humanity is possible of is generated. The loss is in essence the space in which individuals
discover and realize the bonds of their association with their fellow human beings.273 In
conceiving the world and the political as a creation of the in-between that emerges when
people engage with each other it is possible to understand that citizenship is an identity,
like “every identity is relational.”274 It is in “the way we define” this relationship
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indicated in “citizenship” that is strongly constituent of “the kind of society and political
community”275 that its members labor under or actively engage in. The characteristics
associated with citizenship are productive of who is considered to be a citizen and as a
form “of collective identifications”; not only constitutive of “a ‘we’” but also, as noted by
Chantel Mouffe, a “delimitation … a ‘them’.”276 Citizenship is an exclusive domain that
is indicative of who rules society, those subjected to their rule, and those others outside of
its particular societal boundaries and scope of power.
To distinguish the characteristics of a citizen is or should be, it is fruitful to first
describe what a citizen is not. An individual who lives “under the law” of a society
insofar as “the force of its law extends” and partakes of the “privileges and protection of
it”277 is merely a denizen of that society and a subject of its governance. “Subjects”
according to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “extol the public tranquility … [and] prefer [the]
security of possessions,” since they desire the benefits they can acquire, rather than what
they can give to society.278 They are, in Barber’s estimation, “free-riders” who “act
exclusively out of self-interest.”279 These individuals are “not taken into consultation”
and have no or little voice when “the arbiters of their destiny”280 make collectively
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binding decisions. Subjects and even denizens are not citizens in that they withdraw or
are excluded from the public realm and political space that facilitate the constitution of
the in-between, the we, freedom and therefore public happiness.
On the other hand, a citizen, while a subject and denizen, acts in the public realm
by employing his or her capacities toward making the collectively binding decisions
under which s/he lives. “They understand that their freedom,” as Barber contends, “is a
consequence of their participation in the making and acting out of common decisions.”281
A citizen, as noted by Aristotle, is a person who “should know how to govern … and how
to obey like”282 one who is free. Citizenship also entails a “continuous
acknowledgement” of one’s “obligation” to “an ensemble of practices”283 and a “set of
political principles … freedom and equality for all.”284 When individuals, “recognize the
authority of such principles and the rules in which they are embodied,” they proactively
engage in constituting the “political judgement and … actions” and “identity” 285
necessary to be citizens. It is through “actually entering into … by positive
engagement”286 the ensemble of political practices that the “practical discipline”
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necessary for “the character”287 of citizenship becomes generative of an identification as
a citizen. Consequently, citizens are members of society who actively engage the public
and political realm, willing an order of society toward community generated common
goods through the production of and agreement with the collectively binding decisions
under which they choose to live.
Will a World into Being
To will is to create a world or to bring about events in a, world, and this act entails
(and thus defines) power – the ability to create or modify reality.
–Benjamin R. Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age
To be constituted by and to constitute something in the world, one has to act in
the world. Preceding an act, the will is either engaged to direct what a person will will to
be and be done within the particular concern under consideration. Whether an individual
has time to process his or her will prior to the decisional event or one acts within the
moment the will is involved. In the case in which time is permitted the development of
the will is allowed to be inquisitive and reflective, whereas in the moment the will must
draw from previous, like instances. In an authentic democracy, citizens processing the
“common good,” actualize the “public” where “citizens com[e] together to talk about
collective problems.”288 By talking together, especially in the political frame, citizens act
as creative beings, “creat[ing] … visions [that] are provisional” and propositional of
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imaginary, “shared consequences.”289 Transitioning talk from vision to, as Barber argues,
“decision converts [its] promise into reality and compels [citizens] to give irrevocable
shape and life”290 to the vision. A vision and decision call for a “will”291 and a “way to
willing common actions”292 that aspires to bring into being a reality conceived of and
shared by the citizenry.
When a collection of individuals come together to form a community they bring
with them differences of opinion about how they will govern. Their judgments about how
they govern, act upon their common world, arises from what they will to be in their
world. Difference in social location, power relations, and relational development and
connections in heterogeneous, as well as homogenous, communities implicate the use of
rhetoric. Rhetoric, in part, is a communicative resource that brings these individual
together in order for them to identify the character and responsibilities of citizenship and
as citizens. From difference individuals privilege certain influences over others, resulting
in a plurality within the decision-making space constituted in-between citizens. To arrive
at a collectively binding decision, citizens must decide which possibility has the most
potentiality to promote the common good. Common good, meaning here that which
advances a good that is beneficial to the community; not as an abstract good that favors
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the common, but a concrete good that might just as likely advantage a segment of the
community to further its identification with and as part of the community; not as an end
in of itself, but inherent in a process that includes free, equal, engaged, and empowered
participation by the citizenry. To decide on a collectively binding decision
democratically, persuasion provides rhetorical parameters that guide citizens’
communicative participation. Mark Warren refers to three conditions that this “dynamic”
engagement espouses and rewards. When individuals present their arguments they need
to:
1.

“appeal to common or coinciding interests or norms”

2.

foster a favorable evaluation of one’s credibility in relation to claims and
evidence

3.

inspire a perception of goodwill toward the community293

A citizen presenting his or her argument for a vision of the community in a decisional
space can only deceptively appear to meet these conditions for a time since the
appearance of the person and the argument transpires publically. The capability to
influence the community therefore can be limited or even negated when an individual
does not consistently project a character and proposed collectively binding decision that
the community recognizes as common, credible, and grounded in goodwill over the short
and long-term.294 In acting within these conditions and providing profitable proposals,
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whether accepted or not, will “increase future [capabilities] for influence.”295 The will of
the community and of its citizens, then is a rhetorical result.
Rhetoric and political deliberation, which is also rhetorical, gains significance in
the democratic process, in that both are “transform[ative of individual] preferences
according to public-minded ends.”296 Constitutive and transformative affects are a
consequence of “coordinat[ing] action [that] requires … share[d and held] interpretations
of facts, norms, and intentions.”297 These interpretative resources are made and refined
through a public intercourse298 that is generative of “public seeing and political
judgment.”299 By being able to interact with and influence one another, citizens engage in
evaluating and selecting from a “myriad [of] visions that compete for the common
will.”300 To will, is not the same as “‘I prefer’ or ‘I want’,”301 in that will is productive of
a judgment that brings into existence a common experience now and for the future.
From Locke’s perspective, while in a state of nature, an individual’s will is the
impetus behind his or her decision as to what s/he determines to pursue according to the
first liberty. Within a collective the individuated individual wills are aggregated,
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generally with the majority will guiding collective ends. In a community, its collectively
binding decisions are not an act of discovery, but are generated through public will.302
Rousseau’s contention was that the “act of association” is creative of a “unity,”
productive of the association’s “common self, its life, and its will.303 Standing in the
place of the individuated individuals’ wills, the collective transforms into and replaces
individual wills with that of a public body.304 In a community, since difference is, in part,
constitutive of the need to learn about and deliberate on proposed or existing common
goods, Locke’s view is too weak due to its reliance on self-interest while Rousseau’s is
too strong as it negates difference. An alternative view, that addresses a scheme that
includes private and public wills, which in turn produces a collective will, is advocated
by contemporary theorist Majid Behrouzi.
Behrouzi holds that as a citizen, “the individual is a public person with public
interests, as well as a holder of a set of views and conceptions on the matters of the
‘common good’.”305 Awareness of a common issue is demonstrative of private and public
concerns and interests that are learned through “general and formal education,”306 as well
as the individual’s active engagement in society and with its members. Once a person
becomes “committed, and willing, to ‘act’ on” an issue, his or her private wills transform

302

Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, 84.

303

Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 19.

304

Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, 19.

305

Behrouzi, Democracy as the Political Empowerment of the Citizen, 27.

306

Behrouzi, Democracy as the Political Empowerment of the Citizen, 27.
86

into “‘public wills’.”307 If citizens are empowered to participate and act in the collectively
binding decision-making process, then through rhetorical engagement the community
attends and decides to “‘co-join’ [their] wills” into a “‘collected wills’.”308 Able to
provide consequential input, one’s public will in the decisional scheme affords citizens
the ability to enact their “sovereignty.”309 Additionally, this process serves to legitimate
the decision and motivate citizens to support and live by decisions for (non)advocates.310
An issue that becomes a public problematic, open to public discussion, orients an
individual “to that issue through both, his or her, private and public wills311 While the
wills are not mutually exclusive as they “may or may not be in harmony” and their “interconnections”312 might or might not be known they are distinguished through their relation
to what is considered the “good [for] the public.”313 A private will is a representative of a
person’s individual desires and judgments about a particular situation that s/he does not
want to express in a public forum. In making public a will that relates to political
“issues,” the citizen identifies his or her “criteria” for making the judgment, as well as
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what s/he “wills to be actualized”314 through advancing his or her suggested potential
collectively binding decision. In other words, a public will proposes ways that the
community should pursue the common good, thereby if chosen instituting individual and
common responsibilities.315 Formulated in and through public interaction, public wills are
malleable and susceptible to change.316 “Public wills” then according to Behrouzi, are
“expressions of considered and reflected-upon judgements.”317 After a particular public
will or a combination of multiple public wills is accepted by the community a “‘collective
will’”318 is produced.
To explicate the difference and relationship between private, public and collective
wills Plato’s account of Socrates trial provides fruitful examples. When Socrates, “‘that
wise man’,”319 was charged with leading the youth of Athens astray by teaching them to
challenge their received traditions and religion, along with a sundry of other violations,
he based his defense on his public and private wills. In his attempt to obtain an acquittal,
Socrates had to convince the jury that his view relating to the charges was the correct
perspective. Besides the necessary challenge of the prosecution’s evidence, he
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endeavored to convince the jury via his public will. Arguing that while he was “pleading
on [his] own behalf,” he also claimed that he was “really pleading on [theirs]” in order
“to save [the Athenians] from misusing the gift of God by condemning [him].” Socrates
asserted that he was god’s gift to Athens in that through “the greatest possible service” he
could provide, he had become in words and deeds their conscience. Throughout his life
he had continually attempted “to persuade each [one] not to think more of practical
advantages then of his mental and moral well-being, or in general … of well-being in the
case of the state or of anything else.”320 The jury unmoved by his defense sided with his
accusers.321 Convicted of the crimes, Socrates had the opportunity to persuade the jury to
sentence him to some other punishment than the called for death penalty. In an
expression of his private will, “I am convinced that I never wrong anyone
intentionally,”322 he offered his opinion of innocence and therefore he should not be
subject to any sanction. The jury, not swayed by his arguments, agreed with his accusers
and one month later had him executed.323 Prior to the trial the members of the jury, all
male Athenian citizens, had either met or heard about the influence and character of
Socrates.324 From these experiences and knowledge, many of the jury members likely
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entered their role with a priori opinions about his guilt or innocence. Through, the likely
public discussions leading up to the trial about its merits and possible outcome, along
with the evidence and statements made by both sides during the trial, the jury members
formed their public wills. In rendering their judgment of his guilt and then passing
sentence, their private and public wills constituted the collective will of Athens.
In rendering their decision about the fate of Socrates the jury came to a judgment
about his guilt and a decision about how to implement that decision. Behind the judgment
and decision were the public wills of the individual jurymen and through their vote they
determined and expressed what they collectively willed the world to be; one in which
Socrates no longer could trouble them and their community. To bring this willed world
into existence the jurymen had a will guiding their choice, the will to decide, the will to
abide by the decision, and the will to see the decision acted upon. Barber posits that “if
common decision is the test of common talk, then common action is the test of common
decision. Common work is a community doing together what it has envisioned and willed
together.”325 To will and act in the world the Athenian had to be empowered to come to
their decision and be able to render is an actuality. As such, the citizens had to be agents
in the constitution of their world.
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To Act in the World
…in all political questions ... only questions of power come into play: “what one
can do” is the first question, what one ought to do is only a secondary
consideration.
–Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power
Or is it? To act in the world, to will the world as one possibility, amongst a sea of
options, relies upon the human “faculty by which the self comes by its ends”326 or
agency. Countering the insights of Nietzsche, Pascal’s assessment of the will is related to
one’s beliefs. What we believe as “true or false” is a matter “by which we judge them.”327
His argument is that as we evaluate “the qualities” of something “our will likes one
aspect more than another.”328 That which the “mind … does not care to see” the will
“deflects”329 one from considering. The mind then is drawn to what remains, or that
“preferred by the will,”330 and an individual then makes his or her judgment accordingly.
If beliefs are generative of our acts in the world, then the will while limiting is directive
of self-reflection that then produces the judgments leading to action. Pascal’s view of the
will is definitely productive for understanding how individuals come to act in the world
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but a more penetrating analysis, providing deeper distinction, is necessary to develop a
thorough understanding of human agency.
Michael Sandel provides a framework for understanding the constitutive elements
of one’s agency and for building a sense of agency of a citizen. In review, he offers a
prevalent perspective of agency, which he follows with a richer, deeper, and more
productive view. He constructs agency as residing in two possible faculties: willing and
self-reflection. Willing involves the ability of a person, or self, to choose between
possible desired outcomes, or ends, while reflection occurs through discovery.331 In each
case, agency serves as a remedy for a particular type of disempowerment. When agency
is conceived as willing the “self is disempowered because [it is] detached from its ends”;
in reflection it “is disempowered because [it is] undifferentiated from its end.”332 In other
words, willing is an enactment of power to bridge the gulf between the known self,
antecedent to life and societal goals, in order to decide and act towards a chosen, certain
end. In reflection, a person’s understanding of ends is constitutive of his or her selfunderstanding. By reflecting on the connection between ends and self, a person creates
distance between the two in order to empower the self to consider the value of the end for
its own constitution. In this sense a person “achieves self-command” by “making the
self”333 an object, thereby enabling a “survey [of] its various attachments … [in order to]
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acknowledge [the object’s] respective claims.”334 In doing so, the ends is caused to lessen
or relinquish its constitutive power over the self so that a person can determine what ends
(and its correlated, sundry attachments) it desires to be self-constitutive.
While Sandel’s construct of agency as an unencumbered self, posits a divide
between willing and self-reflection, the divide is not necessary. Agency is not an
either/or, as Sandel attests to when he (re)envisions agency as an encumbered self –“Will
alone is not enough”335– but a both/and. As a both/and agency is a product of selfreflection, distancing the self from ends, and then an act of willing or a choice to “reverse
the drifting apart of self and ends by restoring a certain continuity between them.”336 The
subject or ends are open questions that are answered through the process of living,
judging, and acting. In life, human beings are embedded in a historical association or
society of others, and when the openness of an indeterminacy or a question confronts that
society of self and others, the person contingently answers the questions of Who am I?
and What ends should be pursued? through the working of one’s agency: reflection and
willing. The contingency of this openness for self and ends does not exist free of
constraints in that both, the self and ends, are embedded: The history of Selfs and Ends,
of the self and ends, the authority of culturally and socially accounted for and discounted
possibilities, and interrelationships with others contending with the question provides a
powerful effectual frame to contextualize who one can be(come) and what one can do.
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Due to humanity’s embeddedness, agency through self-reflection cannot be a complete
withdrawal in thought from the community of others. Consequently, the self that reflects
on its ends is not nor can be an actual antecedent to the person’s life and society goals.
Joining the self in its reflection are the voices of others who have influenced the ongoing
construction of the self and therefore speak into the consideration of what ends a person
decides to esteem and act upon.337 Even though the process of self-reflection is a process
of (re)visitation, action necessitates a movement away from contemplation to willing,
which leads toward a moment of decision.338 Agency, here takes the result of selfreflection and transforms its determinations into a willing of what ends to pursue and how
to achieve that particular possibility.
Conclusion: Fostering the Flourishing of Humanity
The nature of humanity and their existence exhibit a particular disposition that
provides the foundation for authentic governance. Out of this disposition should emerge
the form of governance that fosters the flourishing of humanity. Authentic democracy
would provide the people with a means to transform their natural liberties –to pursue
individual ends and punish impediment of those ends– through language into common,
just pursuits and benefits. Humanity experiences a compulsion to overcome their natural
state of division through the creation of identification between one another. When
individuals do so, they construct and constitute a shared will and world that forms
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communion and community between them. In building society, individuals agree to live
under a common power, but the nature and function of this power can either rob societal
members of their means of participation and public happiness or it can provide the space
for its realization. To be active participants –to be citizens who are agents that move from
individual, private wills to a collective will– necessitates authentic democracy: a
democracy that, facilitating the people’s interactions, achieves their empowerment and
thereby enables their self-rule.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE DEMOCRATIC RHETORIC PROJECT
…democracy is a project concerned with the political potentialities of ordinary
citizens, that is, with their possibilities for becoming political beings through the
self-discovery of common concerns and of modes of action for realizing them.
–Sheldon S. Wolin, Democracy and Difference
Introduction: Justifications for Authentic Democracy
Knowing the general character of human beings and humanity’s reasons for
associating with each other is beneficial in constructing governance of individuals in
society. Understanding how symbolic orders are productive of communication codes that
are indicative of a people’s webs of significance or culture, addressed here, provides
guidance for how an authentic system of governance should be constructed. This
knowledge and understanding can be employed for the common good or the good of the
few. Authentic governance implements this knowledge and understanding in ways that
maximize the potentialities of societal members as citizens. For Bryan Garsten “a polity’s
institutional structure influences the type of political activity”339 open for its citizenry
while Mouffe desires “a mode of political association” that suggests “the idea of
commonality” and establishes relational bonds “among the participants in the
association.”340 Institutional structures and modes of political association, through their
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“rules and prescribed norms of conduct”341 facilitate and constitute the identities and
activities possible. These structures and norms, inculcate within a citizenry certain
political expectations based on habits of behavior. People, argues Pascal, follow their
habits formed through continual, repetitive behavior warranted by the institutions and
norms they partake of in their lived experience.342 Authentic governance then is one that
institutionalizes political potentialities of ordinary citizens in a particular way that aligns
with character of human beings and their political association. How the associated
individuals of a society constitutes its governance –its institutions, actors, and
cooperative acts– are constituted through the nature of their associations; since in part
individuals constitute and are constituted through the nature of their associations, how a
society’s political space is concretized affects how the citizenry engages in the productive
process of will formation and is empowered to choose and act collectively in the world.
Authentic Governance
…a state is a community of freemen…
…a political society exists for the sake of noble actions…
…who has the power to take part in the … administration of any state is …
a citizen of that state … a state is a body of citizens sufficing for the purposes of
life.
–Aristotle, Politics
Any form of governance that provides the institutional structure, norms, and
habits of a political association should be grounded in the character of human beings and
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community in order to establish those habits, norms and structure. Building from the
exposition provided above about human nature and existence, society, citizenship, will,
and agency authentic governance should acknowledge, enable, and have the potentiality
to achieve the characteristics noted. Authentic governance then is generative of a
collectively binding decision-making space in which:
1.

functional equality is fostered and flourishes in order to equalize the
inequalities created through differing capacities and resources

2.

the liberty of individuals to choose the ends they desire and pursue the acts
they believe will lead to those ends is maximized

3.

citizens are empowered to be world-builders who can express their public
wills in negotiations with others to secure their own persons, property, and
a collective will

4.

identification with others bridges the diversity of societal plurality through
rhetorical engagements pursuant of common goods, feeding back into a
constitutive circle productive of community identification and

5.

the citizenry’s public happiness is secured through their constitution as
engaged participators in self-rule

The specificity of these claims is significant for they are productive of the parameter for
the actualization of equality, liberty, power, identification, and public happiness with
governance. It is possible to succinctly summarize these claims of acknowledgement,
enablement, and achievement: Authentic governance necessitates that individuals are
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free, equal and empowered actors who can collectively constitute their existence in
society and its goods.
Such reduction to core concepts or succinct summary though leaves a gap in the
breadth and depth of interpretation that could be productive of governance that would not
be authentic. Neither, would it not necessarily distinguish parameters through which
possible forms of governance could be invalidated as inauthentic. For instance, Aristotle
claims that the three basic forms by which governance is secured, “the one, or the few, or
the many,”343 can only be evaluated as authentic from a rich understanding of authentic
governance. A government of one or the few violates equality, power and public
happiness, but could be said to enable and perhaps even achieve a sense of liberty and
identification for its subjects. Whereas, it is only in the governance of the many that
acknowledgment, engagement, and the potentiality for the achievement of equality;
liberty; empowerment found in reflection, will, agency, acts, and security; identification
constituted out of difference, common goods, and collectively binding decision-making;
as well as public happiness through engaged participation that authentic self-rule is
actualized.
Authentic Governance is Democratic Governance
Authentic governance, found only in the self-rule of the many, brings democracy
back to the foreground, “for democracy is said to be” claimed Aristotle, “the government
of the many.”344 Unlike for Aristotle, democracy is no longer a singularity, but over the
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centuries since it flourishing in ancient Athens, it has become, in Dahl’s words, an
amalgam of elements that do not fully cohere.”345 Today the experience of democracy is
filtered through a fusion with other philosophical and political elements, so that its
variants are now called “modern democracy, pluralist democracy, constitutional
democracy, liberal democracy”346 to which could be added representative democracy,
participatory democracy347 and deliberative democracy348 to name a few versions. In
each, democracy has been modified in order to make it more palatable for the sensibilities
of the times and “the party on top.”349 Democracy, as a political community, is an
expression of “the bonds securing men’s mutual respect [and] … bonds of necessity.”350
Pascal argued that community bonds are “maintained by [an] imagination”351 that project
a certain conception of power through which a particular version of governance is
accepted. How democracy is conceived and enacted then reflects a vision of power and
who and how it is to be enacted. With the imagined authentic governance presented
above serving as the grounds for an authentic conception of democracy, authentic
democracy too must be envisioned in a particular way.
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Central to the “political condition,” according to Barber, is “the absence of an
independent ground for judgment.”352 The questions that trouble a political community
are those rooted in issues that cause conflict within society. Difference driving divergent
private and public wills creates a space between the citizenry “where truth is not – or is
not yet – known,”353 so that conflict emerges about what collective will, productive of
collectively binding decisions, the community should act upon. Conflict in democracy,
Mouffe claims, serves an “integrative role” since it “calls for a confrontation between
democratic positions, and … requires a real debate about possible alternatives.”354 The
political realm of democracy consequently, must provide a space in which citizens are
free, equal, and empowered to constitute a collective will and collective binding
decisions. Barber argues that “politics” in a strong democracy includes “the art of
engaging strangers in talk and of stimulating in them an artificial kinship.”355 While he
develops a democratic program that favors talk, the constitutive nature of the political
community, privileges a particular type of talk, rhetoric. As such, authentic democracy is
a rhetorical democracy in which a democratic rhetoric is practiced.
Compelling the necessity for governance are public problems productive of the
need for collectively binding decisions that endeavor toward solutions representative of
the common good. Central to a public problem is an ambiguity confronting the
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community or a contention dividing the people. A public problem is a unique type of
problem in that its impact is perceived to have some significance for the association of
the people. A public problem is one that impedes the ability of the people to realize
equality, liberty, power, community, and/or their happiness. Public problems, like “every
human problem” as Frantz Fanon points out, “must be considered from the standpoint of
time.”356 As such, a public problem needs to be understood also as contextualized and
particular. A public problem is always already contextualized or situated in time and
space –historically, culturally and socially– and it is this particular contextualization that
shapes the citizenry’s desire to address the problem collectively, their determination of
the common good in relation to it, and how they can achieve that common good for the
community.
A public problem is particular in that as a problem it is peculiar to the citizenry
and their historical, cultural, and social composition; making its members uniquely
qualified to decide how to address it publically. As an ambiguity, a contextualized
particular can be veiled in three ways. First, the citizenry does not consider a
contextualized particular problematic and therefore it needs to be made present to their
awareness before public attention is deemed warranted; like a whistleblower bringing to
light that which is meant to be hidden from public view. It is also possible that due to the
plurality of the citizenry, most may consider its significance as not meriting public action,
while for certain citizens the public nature of the contextualized particular is
unquestionable; an example would be when a policy, like standardized testing, privileges
356
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the success of certain groups over that of others. In the final instance of ambiguity the
contextualized particular is known as a public problem that necessitates public attention
and cooperative action, but the possibilities for how the public should proceed are
unknown, thus potential policies must be generated and brought to light for these
generally emergent and unique problems; for instance, the discussions of President
Kennedy’s advisors to generate responses to the Cuban missile crisis. In regards to
contention, the citizenry’s attention might very well be riveted on the contextualized
particular but they are conflicted over what collectively binding decision actualizes a
collective will representative of their individuated public wills. In democratic rhetoric the
citizen considers his or her relation to the contextualized particular, the citizenry’s
interpretation of it, and/or the sources of contention between them to inform his or her
use of rhetoric. Thus, engagement of a public point of ambiguity or contention is limited
structurally, primarily through the mediating influence of persuasive communication.
Foundation of Rhetoric for Democratic Rhetoric
Communicative acts that entreat a citizen to consider his or her private or public
will, influential of the formation of a collective will, and constitutive of a collectively
binding decision addressing a particular concern, are rhetorical engagements within a
rhetorical event. A citizen’s rhetorical engagement within a rhetorical event seeks to
modify a particular ambiguity or contention that is embedded in the community, in order
to alter its reality in accord with his or her desire.357 These claims rest upon a particular
meaning for rhetoric and are related to specific ways for and contexts in which rhetoric is
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employed. Over the millenniums rhetoric has taken on many meanings and yet at its
center is the conception that it is both the “the means of persuasion”358 –the how to
engage an audience of others– and the “art of persuasion.”359 As an art its foundational
purpose is “to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents”360 through the
employment of symbols as “a mode of altering reality.”361 Its power to alter reality
begins with how it instigates a shift in the way individuals relate to reality through what it
foregrounds, what it highlights as needing attention.
In “soliciting attention” it simultaneously creates an opening “by driving a wedge
between subject and object”362 and attempts to establish the presence of a particular
persuasive appeal by “isolat[ing] it”363 from competing appeals. When focused on a
public problem, rhetoric addresses “in ways appropriate to a particular public in a
particular situation”364 possible futures for directing the citizenry “either to do or not do
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something”365 through specific proposals. An individual who commits to presenting his
or her solution to a contextualized particular reveals his or her understanding of the
public problem in question. As Michael Hyde argues:
Rhetoric offers an interpretative understanding of this world; it articulates and
thus makes explicit something about how people are faring (‘dwelling’) in their
everyday relationships with things and with others and how they might think and
act in order to understand better and perhaps improve a particular situation.366
Through rhetorical engagements, communicated in the presence of an audience, an
individual attends to “the practical consequences – the meanings to persons involved – of
the human relations”; in that the “one who speaks rhetorically chooses to inaugurate and
to try to sustain until attainment of a purpose a series of events in human relations.”367 As
such, rhetoric is always relational, constituting relationships through the maintenance of
existent connections and/or establishing new connections and bonds with (un)familiar
others.
Rhetoric establishes and distinguishes the nature of the relationship between the
individual engaging in a rhetorical engagement and an audience through its
acknowledgment of their presence as participants. “Acknowledgment,” Hyde contends,
“is a conscious act of creation that marks an origin, a beginning, an opening in space-time
where people can feel at home as they dwell, deliberate, and know together.”368 Rhetoric
here functions democratically through naming the addressed participants as members of
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the community and holders of either positions of congruity, neutrality or conflict.369
Acknowledgement indicates: a new beginning; the dignity of the others as equal, free and
empowered actors;370 a relationship and potentiality for positioning and transforming the
nature of the relationship;371 and who is included in the collectively binding decisionmaking process. On the other hand, the lack of acknowledgment within rhetorical,
democratic engagement also is telling, turning its positive potentialities into negatives.
Through acknowledgment’s power individuals or groups can initiate a rhetorical
engagement of others, generative of a hospitable or hostile space that is conducive of
either authentic or inauthentic democracy. Through these attributes, directing attention
and acknowledging others, rhetoric can subtly or radically alter a person’s perception of
reality.
The capacity of rhetoric to alter reality reaches its culmination in bringing people
to a decision or judgment regarding a probable and provisional satisfactory solution for a
contextualized particular.372 Poetically describing rhetoric, Burke argued that it “is par
excellence the region of the Scramble.”373 When divided individuals, recognize a societal
need they attempt to persuade one another of the merits of one means to meet that need
over another. In the scramble of a political clash, rhetoric attends to and is the means “of
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persuasive speech.”374 During a rhetorical engagement, to persuade a citizenry of the
merits of one proposal over others, an individual needs to create an actual or perceived
sense of identification.
Identification is a joining of citizens’ interests375 by foregrounding similarities and
providing a “bridge”376 across difference. It is through rhetoric that identification bonds
individuals together through similar attitudes that lead to cooperative acts. At the heart of
identification are the ideas of substance and consubstantiality. “Substance,” according to
Burke: “was an act; and a way of life is an acting-together [consubstantiality]; and in
acting together, men have common sensations, concepts, images, ideas, attitudes that
make them consubstantial.”377 In essence, then identification is rooted in a belief that the
proposal an individual advocates presents a common way of acting in the world, based on
the common interests shared by the citizenry. It is the purpose of rhetoric to “lead to
decisions.”378 Thus, for a citizenry to be empowered to act equally and freely democracy
needs to enable rhetorical engagement between its citizens and a particular conflict so
that they can persuade one another, up the point of decision, as to which course of action
to follow related to a contextualized particular.
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For Lloyd Bitzer the contextualized particular functions as an exigence –“some
specific condition or situation”379 considered “an imperfection marked by urgency”– and
is that “which invites utterance”380 or rhetorical engagement. In the art of rhetoric, as in
any art, a contextualized particular, stimulant of a citizen’s attention, appears to the
individual “demand[ing] … effective power.” 381 This agrees with Quintilian’s position
that rhetoric addresses “the subjects that come before”382 it and its “material … is
everything that may come before [it] for discussion.”383 Yet, while appearance or
demands are important for securing attention, it is one’s perception that constitutes the
interpretation of the contextualized particular that drives if and how one will attend to it.
Perception and interpretation guides the citizen’s attention as to “what [one] believe[s]
she / he [i]s responding to, why, and in conversation with whom.”384 It is in the tension
between, not only the questions of “what is to be modified” and “who is to be

379

Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, S4.

380

Bitzer, The Rhetorical Situation, S6-S7.

381

Martin Buber, I and Thou, 2nd ed., trans. Reinhold Niebuhr (London,
Continuum Impacts, 2008), 16.
382

Quintilian, “Institutes of Oratory.” In The Rhetorical Tradition: Readings from
Classical Times to the Present, 2nd ed., eds. Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg
(Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2001), 399.
383

384

Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory, 398.

Neil R. Leroux, “The Rhetor's Perceived Situation: Luther's Invocavit
Sermons,” RSQ: Rhetoric Society Quarterly 28, no. 1 (January 1998): 53.
108

addressed,”385 but also why the contextualized particular is being addressed and to what
end that structures a particular employment of the rhetoric.
Whether a citizen who, through the investigation of the rhetorical art and
technique, is consider competent or as lacking s/he employs the rhetorical complex,
which is inherent to any use of rhetoric. Before proceeding to an explication of the
rhetorical complex the question of competency merits a brief discussion. Competency in
rhetoric comes through honing one’s skills in its principles and practice, and while formal
inquiry can lead to excellence, “ordinary people” through “random” forays “or …
practice” –recognizing causality (this appeal has lead to a good affect whereas this has
not)– constitute a “habit”386 of rhetorical competence. This is seen early on in the
rhetorical engagements of a child. Desirous of a particular end, the child builds a
repertoire of rhetorical skill, when confronted with a failed attempt at procuring the end,
through continual fresh attempts to arrive at success until the end is finally attained.
Certainly there is slippage, due to proficiency of recalling related successful attempts and
contextual factors, but those causes achieving the goal with consistency build a
systematic understanding of competent rhetorical appeals. These competent appeals,
exhibit an ideological component, as the sanctioning agent carries into the rhetorical
engagement a particular set of beliefs about how to judge and act in light of the request.
The sanctioning agent’s response is informed and shaped by the relevant ideological
beliefs s/he or they hold. Therefore to produce a favorable result, a citizen through
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rhetorical engagement must structure his or her rhetorical appeal to address the
expectations found in the ideological environment; an environment constructed through
the communication within one’s greater and familiar social worlds.
The components of any rhetorical appeal, commonly referred to as the five canons
of rhetoric, involves “Invention, Arrangement, Style, Memory, and Delivery.”387 The
tradition term canons can create a silo(ing) affect or impression and so here the phrase
rhetorical complex will be employed instead as a means to emphasize the
interconnections between the canons. Every (in)competent public rhetorical engagement
accesses these components either through the preparation or performance of the message.
In short:


Invention “is the devising of the matter … [to] make the case convincing.”



Arrangement addresses the organizational structure of the message.



Style involves “adapt[ing]” the appeal of the message to the rhetorical
situation.



Memory is now implicative of any technological tool used to assist in
remembrance.



Delivery refers to how a message and its persuasive appeal is conveyed to
an audience.388

In democratic rhetoric, each aspect of the rhetorical complex has significance for a
citizen’s rhetorical engagement of the citizenry in relation to a contextualized particular.
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What one is to argue (invention), how the argument is to be formed (arrangement) and
articulated (style) and conveyed (memory and delivery) flow out of the process of
invention. For it is not just in what one chooses to advocate that invention resides, but its
effects in how to arrange one’s points, how to stylize those points through their
articulation and delivery in order to facilitate their best chance for a full hearing and
consideration, also should be felt and realized. Consequently, invention’s critical role and
potentiality in the process of rhetorical engagement that warrants deeper analysis in order
to further explicate the nature of democratic rhetoric.
Invention is a multifaceted process that takes one through two phases of
deliberation; distinguished from each other in that the first phase seeks to narrow
preference to an end desired and the second orients the end to existent conditions for
public evaluation. Put more simply, the first phase relates to one’s private will, whereas
the second is productive of the public will. It is in the thought of John Dewey on ends and
deliberation that the process of invention is grandly elucidated. Through a little free play
in the interpretative process it becomes possible to appropriate his insights in these areas
in order to apply them to a rhetorical frame.
Invention first needs to be understood in light of the paradoxical nature of an end
or aim. Dewey succinctly claims “that an end is a device of intelligence in guiding action,
instrumental to freeing and harmonizing troubled and divided tendencies.”389 An end is
an aim through which a present act is imaginatively “thrown back upon itself” in
deliberation to discover ways of acting in the “present” according to means that “would
389
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afford satisfaction.”390 The paradox is that an end provides deliberation with both a point
of closure and “turning points in activity.”391 Both are found in “terminals of
deliberation”392 that act as an end –“directive stimuli to present choice”393– and a
beginning –“perforce beginnings”394– when understood through the metaphor of
traveling. At a terminal one has arrived at a destination –a point of rest– and a point of
transfer –action– or “redirecting pivots”395 in which the journey begins, begins anew or
continues.
To imaginatively reflect on invention consider that it starts at a terminal from
which a particular destination –an end terminal– is sought even though the route is yet to
be determined. Along the various paths to the destination what is encountered along the
way can alter the travel, resulting in new terminals opening up even further possible
corridors. In arriving at the original destination, its terminal functions as a place of rest or
cessation from invention and therefore throws the person into action. It must be
remembered though that every terminal always includes the possibility for further travel.
In this way terminals or ends are actually “endless ends” with “no fixed self-enclosed
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finalities”396 and yet every closure –terminal point or choice– to invention –productive of
arguments– can also become generative of a new terminal for future deliberation. In
framing invention the end becomes the aim of a rhetorical engagement, which is arrived
at through deliberation.
Confronted with a contextualized particular an individual stands before a problem
that induces deliberative thought. As Dewey posits, “the occasion of deliberation” is
found in the “stimulus” of a “future” end shrouded by “confusion and uncertainty in
present activities.”397 To “experiment”398 with possible means to resolve this lack of
satisfaction with a problem in one’s world, an individual entertains solutions through
deliberation. The act of deliberating refers to “a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of
various competing possible lines of action.”399 In this dramatic rehearsal, a person
imaginatively constructs the ambiguity or contention so that s/he can investigate –walk
through– where certain courses “of possible action” will lead –the expectant triumphs or
trials encountered along the way– and their affect(s) or end. As each new course is
investigated, the objects –that “which objects”400– discerned, are registered in a mental
account as beneficial or as a hindrance. Objects are what we imagine will make the travel
toward the end easier, that stand with or are congruent and harmonizing. Or they can be
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that which stands against feasibly following the course to the end. Through playful
engagement with the objects of benefice or hindrance an individual modifies the course
until the mind “finds a way fully open”401 to the end. Once a path that is thought to have
impediments completely or sufficiently removed is discovered, deliberation “ceases” with
the culmination of a “choice, decision.”402 Choice, representative of “what we really
want” provides the “decisive direction of action”403 through which the problem is
addressed. Therefore, deliberation engages one’s own preferences or “biases,”
“stimulative” of “one direction rather than another,” in “a search for a way to act.”404
Deliberation and choice then are productive of a transitive position that can stand as
either a state of strong private will or weak public will.
While Dewey highlights and positions choice as the transitional point to indicate
the move from deliberative invention to action, choice actually riddles the deliberative
act. Each time the mind comes to an object a decision is made regarding its value and
how to respond to it. In considering questions of value the individual creates a distance
between the object and the self to determine through self-reflection its significance.
Consideration of the object is determinant of its value and forges an opportunity to
address if it warrants attention and if so, how to deal with it. Is the benefit associated with
the object imperative to preserve, or is it such that if the decided upon path includes or
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passes it by it is of no matter? Does the object present an irresolvable impediment that
makes the course untenable or is its presence justifiable, to which attention to it can
successful modify? Deliberative invention invites a person into self-reflection that leads
to willing and as such is productive of an individual’s agency relating to a public,
contextualized particular.
The private will is found in its truest, yet weakest form, when a present problem is
noticed as a problem and in noticing a person says, “this is not how it should be, it should
be like this.” This initial response can be nearly simultaneous as it pulls from held
preferences and hopes to generate a desired end or it can even evolve out of thorough
deliberative invention. In either case, when deliberation’s resources are predominately
limited to preferences and hopes, Dewey argues that the arrived at end is merely a
“fancy.”405 A fancy begins with “an emotional reaction against the present state of things
and a hope for something different.”406 Hope is both generative –like an end can be– and
guiding in that it supplies the motivating belief that even though the action found in the
current state is deficient, it can actually be modified so as to be satisfying, leading to
satisfactory results. Combined, one’s preferences and hope gestates the “it should be like
this” idea and invents a means to express one’s private will in relation to an ambiguity or
contention.
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Dewey pushes beyond fancy to speak of how “invention operates” when “old
consequences are enhanced, recombined, modified in imagination”407 for the purpose of
being an aim. The transformation of a fancy into an aim is dependent on adding to the
resource list the current context and memory. An aim is constituted “only when [a fancy]
is worked out in terms of concrete conditions.”408 Found in memory or recorded history, a
past answer to a problematic similar to the current situation is looked to as a means for
understanding the current “sequences of [the] known cause-and-effect.”409 The past
answer, “projected into the future”410 is applied to the situation “to generate a like
result.”411 Applying a past answer to a current concrete context entails combining the
fruitful aspects of both. Stripping away from the past answer that which does not translate
to the current context, filling in those areas that call for different means and incorporating
the specificity of the contextualized particular give an aim a “definite form and solid
substance,” a “practicality” that “constitute it [as] a working end.”412 Deliberation on a
current problematic rooted in ambiguity or contention, imaginatively invents an end and
means to improve the situation; first through a phase that draws upon one’s preferences
and hopes and then by adding knowledge of past similar occurrences and the concrete
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attributes of the current context. In the first phase the private will in a weak form leads a
discovery of one’s preferences and hopes, transitions into a strong private will or weak
public one, and then through the second phase shifts into a public will, ready for public
articulation and scrutiny.
Deliberative invention, constructed from Dewey’s insights, pulls from personal
preferences, hopes, past answers and present concrete context to construct how one
decides to act in relation to a contextualized particular. This view resembles and enhances
the more familiar rhetorical notion of invention that “involve(s),” in Young’s estimation,
“attention to the particular audience of one’s communication, and orienting one’s claims
and arguments to the particular assumptions, history, and idioms of that audience.”413 The
process of deliberative invention then needs to include drawing upon, in Bitzer’s
incomplete summation, the “persons, events, objects, and relations,”414 as well as the
tradition and “historical conditions” in which the rhetorical engagement is embedded.
These resources are productive of the “beliefs, attitudes, documents, facts, traditions,
images, interests, motives and the like,” that a citizen can employ in attempt to elicit the
“decision and action … [necessary] to modify”415 a contextualized particularity. Aristotle
contends that an individual “must know some, if not all, of the facts” related to the
contextualized particular, or else there will be “no materials out of which to construct
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arguments.”416 The summary list of inventional resources are sources from which a
citizen develops the “topics” or “‘places’ – issues, values, commitments, beliefs,
likelihoods” generative of and acting upon, in Michael Hyde’s view, the community’s
“common sense.”417 By knowing the resources, sources, and sense of the common the
citizen then is able to invent the appeals to be utilized. It is in invention that a citizen
considers “the actual creating of narratives and arguments”418 that will be influential for
potentially achieving his or her desired end. For a desired end to be persuasive though,
one needs to attend to the influence of the plurality of the community in order to invent
the rhetorical appeals necessary to democratic rhetoric and an authentic expression of
democracy.
This understanding of invention rests upon a particular conception of how a
society is formed through communication. To invent persuasive appeals relating to a
contextualized particular a citizen draws upon resources, sources, and sense of the
common rooted in the ongoing construction of a society’s macro- and micro-culture(s). It
is in understanding culture as a construct of communication and communication as
constituted through culture that gives significance to and necessitates the relationship
between rhetoric and democracy in its authentic form. The notion that culture is relational
and interactively constructed through communication is one that has emerged through the
work of various scholars. While one scholar would provide a prosperous perspective; to
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develop a nuanced understanding of rhetoric’s significance for the constitution of society
and culture a projection of the societal space in which a culture appears requires an
imaginative interweaving of the contributions of many.
From Symbols to Culture and Back Again
Symbols
Interpreting human nature and the nature of society provides a way of knowing
what is essential for authentic governance, and yet it does not foster an understanding of
how human beings and their societies are constituted. This understanding arises only
when humanity’s dependency on and relationship to symbols is recognized as its
preeminent characteristic, for human beings exist “in a symbolic universe.”419 This is not
to diminish the stark actuality that humans live within nature or material reality, for
human beings are born and caught up into the cradle of possibilities and constraints found
in the physical universe; but it is to emphasize that people have a “drive to make sense
out of experience, to give it form and order” through “symbolic activities” that enable
them to “live in a world” that they need “to understand.”420 Clifford Geertz contends that
the need for the symbolic is just “as real and as pressing as the more familiar biological
needs”421 and perhaps more significantly that “symbols” actually “are prerequisites” for
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“our biological, psychological, and social existence.”422 Through “symbolic expression”
life breaks free, according to Ernst Cassirer, of “the limits of [its] biological needs and …
practical interests.”423 It is through the ability to symbolize that one gains “access to the
‘ideal world’”424 made available through thought. Thought itself is an “internalized
conversation,” according to Geertz, that is reflective of those “external conversations …
we carry on with individuals” and therefore thinking “is basically both social and
public.”425 This means that thought, as George Mead argues, transpires “only in terms of
… significant symbols.”426 Through the symbolic, individuals are able to satisfy their
drive for understanding, think “relational[ly],”427 are “disengaged from … mere actuality
[to] … impose meaning upon experience,” which then is productive of “human
knowledge.”428 In the symbol, the reality of nature, the material, and the physical
universe and its laws, “no longer … confront” individuals “immediately.”429 Instead the
symbolic universal of human existence mediates between the individual and his or her
experience of it and the world s/he lives in.
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The symbolic universe is one that is “largely given”430 as each individual is born
into an established –historical– system of socially constructed and circulating symbols.
Analysis of a symbol, freezing it in time and space, is revealing of its general
characteristics while also obscuring the dynamism of symbols in use. Consequently, it is
imperative to be mindful that a symbol, rooted in a particular context, flows along a
stream continually fed by a symbolic system. Prior, concurrent, and beyond the course of
a lifetime an individual finds that symbols floating upon this stream “remain, with some
additions, subtractions, and partial alterations.”431 Rooted and yet dynamic, the
development of the symbol has allowed human beings to “make a sharp distinction
between real and possible, between actual and ideal things.”432 Its first characteristic
generated through and generative of social processes is representative of a symbol’s
“functional value.”433
Symbol’s functionality, as noted by Mead, is realized through their enabling
characteristic “to make adjustment possible among the individuals implicated in any
given social act with reference to the object or objects with which that act is
concerned.”434 In other words, when an individual is desirous to engage with others
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“deliberatively” or “spontaneously,” with “an end in view,”435 s/he must symbolically
express that desire, which is then generative of an emotional, orientational, or actionable
adjustment within that social context. For Mead, a “significant symbol” serves to
“arouse,” in both the person employing it and those others to which it is directed (or
pushing further those who attend to it), “the same response.”436 In his construction then a
symbol is a stimulus and a response.437 Using a symbol, a person stimulates or “calls
out”438 a certain attitude for both s/he and the person addressed, productive of a response
or reaction within a particular social situation. As a means of arousal, the symbol
awakens in an individual his or her consciousness by “mak[ing] him conscious of their
[his or her and the other’s] attitude toward”439 it. Consequently, the use of a symbol
allows one through reflection to make future (re)adjustments.440 To frame this insight into
symbols more succinctly, symbols are arousal agents that act as “‘designators’,”441
stimulant of particular attitudes that call for certain responses.
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For a symbol to achieve this functionality, it must also share communally a sense
of “universal[ity]”442 and “uniformity”443 so that “the idea behind” the symbol “arouses
that idea in the other.”444 Without this universal and uniform characteristic symbols
would not convey to any other the idea, attitude or response desired. This sense of
universality and uniformity is not rigid as a symbol’s plasticity, recalling its dynamic
nature, makes reception of it “extremely variable”445 and marked by “versatility.”446 Even
those symbols that have remained can be received by those addressed as eliciting shades
of or different attitudes generative of responses unintended by the person who employed
it. When this occurs, an individual is awakened to the distinction in how the other is
interpreting the symbol, foregrounding the difference and division between the
interactants. Consequently, symbol use is productive of (un)certainty. Significant
symbols shared across a social landscape create an expectation of certainty –that a certain
symbol will stimulate a certain response– and yet the same symbol within that space, but
more likely when used with another individual with whom cooperative symbol use has
not occurred or is limited, also can create uncertainty which can become a space of
learning through ongoing symbolic experimentation.
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Meaning
Learning to use a symbol is an ongoing process of awakening to an awareness of
the attitudes and responses particular symbols produce. To clarify this point, a symbol
becomes significant when a community of people learn what it symbolizes or means as a
code for the attitudes and responses it is to stimulate. Expressive of this claim, Cassirer
held that “a symbol is a part of the human world of meaning”447 and Geertz stated that
“meanings can only be ‘stored’ in symbols.”448 This is especially true, according to
Mead, when a symbol is significant or when a symbol is “internalized” to “have the same
meaning for all individual members of the given society or social group.”449 From this
perspective symbols are constructed socially to convey the meaning of an act; emotional,
orientational, or actionable.
The meaning identified with a significant symbol shares and is reflective of the
characteristics of symbols. As “the conceptual structures individuals use to construe
experience”450 meanings function upon “the field of relation between” a symbol
employed by an individual “and the subsequent behavior … indicated”451 in the response
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of an other. In other words, in Dewey’s definition, “meaning is a method of action.”452
Supporting this contention, Burke makes a similar argument when he states that:
To call a man a friend or an enemy is per se to suggest a program of action with
regard to him. An important ingredient in the meaning of such words is precisely
the attitudes and acts which go with them.453
By communicating a particular symbol to another, one is not only eliciting its meaning,
but in affect calling out within the other a desired attitude generative of a specific
individual response/act that will facilitate present and future cooperative behavior.
When symbols are expressed they call for a particular response, but they also
project a frame of reference for future acts within that social context. All meaning, Mead
claims, arises out of the “triadic relation” representative of the symbol, reaction, and
“resultant … given social act.”454 This understanding of meaning points to a “matrix”
from which one meaning employed “develops into [a] field of meaning.”455 For instance,
if an individual, cognizant of a public problem, calls for a particular solution to be placed
upon a future agenda for consideration by those empowered to act in the public realm, the
call (symbol), if successful, not only achieves its goal (reaction), but also then results in
the problem being addressed by those in power when they assemble (resultant given
social act). If they accept that it is a problem worthy of a public response they will then
provide the requisite corrective to provide what they believe to be a feasible remedy
452

John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, 1958),

187.
453

Kenneth Burke, Permanence and Change: An Anatomy of Purpose, 3rd ed.
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 177.
454

Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, 80.

455

Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, 76.
125

(further future resultant social acts). Thus, when a citizen recognizes a public problem
and voices his or her interest in a public resolution for it s/he not only calls out the
possibility of future resultant acts, but is also indicating that it is something that would
call forth a similar response or action within his or her self.456
By introducing a meaning into a particular situation, an individual identifies the
desired response as a response s/he would tend to produce as well. In calling someone by
an affectionate term, that individual “takes the rôle of the other” believing that the person
addressed will respond to the term in a similar attitude that the symbol’s meaning
construes within the person who used it. So while the meaning of a symbol allows one to
make distinctions productive of distinguishing difference and therefore division, it also is
generative of a “common basis”457 or identification of how the individual believes s/he
would and how those addressed should respond.458
While Mead provides a foundation to understand the connection between a
symbol or a symbolic system or order and meaning or a field of meaning, Dewey
explicates the implications of meaning. Meaning, for Dewey is “primarily … [an] intent”
to act, according to the significance ascribed to the symbols used, through “making
possible and fulfilling shared cooperation.”459 These social acts arise out of the dual
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nature of meaning; existent in “a property of behaviors, and … a property of objects.”460
Beginning with the later first, as a meaning is circulated within a social group it comes to
mark an object’s properties or essence in that it defines what that social group has taken it
to be or “what it is.”461 By ascribing and inscribing a thing, person, or event with an
essence, the community that has accepted a common symbol to symbolize it, they denote
what it means to and within that social group.462 Consequently, the symbol and its
meaning is not its “real substance of existence,”463 but is an arbitrary social construction
that constitutes its parameters in order to render it understandable.464 Simultaneously
though, when a “thing [is] pointed out … [it] gains meaning,” beyond what it “is at the
moment” (essence), connoting or encompassing “its potentiality, as a means to remoter
consequence”465 (future possible cooperative behaviors). In other words, meaning is
generative of an “overt actuality and potentiality, the consummatory and the
instrumental,”466 or what will be done and the means for its accomplishment. Therefore,
meaning points to an object’s character (essence) and its characteristics (potentiality).467
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From Dewey’s understanding of meaning three additional significant insights
emerge. First meaning, as noted by Geertz, is a conceptual structure, indicating that
while it arises out of a social context through interaction,468 it is productive of and held in
the minds of society’s members. As such, Dewey claims that a meaning can be made
“operative” beyond the particular context in which it is initially applied, carrying it across
“space and time.”469 The meaning of a social act can be attended to by a person prior to
its actuality (in deliberation of an end) or after it has transpired. Second, through the
potentiality of a meaning, it also signals “more than mere occurrences” as it indicates the
“implications”470 associated to an object or event. Taking both of these insights together,
meaning then enables “inference and reasoning” since an individual can think through
what certain responses and resultant given social acts or cooperative behaviors will likely
result from introducing different meanings into particular “human associations.”471
Meanings in this regard become “subject to ideal experimentation” through an
individual’s capacity to imagine what results various acts, differently “combined and rearranged”472 will possibly produce. Through this process of experimentation then,
individuals are able to learn how “some meanings”473 are or will be positively or
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negatively held by the members of a certain community. This then leads to the third
insight noted by Dewey.
Enabling effective experimentation is the consistency that meaning attains
through its significant symbol’s repetition and circulation. Its character and
characteristics are indicative of “comprehensive and persisting … standardized habit[s],
of social interaction.”474 These “rules” provide for “pattern[s]” of communicative
behaviors that are “established by social agreement.”475 Considering all three of the
insights together, a citizen preparing for a public discussion on a contextualized particular
is enabled through thoughtful deliberation, possible through symbols, to experiment with
different meanings to project how to best construct persuasive appeals that will result in a
desired, positive outcome. Similarly, after (or during) such a rhetorical engagement, a
citizen can recall the events that transpired, referring to the meanings employed to make
beneficial (re)adjustments in future collectively binding decision-making opportunities.
Typically significant symbols and meanings are lost in a sea of spontaneous use
that obscures the deep weight they have for humanity. In part this is a result of the
flourishing of symbols, becoming a ubiquitous phenomenon within the social space.
Since an individual is born into a social world inundated with communication, symbolic
orders –languages– are perceived as being natural instead of constructed. Language is the
culmination of symbol use and, as Dewey notes, “a natural function of human
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associations.”476 By ordering the symbols prevalent in a society, making combinations,
stringing together multiple symbols, symbol users develop the “strict rules”477 that enable
language to become operational. As a system of communication478 language reflects the
attributes of its building blocks: symbols and meanings. Therefore a language exhibits,
emphasizes and extends a number of the characteristics attributed to symbols and
meanings. Here, then, it is important to attend to those areas of emphasis and extension
attributed to language and the communicative conduct it enables.
Language
Building from the sense of uniformity and variability of symbols and meaning,
language exhibits a “conservative” effect upon “human culture,”479 providing “stability
and constancy”480 through “general rules”481 that guide its use and the meaning its
symbols ascribe to the social experience. At this formal level, the uniformity regulating
societal understandings of language practices make its shared meanings resistant to the
deleterious effects of usage by a multitude of individuals over time.482 Despite this effect
language retains the dynamic nature of symbols as it is “a continuous process” of an
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“ever-repeated labor of the human mind.”483 Meaning, that since individuals have their
“own way”484 of (mis)employing language in their day-to-day lives and relationships they
manipulate the general rules to match their own styles and needs. Therefore, by
communicating with other human beings, individuals reinforce the continuity of meaning,
but when making unfamiliar applications they can shift and change meaning as well as
(possibly) the general rules of language. Not only then, is the conservative effect, but also
“change,” as Cassirer claims, “an essential element of language.”485
To penetrate deeper into the implications of these attributes, it is necessary to
point out what Cassirer claims to be the “principle … task of human language”; its
capacity for “objectification and systematization.”486 In providing a system for symbol
use, language separates and categorizes symbols and their associated meanings, so that
individuals, Mead claims, can “pick out … hold” and “indicat[e] certain stimuli”487
productive of making possible the behavioral response sought out in the other. Utilizing
this system, language, notes Dewey, also “serves to register the relationship,” between a
meaning(s) and an object, thereby “making it fruitful in other contexts of particular
existence.”488 This system functions to make “distinction[s] and identification[s]”489
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related to the potentiality of the meanings ascribed to a thing. In facilitating distinctionmaking between objects, language serves to establish “all the difference in the world.”490
Distinctions driving difference leads to recognition of divisive state of objects in nature.
Just as significant, while things appear in nature, language awakens one to their
possibilities as objects of use. In making an object emerge, individuals become cognizant
of it, through objectification, as part of their lived existence.491 Language therefore allows
its users “to carry a set of symbols,”492 representative of specific meanings, productive of
and corresponding to particular objects, that have been created and arranged by a group
of people throughout the history of their ongoing association.
As a means to distinguish and fill the world with objects, language functions as a
tool to facilitate understanding, action and transformation. “Language, being the tool of
tools”493 says Dewey, is “a form of action”494 that provides “a means of concerted action
for an end.”495 By communicating with others, societal members are able to act in
“cooperation” and “modif[y] and regulat[e]” the “activity,”496 situation and even the

489

Dewey, Experience and Nature, 186.

490

Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History, 3rd ed. (1984), 8.

491

Mead, Mind, Self, and Society,78.

492

Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, 54.

493

Dewey, Experience and Nature, 186.

494

Dewey, Experience and Nature, 179.

495

Dewey, Experience and Nature, 184.

496

Dewey, Experience and Nature, 179.
132

members’ partnership that makes the action possible. These cooperative acts, are rooted
in the ability of one person to understand what another is communicating. “Language,”
argues Mead, “is simply a process by means of which the individual who is engaged in
co-operative activity can get the attitude of others involved in the same activity.”497
Understanding another rests upon one being able to react “from the standpoint” –
“perceive[ing] the thing as it may function in … [the] experience”498– of the person
initiating the communication. Additionally, when a person communicates, s/he
“conceives” of the object or act “not only in its direct relationship to himself”;499
considering it also as the other will relate to it. Dewey summarized this well when he
claimed that “understanding is to anticipate together” and “make a cross-reference”500
between that which one deems possible in relation to a situation or act through
cooperative behavior with an other(s). Inherent to language and communication then is
the cognitive process of taking the role of an other, especially when the focus is to elicit a
particular social response to a public problem.
The transformative effects of language are productive of the mind, self, objects or
situations. Mead argues that the “mind arises through communication”501 since a person’s
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mind “is essentially a social phenomenon.”502 Within the social nature of human life “the
individual becomes self-conscious and has a mind.”503 In society a person recognizes and
learns the relations between him/herself and the objects and others found in the world.
Through the “social process” inclusive of “social acts” arising from “social interactions”
that correlate to “experiences … in a social context”504 a person also comes to recognize
how the “social process” can be “modified by the reactions and interactions”505 of
society’s members. Comprehending that social existence is responsive to one’s
communicative behaviors allows for the individual to “reflexive[ly]”506 attend to a social
act, becoming aware of his or her and the other’s attitude in relation to the act, project
and make adjustments, and consider the possible responses. It is in “the turning-back of
the experience of the individual upon” oneself, enabled through symbol use, that the
“[r]eflexiveness, … the essential condition, within the social process, for the development
of the mind”507 is realized. Conscious of the social world, an individual’s conception of
his or her self also arises out of the social processes and communication s/he is
embedded.
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Awareness of oneself as a self emerges through one’s ability to “account” for
one’s role in and relationship to the social process. In using symbols the person addresses
his or her own attitude and response to a particular act. “The organization of the self,”
argues Mead, “is simply [one’s] organization, … of the set of attitudes toward its social
environment – and toward itself from the standpoint of that environment.”508 This
organization is produced through self-reflection, consciously turning-back onto oneself
the consequence of how one communicates in the social context. Each communicative
exchange then, “affect[s] ourselves as we affect others.”509 Or from Dewey’s perspective
the power of communication that results in shared “participation … is a wonder by the
side of which transubstantiation pales.”510 In other words, communication makes possible
the identification Burke says is part of human nature and existence. When an individual
identifies with another through interaction, neither “person,” according to Dewey,
“remains unchanged.”511 Drawing a further conclusion out of these insights –recalling
that “if we had not talked with others and they with us, we should never talk to and with
ourselves”512 or in other words think– when a person deliberately engages in thought
about a social experience or issue, through the internal conversation s/he transforms
him/herself.
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Symbol use, generative of the mind and self, fosters an awareness of internal
attitudes and desired responses that relate to social acts; acts that are primarily made
possible through the ability to communicate. As an arousal agent a symbol stimulates an
attitude in the individual that initiates particular ways of acting: emotional, orientational,
or actionable. When these symbols are circulated and communally shared they become
significant as a form societal expectation of or code for certain shared attitudes and
responses. Points of uncertainty within a social space, public concern over public
problems in which the course of cooperative action is ambiguous for instance, are areas
in which symbolic experimentation is most open to the potentiality and change in the
meanings that symbols carry. The consequences of meaning, indicate that when a certain
meaning is settled upon its effects ripple through the social space in (un)traceable ways
through their associated resultant given social acts. To achieve these ends though, an
individual, engaging in a symbolic expression or communication, has to reflexively take
the role of the other in order to consider the likelihood that the communicative act will
stimulate the attitude and result desired. Without doing so, participants will not achieve
understanding and therefore be unable to arrive at cooperative behaviors. Actual
communicative exchanges though allow for a person to (re)test prior conclusion about
particular symbolic use to make ongoing (re)adjustments. Throughout this dynamic
social process the individual awakens and constructs distinctions, identifications, and
new possibilities for action by drawing from and (re)arranging –including and excluding–
the existing, learned symbolic order internalized in the individual’s mind: a mind
constituted through interaction with and consideration of one’s own standpoint as well as
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that of others. Society and the meanings that suture together its people then, are primarily
a result of the symbolic order through which it communicates.
From this perspective, at each step of the process, it should be apparent that this
construction of the mind, self, objects and cooperative acts productive of society involves
not just communication, but rhetoric.513 Generating a shared meaning for a particular
symbol dictates that individuals are persuasive in presenting the symbol and its
application to particular social contexts. When a symbolic order, language, fixes meaning
to symbols, it becomes a means, through the associated stimulants, attitudes, and
responses that provide codes for communicative behavior, for persuasively enabling
(determining what is possible and acceptable) and constraining (determining what is not
possible, discouraged or disallowed) social acts. To persuade a community of others that
a particular social, cooperative act will be more satisfactory as a common response to a
contextualized particular, an individual must consider what other societal members will
perceive as positive or negative stimulants, attitudes and responses in order to influence
and generate a desirable reaction to his or her proposal. Additionally, with each rhetorical
engagement, societal members experience a transformation of their own thinking and
selves, even more so as they prepare for the engagement, reflectively replay the
engagement or consider how to make (re)adjustments for future engagements. This
understanding also implies that for collectively binding decisions to be truly integrated
into a social space and integrative of the citizens their participation in the rhetorical
engagement is of paramount significance since it is in the decision-making process that
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the citizenry experiments and learns the symbolic meanings that stimulant the decisional
outcome or response.
Culture
This story of symbol use is expressive of how symbols, meanings and languages
emerge from and are generative of social processes and human associations. It is through
“symbolic thought and symbolic behavior,” Cassirer claims, “that the whole progress of
human culture is based.”514 Significant symbols, Mead contends, “aris[e] … [out of] a
universe of discourse [that] is always implied … as the field within which … [they] have
significance.”515 When a group of people gather they confront unique problematic social
experiences that they must work through by innovating novel social acts responsive to the
stimulant of a problematic contextualized particular. Meeting similar challenges members
of this social group make (re)adjustments until a particular social act, aligning with their
expectations, comes to provide a uniform social response.516 This process, repeated over
a multitude of social situations results in the accrual of a repository of social acts and a
language indicative of Mead’s universe of discourse. Certainly, there is drift in individual
use of a community’s universe of discourse for as Mead notes, one’s “common response
is one which … varies with the character of the individual.”517 Yet each social group,
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producing different “common meanings for all [of their] members,”518 develop their own
understandings of the world and social experiences, thereby forming the basis for and
variety of cultures.519 These cultures with differing symbolic orders –languages– are
indicative of the variety of, as Cassirer notes, “‘world-perspectives’”520 found across the
social space of human existence.521 In other words, particular symbolic orders, productive
of unique universes of discourse, are also generative of a particular point of view for how
a people perceive the world through their culture. As Burke claims:
Our minds, as linguistic products, are composed of concepts (verbally molded)
which select certain relationships as meaningful. Other groups may select other
relationships as meaningful. These relationships are not realities, they are
interpretations of reality – hence different frameworks of interpretation will lead
to different conclusions as to what reality is.522
Consequently, to reinforce the argument that rhetoric is necessary for not only self-rule,
but to provide validation for the claim that authentic democracy rests upon an empowered
people it is imperative to drill back down through the end of social action and symbol use
–cultures– to the communicative codes influential of the social acts of particular
communities.
Individuals living in society with one another generate a way of living or culture
that dynamically emerges from their existent, structured social processes. Populated by
individuals born into a pre-existing social world, societal members identify with
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particular social groups and consequently coalesce into distinct associations. Culture
entwines society, argues Clifford Geertz, through the “webs of significance … spun”523
by its own members. Constructed, culture like a web connects a social space, bridging the
divide between people for the purpose of providing a place of provision, meaning, and
living. It is the source of necessary “information (or misinformation)” that “fill” the
“vacuum”524 between humanity’s physiological existence and the means to procure the
resources it requires for existence. Using Geertz’s example, while “the capacity to speak
is … innate” the language a person communicates through is “cultural.”525 Significance
signals that the webs of a culture individually and collectively convey certain publically
held consensual meanings: “culture … is public526 … because meaning is.”527 Its patterns
of meaning “give[s] form … and direction to … lives,”528 shaping their “‘…struggle for
the real’” in which different social groups “attempt to impose upon the world a particular
conception of how things at bottom are and how [societal members] are therefore obliged
to act.”529 Defining the norms for communicative behaviors through this ongoing contest
between social groups structures how experience is to be interpreted and conveyed.
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Therefore, to comprehend a culture it is imperative to understand its symbolic order
which in turn “exposes [its] normalness” or what a people consider to be common;
“render[ing] them accessible … dissolv[ing] their opacity.”530 Culture, “as interworked
systems of construable … symbols” provides the “context”531 –ever present, yet lurking
beneath a society’s surface– in which the “flow of behaviors – or … social actions” of
others are imbued with shared meanings that relate “an ongoing pattern of life.”532 For as
Fanon states, “to speak a language is to take on a world, a culture.”533 In other words,
being born into a symbolic order, inculcated by a society’s meaning making system,
means that one exists always already in a culture.
While a human being “begin[s] with the natural equipment to live a thousand
kinds of life,” a societal member is constrained by the webs s/he is born into, resulting in
him or her “liv[ing] only one.”534 To be caught in a web, the potentiality of a person
immersed in the connections that the web entails, seems to posit that culture is primarily a
limiting structure. Instead, as the previous analysis of symbolic use and orders reveals,
culture should also be conceived of as a productive power. Culture does constrain, but
without its “patterns – organized systems of significant symbols,” Geertz contends,
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humanity would be left adrift, “virtually ungovernable”535 as individuals lived a
Hobbesian existence as “unworkable monstrosities with very few useful instincts, fewer
recognizable sentiments, and no intellect.”536 Transforming monsters into humans,
culture sets the stage upon which individuals come to know and recognize their place
together in the world through facilitating cooperative behaviors. Its power does not
submerge societal members’ individuality into mere expression of a collective self;
instead it tangibly actuates “becoming human” through “becoming individual[s]”537 as it
allows for each person a place to productively employ their differing natural and learned
capacities. For Geertz, (wo)men are essential for culture, “but equally, and more
significantly, without culture” there would be “no [wo]men.”538 It is in how individuals
come to co-exist together in cooperative behaviors made possible through symbol use and
exchange that humans come to distinguish themselves, their potentialities and the
necessary conception for knowing how to exist in the world.
In order to persuasively propose cooperative behaviors to rectify a common
problem an individual needs to draw from the symbolic order, ethos and worldview of the
cultural context. A society’s “organized systems of significant symbols”539 or culture,
function, according to Geertz, to provide its “common sense,” emergent from its “ethos”
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–“approved style of life”– and “world view” –“assumed structure of reality.”540
“Congruence” among these building blocks results in “the imaginative universe”541 that
gives the social acts of societal members meaning. What clouds one’s reading of a culture
is its normalness or what is perceived as natural as the ebb and flow of a (symbolic) sea.
It is in “grasping” the particular symbolic systems, ethos and worldview of a people that is
generative of an individual’s “familiarity”542 with one’s own or another’s culture.
Understanding society’s “conceptual world,”543 pushes one beyond just being able to
account “realistically and concretely about” its people and their acts, it also enables one
“to think … creatively and imaginatively with them,”544 as well as being able to
“converse with them.”545
Culture in a heterogeneous society is not monolithic, it is a composite of the
various “powerful social groups” that “have powerful social effects”546 upon the struggle
for what is defined as real. These groups “revere … celebrat[e] … defend … and impose”
the core ideas that (re)produce their “intellectual and material” conceptions and
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actualities of social “existence.”547 To transform a society, a change in its “pattern of
social relationships” will reconfigure “the coordinates of the experienced world”548 and
vice versa. At the institutional level this would mean nullifying or altering currently
active establishments or constituting new ones. Especially generative for transformation
of a society’s symbolic order and lived experience, from Geertz’s evaluation, are those
that involve “politics” as it encompasses “the principal arenas”549 productive of cultural
meanings. This occurred when the American colonists revolted against British rule,
throwing off the authority of the Crown (nullification), to convene a republic ruled by
representatives at the State and Federal levels (alteration and constitution). The American
Revolution was preceded by and simultaneous with an ongoing shift in the colonists’
symbolic order that highlighted the power of the inhabitants for self-rule and selfgovernance. Therefore, changing a society’s “structure of meaning”550 provides another
level to influence changes in the intellectual and material organization of societal
experience.
Habitus
Breaking through the cultural layer to social groups involves a metaphoric shift
from that of a web of significance to space. Conceiving of society as “space” emphasizes
that its social actors “occupy relative positions” as “directly visible beings” who “exist
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and subsist in and through difference.”551 Upon a positional plane of existence an
individual is a solitary being who “coexist[s]”552 in and is connected to society through its
inherent relationships.553 Pierre Bourdieu, employing this spatial metaphor, positions
individuals on a social plane to explain how one’s “relational property” separates and
links with the “properties”554 of others. Using the metaphor of space facilitates an
understanding of society’s “social space”555 –“structures of difference”556– through its
entailments of “relations of proximity, vicinity, or distance” and “order, such as above,
below, and between.”557 Positing that “the social world is accumulated history,”558
Bourdieu, distinguishes social actors through their accrual of differing, operative capitals
that provide “a force inscribed in [society’s] objective or subjective structures … [and]
the principle underlying the immanent regularities of the social world.”559 It is through
the capital(s) that one possesses and accumulates and is given significance in society then
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that act to construct, influence, differentiate and structure the social world as found in
society.
All capital is not valued equally though, as each type of capital comes to be
imbued with different symbolical significance within differing cultures. Economic capital
–basically “private” ownership “of production”560 and accumulated goods– and cultural
capital –particular dispositions and practices– form “the two principles of differentiation”
for “advanced societies.”561 Using the relations of capital as the defining characteristics
of social actors on a social plane points to “a structure of differentiated positions”562 that
serve as references which allows for the “making of distinction”563 between individuals.
“Difference,” then, “becomes a sign … of distinction” that “endow[s one] with categories
of perception, with classificatory schemata, with a certain taste”564 indicative of
(dis)similarity. The position of an individual therefore is aligned with positions one takes
regarding society, societal members, and social acts.565
An individual as a point on the social plane provides one with “a point of view”566
from which s/he perceives and acts in the social world. From a particular point of view an
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individual or social group (mis)recognizes the distance between his, her, or their position
and that of others. This point of view, typically shared by others located in close
proximity, emerges from a similar disposition or habitus. A habitus’ societal function is
as a means for the “social conditioning” that is “generative” and reinforcing of a “unit[y]
by an affinity of style.”567 While not determinant of “unity,” a habitus does indicate “an
objective potentiality of unity,” as proximity “predisposes” social actors “to closer
relations.”568 As such, knowing the habitus of an individual or social group, is
“predictive of encounters, affinities, sympathies, or even desires”569 held by its member
toward each other and other social actors within the social space. It is this concept of the
habitus that is extremely valuable in comprehending the significance of rhetoric’s role in
engaging the solid, yet shifting ground of a particular society or community.
Since a habitus, expressive of a particular point of view “produces a form of
interest,”570 it is instrumental in constructing and sustaining a mutable571 “unity of style”
influential of “choices of persons, goods, practices” that are “distinct and distinctive.”572
Productive of “different principles” or differing interpretations of communally held
interests that an individual or social group employs to make differential decisions, a
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habitus discriminates “between what is good and … bad, … right and … wrong,
…distinguished and … vulgar.”573 Each habitus is “differentiated … [and]
differentiating,”574 imputing principal interests that are distinct from other operative
habitus and enabling recognition of distinctions between them. In a sense, the goods,
practices and tastes of the various habitus of a society “constitute symbolic systems”
composed of “distinctive signs.”575
As a symbol system, the “socialized body” of a habitus “structures the perception
of [the] world as well as action in that world.”576 How “social agents” engage the social
world occurs through the “practical sense” rooted in the “acquired system of preferences
… and durable [internalized] cognitive structures and schemes of action”577 reflective of
one’s habitus. When an individual or social group recognizes a public problem,
oftentimes it is the habitus that informs “perception of the situation and the appropriate
response.”578 Instead of making decisions “with full knowledge of the facts”579 a habitus
guides the decisions of its group members through “a ‘feel’” that anticipates “what is to
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be done in a given situation.”580 It does so by casting the principles of differentiation that
filter the relationships between the social actors on the social plane into the future; either
as the potentiality of a future “project” or as “pre-perceptive anticipations” provisional of
“practical induction based on previous experience.”581 These projects and anticipations,
generative of expectations, are based in the acquired dispositions of a habitus. Therefore,
they are typically more substantial in relation to decision-making processes that lead to
social, public action then conscious, intentional, deliberative choice.582
Reflective of this claim, Geertz in essence concurs with Bourdieu when he states
that “some of the most critical decisions concerning the direction of public life … are
made in the unformalized realms of … ‘the collective conscience’ (or
‘consciousness’).”583 Like Geertz, who contends that society emerges out of a struggle
for the real, Bourdieu argues that “the social world, with its division” is “a field of
forces” that structures how social actors act “in cooperation and conflict” upon “a field of
struggles” when “collectively” considering their “contribut[ions] to conserving or
transforming [the societal] structure.” 584 Consequently, proposed public solutions to
public problems that fail to account for, acknowledge and incorporate in some way the
various habitus of the social space that the collectively binding decision would effect will

580

Bourdieu, Practical Reason, 25.

581

Bourdieu, Practical Reason, 80.

582

Bourdieu, Practical Reason, 97-98.

583

Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 316.

584

Bourdieu, Practical Reason, 12, 32.
149

lack persuasive appeal for those social actors. Worse, a collectively binding decision
made without such consideration would appear unintelligible to members of unaccounted
for habitus and serve to disenfranchise their public contributions and participation. Such
an outcome likely would mitigate or negate support for the necessary social, cooperative
behaviors to bring about the desired social end that addresses a problematized
contextualized particular.
Bourdieu’s analysis of society is based primarily on the metaphor of the social
world as space and secondarily as capital. Both are productive for understanding the
structure of social relations and the necessity of addressing society’s habitus in order to
construct persuasive appeals for rhetorical engagements utilized in the context of
collectively binding decision-making processes. By employing and emphasizing a spatial
metaphor, Bourdieu’s contributions favor and establish the primacy of societal division
and difference since one of the attributes of space is that an object cannot occupy the
same space at the same time.
Communication Communities
Working from a different premise, Gerry Philipsen, builds his approach to society
through the connective threads of communication. From his perspective “every person is
connected to other people, whether the connection is obvious or subtle, tacit or
announced, strong or weak, active or passive, pleasing or repugnant.”585 Consequently, “a
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universal phenomenon” of human existence is “connections.”586 Society as connections,
is contextualized and “constructed” by the “situated resources, the discursive resources in
and through which the connections between and among people are thematized,
constituted or reconstituted, and managed.”587 A paradox of human existence then is that
emergent out of the symbol order, the situated, discursive resources used by a people, are
the unique webs of significance –culture– that hold them together and the context that
constructs and frames the “communicative conduct” of a society, as Philipsen posits, “is
radically cultural.”588
As previously explicated, culture is a publically constructed way of imagining
human existence; constraining lived possibilities through the context it engenders while
also productive of the cooperative behaviors necessary to meet physiological (resource
provision) and psychological (individualizing) needs. It does so by providing a discourse
effectually universal to a society, generated by and generative of common, consensual
meanings that inform it members of its concepts, norms and common sense, which
originate from the ethos and worldview that it describes and prescribes. Through these
attributes of culture, a society’s heterogeneous social groups engage in a struggle to
influence its symbolic order, social relations and institutions so as to conserve or
transform it. Philipsen, closely following this conceptualization, summarizes his view of
“culture as a code” representative of “a socially constructed system of symbols,
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meanings, premises, and rules.”589 Out of a culture then arise the symbolic order
employed by societal members to convey its conceptualization of the world and thereby
what it sanctions and censures. While Philipsen delimits his theoretical insights, based on
his empirical research, to speech and therefore refers to his theory as speech codes, it is
possible and productive to push beyond this limitation by applying his contributions to
communicative conduct in general. Communication codes then, of a particular people, are
generative of and generated by the codes found in their culture.
A code functions by putting its “particular elements” (symbols, meanings,
premises, and rules) in relationship with each other in a “particular way”590 and thus
wherever a particular pattern of elements –code– are operative, a culture exists. Or as
Philipsen argues, with each “distinctive culture” there is a “distinctive [communication]
code,” representative of “speech [communication] communities or social settings”591 that
“reveals a distinctive code of self, society, and strategic action.”592 Within a society these
ways of being, relating and acting form multiple dominant communication codes 593 that
reach only as far as its common usage extends.594 While those individuals who reside
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within its domain of dominance are “expected to conform”595 to it, they also live amongst
other overlapping, interpenetrating codes with which they develop varying levels of
proficiency.
It is one’s dominant communication code though that exhibits the strongest force
upon how its users interact and engage the world. Knowing the dominant communication
codes within a particular association of people then reveals their substance596 and serves
as a means to rhetorically engage with them. Dominant communication codes infuse
“substance” into an individual through its very “matter, … social life.”597 Individuals
develop and express, not only a means “of coding, encoding, and decoding”
communicative conduct, but also the “distinctive psychology, sociology, and rhetoric”598
that a communication code engenders. Just as symbols are imbued with socially
constructed meanings, all interaction is expressive of a distinct code that is meaningful
and is comprehended by the actor and others as a means of “doing something.”599
Through a code then, one’s expression of self is constituted, values are “embodi[ed]” and
his or her “process of knowing”600 is enacted, enabling that knowledge to act upon the
world.
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Directed by a particular code “the ends and means of social action” are
“thematiz[ed]” empowering its “knowledge about what to feel and what to do”601 to be
“properly and efficaciously … employed.”602 Familiarity of the operative, dominant
communication codes, influential within a collectively binding decisional space, allows
one to understand points of conflict, the why behind ends desired, and the proposals
offered for how to attain the necessary cooperative behaviors and act. It also is generative
of understanding how to constructively find means to mutually constitute satisfying
decisions for all those involved. In addition and even more significant, denial of a
dominant communication code in the decision-making process excludes its users as well
as the valuable experiential and practical knowledge it begets.
Communication codes are “learned” ways of communicating, involving “terms,
rules, and premises … [that] are inexplicably woven into [communication] itself.”603
How a person communicates exhibits particular “patterns” conveying the values and
practices of their dominant communication code. Recognition of these patterns, Philipsen
holds, marks what cultural constituents are “expressed more prominently” due to their
perceived significance and which resonate “widely throughout the lives of who use
them.”604 The power of such a pattern, is that from it individuals can conceive of how
certain communication conduct will be received, perceiving of the likelihood of outcomes
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yet to be determined. Thus, through a dominant communication code the attitudes and
responses of an individual to a stimulant are narrowed, from unlimited possibilities, to the
constraints of meaning found in the cultural imperatives that it carries.
While as Geertz contends, a “code does not determine conduct,”605 an assertion to
which Philipsen agrees when he stated that, “individuals … on occasion violate and resist
various cultural imperatives,”606 codes do describe and prescribe strong expectations
guiding one’s communicative conduct. Through their employment, social actors “evoke
and invoke standards of social expression” utilized “in characterizing and evaluating
oneself and others.”607 When these expectations are violated, the individual is weighed in
reference to the rules and premises of the code.608 When s/he uses them correctly,
unnoticed, and when employed eloquently, honored. In providing “orderliness”609 for a
communication community, a dominant communication code, allows one “a sufficient
condition for predicting, explaining, and controlling” the “communicative conduct”610 of
those who employ it. The pattern of communicative conduct of a particular social group
serves as a resource that facilities the ability to enter into communicative conduct with
expectations and explanations for the responses that communication elicits. Knowledge
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of these expectations and explanations subsequently allow an individual to better
influence the outcome of interactions with individuals who use that code. Therefore,
when an individual’s communicative conduct expresses the meanings and conceptual
world woven in and through the dominant communication code of another social group,
that individual not only knows realistically and concretely about who they conceive
themselves to be, the social relations they perceive as possible and how to rhetorically
engage them, but also how to creatively and imaginatively think and converse with them
in order to either effectively convey his or her own satisfactory proposal for or actively
co-construct novel solutions to the common, public problem that has stimulated the need
for cooperative social acts and ends.
Returning to Philipsen’s nomenclature, speech codes guide who speaks when,
how they speak and why, as well as where they convey what they speak about. Similarly
non-verbal communication speaks, personal attire and artifacts speak, goods and practices
speak, institutions speak, and the physical world is given meaning so that it can speak
too. How a person stands before another, his or her appearance, a nod of
acknowledgement or disapproval, symbols worn or waved, and even the procedures and
procedural rules for collectively binding decision-making all rhetorically communicates.
Constituted through this coded communication within a community are the self and
others; what is meaningful and what is not; expectations regarding social relations and
practices; predictions, explanations, understandings, and judgments of acts and actors;
and even how one conceives of, relates to and acts in the world.
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Symbolic Orders as Necessary Resources for Democratic Rhetoric
Only those voices from without are effective which can speak in the language of a
voice within.
–Kenneth Burke, The Rhetoric of Motives
The symbolic order, manifest in its most complex system, language, provides a
standpoint from which to see and be in the world. A shared language unites a society
through the common culture that the citizenry always already experiences. “Language,”
as Hans Gadamer stated, “always presupposes a common world.”611 A culture, productive
of the common sense or ethos that provides an approved style of life and worldview,
assumes a particular structure of reality. What a person perceives to be real shapes what
s/he judges to be probable, right, and good. When a people share a symbolic order they
are enabled to participate in a common interpretation of what is real and their relation to
the real. In other words, a culture engendered through language is expressive of what a
people believes to be reality and through their united perception a bond forms between
them through their shared common sense. This common sense is in essence the “sense of
the community”612 that guides how an individual member “sees things from right and
sound points of view”613 in regards to the “concrete situation(s)”614 that comprise the
community’s lived existence. For a people who live under the influence of a dominant,
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unified culture, their sense of the common, constituted through their shared symbolic
order, provides them with certainty when addressing each other persuasively. Under this
ideal situation the symbolic choices that an individual employs in rhetorical engagements
will likely lead to the desired cooperative behaviors s/he desired to induce.
In general, a common good emerges out of a society’s sense of the common. This
sense of the common helps to structure what solution will be perceived by the citizenry as
a specific common good in relation to a contextualized particular. At times this could
involve a solution held as beneficial for all citizens, but it also could mean that the
common good is specifically beneficial for a micro-cultural group(s). A common good
directed to a particular micro-culture, alleviating the burden of a public problem they
experience, can be productive of a societal common good in that the collectively binding
decision acknowledges these members as part of the community. In attending to and
acting upon what a few perceive to be a contextualized particular through the
cooperative attitudes and actions of the many, then can act as a means to establish an
understanding of the lived experience of the few. This focused attention and
understanding could then lead to new ways of conceiving future societal common goods
and shift the sense of the common to be more inclusive of society’s members.
Since the culture of a society is not monolithic, fragmented through multiple
habitus and communication communities that employ their own micro-cultural meanings
and experiences, the people’s sense of the common is also fractured. The more pluralistic
a society becomes the more likely that the common culture of the people and their sense
of the common will not provide sufficient symbolic resources through which an
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individual can effectively engage the people rhetorically. Consequently, when a
contextualized particular that is considered to be problematic requires the people’s
cooperative behaviors, the symbolic order of the common culture will not provide the
meaningful symbols sufficient to arrive at a collective will or a collectively binding
decision. Instead, individuals will have to build coalitions that secure adequate support to
enact policies and laws through which to govern society.
To foster within the diversity found in a pluralistic society a collective will and
collectively binding decision that is constituted out of the sense of the community and
representative of the common good, requires democratic rhetoric. Democratic rhetoric
emerges out of the very possibilities that communication engenders. Symbols act as
arousal agents that provide unique meanings for the individuals of particular cultures, the
individuals sharing similar dispositions due to their proximity on a social plane that
differentiates them from others (habitus), and the individuals of communication
communities that bridge difference through the employment of particular communication
codes. For each there are particular symbols that stimulate certain responses that are
productive of certainty in relation to attitudes and acts. Rhetorical use of a symbolic order
that does not attend to these meanings will elicit attitudes and actions within an audience
that results in uncertainty. This is especially true for non-in-group members when
communicating in contexts that limit their ability for embodied, ongoing symbolic
experimentation. In other words, to prepare for a successful rhetorical engagement that
addresses a heterogeneous citizen audience an individual needs to take up the meaningful
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symbols employed within society’s habitus or communication communities in order to
influence, let alone elicit, the cooperative behaviors desired.
While the meaningful symbols of a society’s culture provide its members with the
webs of significance that bind them together at a macro-level, for differentiated,
multivocalic societies this symbolic order is not sufficiently generative of the meaningful
symbols that are necessary for rhetorical engagements productive of cooperative
behavior for the common good of the society. To know a culture’s symbolic order allows
a person to rhetorically craft messages that resonate with the majority of that society’s
citizenry. This cultural knowledge provides substantial means to make meaningful
messages, especially for a functionally homogenous society, and yet in societies that are
more fragmented this cultural webbing is less pervasive and persuasive for generating a
collective will productive of cooperative behaviors for the common good in regards to a
contextualized particular. To increase the likelihood of making such connections across
diverse societal groups, in order to constitute a collective will that leads to cooperative
behaviors, an individual needs to engage the symbolic orders of the micro-cultural groups
found in habitus and communication communities. Chaim Perelman and Lucie OlbrechtsTyteca point to the significance of engaging the symbolic orders of others when they
wrote: “He (who wants to convince someone of something) acknowledges that he must
use persuasion, think of arguments capable of acting on his interlocutor, show some
concern for him, and be interested in his state of mind.”615 In the construction of
rhetorical appeals for the engagement of the citizens of these groups the invention
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process has to move beyond the intentional deliberation of persuasive appeals that only
consider those symbolic meanings found within the symbolic order of the macro-culture
to a process of invention that considers the meaningful symbols of society’s microcultures as well. The implication of these factors necessitates that invention is infused
through the entire process of rhetoric.
How a persuasive appeal is arranged, stylized, remembered, and delivered all
convey to an audience specific communicative meanings. Each culture, habitus, and
communication community prefers to arrange their persuasive appeals in a particular
way. This preference provides a temptation for some individuals to seek to privilege and
codify how the citizenry must structure their public rhetorical engagements of
contextualized particulars in a way that favors particular symbolic orders and cultures
over others. In doing so, the means for rhetorical engagement become an object through
which to assert power and dominance over other citizens. When this happens, the
constitutive power and ethos of democratic rhetoric and democracy is subverted.
Significance of Micro-Cultural Symbolic Orders for Democratic Rhetoric
In recognition of this point, it is important to note before proceeding, that
democratic rhetoric does not specify narrow constraints regarding how an empowered
citizen invents, voices, and engages public ambiguities and contentions –public
contextualized particulars. If it did, it would be susceptible to the strong and significant
criticism of democratic formulations that favor one type of discourse for governance over
others, which claims that such privileging is explicitly and implicitly exclusionary.616
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This criticism is predicated on the belief that society’s micro-cultural groups positioned
either at the bottom of society’s social hierarchy or at its margins can be muted by the
dominant group(s) so as to limit the participation of these micro-cultural groups within
the public space in which collectively binding decisions are made.
The process producing mutedness evolves through the relationship between
power and communication and results in dominant societal groups privileging particular
ways of communicating that are expressive of their experience in and understanding of
the world.617 “The experience of reality,” says Dale Spender, “of those who dominate, of
those who have power, dominates.”618 Through their influence a powerful group’s
communication –symbolic order– comes to dominant the public realm and governance.619
The implications of this arrangement are, as Cheris Kramarae argues the following:
…subordinate groups may have a lot to say, but they tend to have relatively little
power to say it… Their speech is disrespected by those in the dominant positions;
their knowledge is not considered sufficient for public decision-making… their
experiences are interpreted for them by others; and they are encouraged to see
themselves as represented in the dominant discourse.620
For subordinate, micro-cultural groups to speak into the political sphere, for their voice to
be heard, they have to either, foster and adopt allies within the dominant group to speak
for them or they have to communicate in a way that mirrors the privileged
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communication style.621 In translating from their means of communicating –symbolic
order– to the dominant form of communication there can be a loss in meaning that leads
to their ideas being undervalued or overlooked.622 Consequently, even when citizens are
viewed as equal, the experiences and ways of communicating the lifeworld of microcultural groups are implicitly or explicitly excluded from governance.
A clear historical instance of the subversive power of privileging a particular
symbolic order over that of others occurred in the municipal assembly of Belmonte,
Portugal. Following the military coup of 1974 “a revolutionary constitution and a liberal
democratic government”623 was adopted in 1976. This new political arrangement shifted
governance of rural local matters to Assemblies composed of elected citizens.624 To
facilitate “a fair hearing of members’ opinions … organize discussion and reach
decision’s fairly”625 the assembly, Robert Reed reports, selected Robert’s Rules of Order
to guide the Assembly’s communication. Instead of equalizing participation, members
who incorporated Robert’s Rules into their communication repertoire were active in and
dominated the Assembly’s proceedings626 over those who believed that the
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communication style of the Assembly should employ the common rhetoric found in
“informal debates in Belmonte’s streets and cafes.”627 Those who favored using rhetoric
common to non-elites of their community did so because they believed that the
imposition of Robert’s Rules invalidated the revolutionary ideal of equality for everyone
and for everyone’s voice concerning local problems and solutions to be heard in the
Assembly.628
Individuals who employed the sanctioned symbolic order, Robert’s Rules, learned
to speak within its communication codes and exhibited the proper disposition, so that
they could know when to adhere to, negotiate, and even violate the Rules. Members
preferring the common rhetoric of the community were muted, in “that they [could not]
participate fully in the Assembly.”629 In Reed’s evaluation, the imposition of Robert’s
Rules, “created a division within the Assembly,” that allowed one group to “make their
voices heard” and the other to “have little political impact.”630 Consequently, by dictating
stringent rules or norms for proper communication, limiting how the citizenry engaged in
the process, resulted in a division within the Assembly, flattening the inclusion of societal
difference and negating the facilitation of collectively binding decisions representative of
a collective will.
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Necessity of Productive Difference for Democratic Rhetoric
By defining the communication space in which collectively binding decisions are
made, unproductive division is produced and productive divisions are constrained. Such a
space is not a democratic space, for if the democratic process is to authentically retain its
vitality it needs to incorporate difference. Tocqueville alludes to this when he noted that
“to meddle in the government of society and to speak about it is the greatest business …
is the only pleasure an American knows.”631 To be able to meddle means, not only the
notion that the people are empowered to do so and that through their efforts they actually
can rule themselves, but that they can introduce differences that interrupt and thereby
agitate the dominant reading of a contextualized particular. By creating this type
collectively binding decision-making, democracy encourages rhetorical engagement of
questions that agitate individuals to ask questions, arising out of their differences, for
which the answers are open and not certain.632
In the realm of governance the decision-making process through which its actors
arrive at collectively binding decisions, productive of a common-good, address
“subject[s] … such as seem to present [the citizenry] with alternative possibilities.”633
Since individuals exist in a divided state and furthermore experience divided interests,
contestation constitutes the very core of the political sphere. In Mouffe’s appraisal it is “a
well-functioning democracy [that] calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political
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positions.”634 This clash is severely hampered when the political space closes down the
symbolic orders considered acceptable within it. Consequently, democracy that does not
provide a space for its citizens to respond to exigencies of political conflict and allow for
the employment of their particular symbolic orders is hardly worthy of conception.635 It is
only when governance creates an inclusive arena for difference, that the collectively
binding decision-making space truly recognizes and actualizes “democracy [that] …
structur[es] political conflict so that [those areas of contestation] might be settled through
the ‘force’ of communicative influence.’”636 It is here that the primacy of democratic
rhetoric as the means for political interaction finds its substantiality.
If democracy is to functionally exist, then a decisional space in which difference
and conflict is constructively engaged in order to produce common good –that does not
mute the symbolic orders of the macro- and micro-cultures of society is required. This
means that the citizenry needs to be able to speak into the collectively binding decisionmaking process through their micro-cultural symbolic orders. It also indicates though that
when rhetorically engaging a pluralistic audience that has come together for the purpose
of producing a collective binding decision an individual who desires to be persuasive
needs to craft his or her rhetorical message in a way that communicates across difference
by employment of the others’ symbolic order. Accomplishment of this type of rhetorical
engagement does not mean that individuals disregard their symbolic orders; it means that
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they integrate the key meaningful symbols of others into their own. To rhetorically
engage in this way –not communicating solely through one’s own symbolic order– will
produce in others the attitudes and actions that will elicit and coordinate the necessary
desired cooperative behaviors.
Symbolic Experimentation through the Process of Invention
Normally when confronted with a symbolic exchange in which symbols used are
not productive of expected attitudes and actions a period of symbolic experimentation
follows until coordination between symbols and meaning is mutually discovered.
Symbolic experimentation tests the attitudes and actions elicited through particular
symbol use for particular macro- and micro-cultural groups. Every interaction actually
involves the potential for this type of experimentation, but its probability is more
pronounced when individuals do not share symbolic orders. In democratic collectively
binding decision-making spaces, an individual who wants to enhance his or her
probability for influencing the decision does not have the liberty to experiment
symbolically during the rhetorical engagement. To experiment during a rhetorical
engagement would result in uncertainty. Consequently, individuals desirous of competent
rhetorical engagements in a pluralistic society need to conduct their symbolic
experimentation prior to addressing the citizenry.
In rhetoric, invention involves not just the mental exploration of effective
arguments, but should also include traveling through the entire rhetorical complex to the
provisional closure of the rhetorical engagement. It is through symbolic experimentation
in the invention process that has the power to move a private will, dependent on personal
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preferences, to a public will that has the possibility of positing and eliciting a collective
will productive of cooperative behaviors for a common good. To engage in democratic
rhetoric an individual needs to address the perspectives of others through invention, in
order to call them into a position that is supportive of the individual’s proposal for a
collectively binding decision. Democratic rhetoric then, does not just involve a question
of how one thinks the contextualized particular should be resolved, it involves asking the
question of how the supposed opposition and other citizens not part of a similar habitus
or communication community will conceive of resolution.
In asking these questions, an individual “unsettle[s]”637 what is true for oneself.
This combined with the nature of a public problem or contextualized particular –always a
matter of the future in which certainty is not possible– frames the collectively binding
decision-making process as inherently a question as well, throwing the individual
involved in the invention process into making the self, others, and the problem
“indeterminate.”638 Gadamer tells us that “questions always bring out the undetermined
possibilities of a thing” and that “questioning is … the test[ing] of possibilities.”639 The
process of invention, indicative of one’s movement through one’s private will to his or
her public will, begins with the question of the contextualized particular. It is when, in the
midst of the process, an individual imaginatively considers the obstacles that the
preferences and public will of others present as a hindrance to achieving the end s/he
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desires that the affects of rhetoric for transformation are truly in effect. The exploratory
period prior to the imaginative investigation during the journey one takes in the mind
through invention is a point of instigation that continues throughout invention during the
crafting required in each component of the rhetorical complex.
Invention through Symbolic Orders is Productive of Transformation
The claim that rhetoric is transformational is not radical when considered from its
end point. Rhetorical engagements leading to collectively binding decisions and their
enactments transforms the contextualized particular in a meaningful way for all members
of society, not just the citizenry. While the validity of this assertion is supported, it does
not broach the depth of the claim about democratic rhetoric being made here. Democratic
rhetoric always transforms and can radically transform how an individual engaging in it
sees him/herself; other citizens, including those in opposition; their relationship to each
other, society, and the contextualized particular; and the contextualized particular itself.
All of this begins with the process of invention and continues through the performance of
rhetorical engagements.
Invention is a mental practice and discipline that involves the process of thinking.
“A person who thinks,” claims Gadamer, “must ask himself questions”640 and
consequently consideration of a contextualized particular begins with a question. In the
process of thinking, a person mentally interacts with oneself about an object through the
symbolic order of his or her macro- and micro-cultures. Thinking then, as noted
previously, is an internalized conversation with the self about what meanings –attitudes
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and actions– relate to the object of thought. When one turns back the symbolic order
upon one’s self, that individual is able to reflexively conceive of him/her self as a self.
The self emerges out of an ongoing process of discovering and positing a person’s
attitude and actions toward him/herself. The meaningful symbols of the particular culture
that primarily shape the attitudes and actions its members hold in reference to their social
reality then actually mold how the person conceives of him/herself and the reality of the
world. In order to engage imaginatively or experientially with another person means that
the individual instigating communication, must take rôle of the other to consider how
s/he will respond to the symbols employed. This means that to induce a desired attitude
and action in the other, an individual must think through the symbolic order of the other.
In order to think through an employment of rhetoric would then entail familiarizing
oneself with the symbolic orders of others.
Beginning with the initial and ongoing questioning inherent to the process of
invention, “opens up possibilities of meaning,” Gadamer posits, “and thus what is
meaningful passes into one’s own thinking on the subject.”641 This uptake of meaning
occurs through the very nature of symbolic use. To construct a rhetorical appeal for a
rhetorical engagement an individual needs to process through his or her own symbolic
order and the orders of those whose support s/he deemed as significant. These other
individuals should also include those believed to offer the most pervasive and persuasive
opposition: to leave a powerful argument against one’s own position stand or even
preemptively unattended to allows that argument’s presence to remain in the mind of the
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audience, inviting the citizenry to take up that position uncritically, and possibly privilege
it.642 Such inattention to proposed solutions could and likely would result in an
undesirable alternative decision guiding the solution for the contextualized particular.
These factors inherent to a rhetorical situation necessitating cooperative actions for the
common good of society means that the deliberating individual needs to learn the
meanings of others. By doing so, his or her perspective of self and the world will shift;
either in negligible or substantial ways depending on the depth of symbolic uptake
involved. Through the use of others’ meaningful symbols the individual facilitates an
understanding of how the symbolic order of the other influences his or her attitudes and
action.
Knowledge of the meaning used by another opens up and enhances the
understanding of a person’s own meaning system. This allows a person to see how the
other interacts with and in the world in relation to the object and scope of the meaning. In
taking the rôle of the other necessary for eliciting the attitudes and actions desired, an
individual develops an understanding for how and why the other perceives a public
problem –contextualized particular– as s/he does. Once the new symbolic meaning and
understanding is integrated into one’s own symbolic order it becomes a resource for
reflexive consideration of the self. The transformative effects of taking up another’s
symbolic order do not end with how an individual sees and relates to him/herself and the
other; they similarly radiate through perspectives regarding the lived experience of
society, other citizens, and the contextualized particular.
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Contextualized Particulars as Exigencies for Democratic Rhetoric
Rhetorical engagements are the people’s responses to the exigency created
through an acknowledged contextualized particular or the voice of a citizen or member of
society that points the attention of the people to an unrecognized contextualized
particular.643 When a contextualized particular is not recognized by the people as a
public problem or even when the majority of the people perceive that a contextualized
particular as not being significant, while for others its importance is unquestionable,
rhetoric facilitates one’s ability to elevate the issue to the attention of the public. Being
able to translate one’s persuasive appeals to the citizenry, providing justifications
supportive of his or her position, will increase the likelihood of opening up of the
people’s awareness to the relevancy of the problem. As Iris Marion Young has noted,
“rhetorical moves often help to get an issue on the agenda for deliberation.”644 In a
similar fashion, rhetoric also provides the means to build identification between the
majority and others.
Reaching out to societal members through their shared macro-cultural or
individual micro-cultural symbolic orders assists an individual in constructing real or
perceived consubstantiality between members of the citizenry. In effectively
communicating how a public problem is common ground or a ‘we’ issue an individual
can shift views of the contextualized particular. Bringing a public problem to the
attention of the people and/or bridging a division between certain societal members can
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educate the people about their differences and even transform how they see and relate to
each other across their differences. Through translating the significance of these
ambiguous contextualized particulars into symbolic orders more likely to produce
attitudes and actions, individuals are able to rhetorical constitute societal identifications
that lead to common interpretations and understandings of societal goods.
Citizens faced with a contextualized particular that is recognized as a problem, for
which solutions remain a mystery, presents an issue that requires the potentiality of
language. Inherent to “the essence of language,” Heidegger argues, is its capacity for
“rift-design” –to open up space– through its ability “to tear up, to rend or rive, to turn
over”645 the ground it attends. In engaging such contextualized particulars, through
multiple symbolic orders, the citizenry make it a question that can be generative of
insights into its nature as well as what is needed to solve the problem it presents to
society. In his explication of rift-design Heidegger employs a farming analogy; when a
farmer plows a field the potentiality of the ground is realized since “it may harbor seed
and growth.”646 Likewise, when solutions are not unknown, rhetorical engagements that
are infused with understandings of the attitudes and actions –meanings– held across the
citizenry, demonstrative of their own micro-cultural perspectives, can stimulate emergent
creative thinking. By creatively thinking through a contextualized particular, solutions
that were not yet known, harbored within its nature and the people, can come into the
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consciousness of the citizenry through the growth made possible in the open space
symbolic order use creates.
When considering the typical scenario of contextualized particulars, those for
which the problem is known and proposed solutions are disputed, rhetoric allows the
citizenry to present their interpretations of the problem, their relation to it, and their
justifications for their advocated public will. How they see the world in relation to the
contextualized particular, its real life implications for their lives, their hopes for its
resolutions and their re-envisioning of what the world should be like once a solution is
implemented through society’s cooperative behaviors enriches the collectively binding
decision-making process and ultimately the outcomes. Rhetorical engagements that
incorporate the voices of all the citizenry allows for understanding of the contextual
particular to be mutually held and resolution to be representative of the common good.
When all citizens are empowered to speak into the collectively binding decisionmaking process the creative process of questioning and thinking, inherent to the
communication process, opens up ways of perceiving the public problem so that resultant
collectively binding decisions are integrative interpretations that strengthen the webs of
significance connecting the people and highlighting the common good. As is known
through lived experience and observation of exchanges in current political arenas these
results often are not the case. Rhetoric and rhetorical engagements do not necessarily
have to recognize their full potentiality for transformation and the production of common
good solutions. Empowering citizens to represent the standpoints generated within their
own habitus and communication communities just as likely instantiate exchanges in
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which the citizenry talks past each other. Individuals, not willing to invent their
persuasive appeals through symbolic experimentation, expressing only their own
preferences for solutions to public problems, risk dividing the citizenry into faction
further. Consequently, for rhetoric to truly be democratic rhetoric, rhetorical engagements
need to empower citizens to fully participate rhetorically and produce rhetorical
accountability through the power of synchronous rhetorical responses.
Democratic Rhetoric as Empowered Participation
At the heart of democracy are the people. This historically rooted ideal of
democracy has found its expression in two different ideological constructions of
democracy that manifest different means for self-governance. As will be seen, in ancient
Athenian democracy self-governance meant that the citizenry ruled themselves through
being empowered for self-rule. In American governance, representatives of the citizenry
are empowered to rule for/over the people, restricting self-governance to the people
governing their selves individually by abiding by the laws and policies their
representatives have deemed necessary for societal life and wellbeing. Democratic
rhetoric eschews the American constraints to self-governance by privileging self-rule: a
democracy in which citizens rule themselves through collectively binding decisions that
they not only establish, but also abide by because they have instituted the decisions they
have agreed to live by. Under this ideological construction of democracy the citizenry
fully participate in the production of the external laws and policies they live under as well
as actively participating in putting these collectively binding decisions into practice by
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internalizing them as legitimate constraints and lived obligations for the betterment of
society and the fulfillment of the goods societal life makes possible.
Collectively binding decisions can be made through two radically different
means. Human beings are decision-makers who can make decisions unilaterally as
individuated beings –division– or through mutual engagement with others as relational
beings –identification. The difference between the two is that unilateral decision-making
asserts dominance, while relational engagement asserts the primacy of mutual
dependence or interdependence. Unilateral decisions are productive of division, distance,
and closure. Mutual engagement is generative of unity, intimacy, and continuance. In
relation to governance, unilateral decision-making is found in the positive and negative
types of the one (monarchy/tyranny) or the few (aristocracy/oligarchy) ruling over the
many, while mutual engagement brings to life the self-rule of the many.647 The type of
decision making that is put into practice affects how the collectively binding decisions of
the shared world are made, thereby constructing the shared, lived experiences of the
world.
For democratic rhetoric to include mutual engagement collectively binding
decision-making must be inclusive of society’s citizenry and the citizenry needs to be
functionally inclusive of society’s micro-cultures. Each micro-culture needs to be able to
bring their own symbolic orders into the decision-making spaces of governance through
which collectively binding decisions are actually constituted. The rhetoric of those who
present proposals based on claims of that they are inclusive of the people’s collective
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will, generative of collectively binding decisions, cannot be tested and narrowed without
members of society’s micro-cultures evaluating their positive and negative consequences
through their unique lived –contingent– and relevant conceptual –non-contingent–
knowledge(s) of contextualized particulars and their implications. While as previously
noted, the certainty of collectively binding decisions in beyond the scope of certainty, the
probability of a collectively binding decision satisfactorily accomplishing its desired end
is only made more secure through the collective knowledge and therefore meaningful
participation of the citizenry. For rhetoric to be democratic then, instantiations of rhetoric
regarding public problems have to rely upon the active, empowered participation of the
citizenry in the collectively binding decision-making process.
Necessity of Rhetorical Accountability for Democratic Rhetoric
Participation in the collectively binding decision-making process is necessary for
democratic rhetoric, but it is not sufficient for its actualization. Citizen participants need
to also be accountable for their rhetorical engagements in the decision-making space.
Accountability, not only refers to an obligation for being answerable, but infers that one,
being obligated to answers for what s/he has called for or done, puts his/her person at
risk. As a result, individuals who enact democratic rhetorical engagements must be
answerable for their collectively binding proposals and risk their ability to effectively
participate in such present and future engagements. Democratic accountability compels
an individual who engages in rhetorical exchanges over a contextualized particular in the
decision-making space to consider the short-term and long-term effects of his/her claim
on his/her own self, micro-culture, and society. When an individual presents his/her
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claims through persuasive appeals s/he needs to recognize that it is not just the
immediacy of the moment that they will be accountable for in the future but the longterm effects of his/her proposals; not just his/her benefits that are at stake, but those of the
entire community. For a citizen to make these associations and be held accountable for
his/her rhetoric, democratic rhetoric must actualize the obligation for being answerable
and the risk to his/her person.
To realize the obligation of being answerable necessary to rhetorical
accountability involves two factors; one relating to temporality and the other to
inclusivity. A weak notion of accountability allows one to separate the obligation to be
answerable from his/her rhetorical act. Accountability is dependent on relationship and
consequently requires at least two to enact –this is even true when one holds oneself
accountable, in that thinking involves an internal conversation– in that to be answerable
means that there is someone to whom one is obligated to give an answer. For someone to
be accountable then there has to be another to hold the person accountable. Holding
someone accountable can be accomplished in the moment or later in time. When done in
the moment accountability rests heavier upon the person who is answerable, while a
delay shifts the burden more fully to the other. When rhetorical accountability is
distanced through time, the citizen audience has to remember the rhetorical claims and
the source of those claims in order to hold the individual making them accountable at a
future date.
In democratic rhetoric, accountability necessitates a strong version that maintains
primacy of the obligation for answerability on the person who makes the rhetoric claims.
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A strong version of rhetorical accountability requires that individuals making claims,
failed or successful, be answerable for those claims. If an individual’s proposal is enacted
it will be embedded in the mind of the audience, as the presence of the event and
experience sustains the collectively binding decision and its advocates in their minds.
Likewise, individuals who propose failed collectively binding decisions, due to society
investment and ownership, will lead to the holding of that individual accountable;
perhaps diminishing that individual’s influence and ability to address the citizenry in the
future. In both of these instances, distance is in part negated by enactment and its ongoing
outcomes. It is the rhetorical claims that are not substantial or that are rejected in relation
to the resolution of the contextualized particular that can become lost in the flux of the
multiple claims made, thereby slipping from the consciousness of the citizenry. Temporal
distance then is detrimental to holding an individual answerable for their rhetorical
claims.
Risking one’s person, necessary for rhetorical accountability, rests upon societal
inclusiveness within the arena of rhetorical engagement. The more inclusive the audience
an individual addresses the more accountability increases. When a person has to
rhetorically engage a group that holds wider, disparate perspectives on the points of
contention the greater the range of invention and relationships s/he must take into
account. This risk to self requires that rhetorical accountability be, not an anonymous
endeavor, but one in which identity and position are known. As Arnold claims, rhetorical
engagements “are not confrontations of impersonally symbolized concepts … and
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vaguely specifiable human beings”;648 they are embodied confrontations that are
inherently “always rhetoric-in-stress.”649 In putting his/her “presence” on the line through
his/her “verbal and physical behaviors,” indicative of his/her “entire physical and
psychological organization,” an individual “must stand with his symbolic acts,” thereby
opening his/her entire person “for interpretation and judgment”650 by the listening
audience. When faced with a diverse audience of others, an audience inclusive of the
micro-cultures of society, rhetoric-as-stress functions to heighten the risk to one’s identity
and position; compelling individuals to vigorously endeavor to be as thorough in their
invention and delivery of their rhetorical claims as possible. This positive inducement is
reinforced by the negative consequences to the self, in that rhetoric-in-stress puts not only
the reputation of the individual, but that of the micro-culture with which s/he is
associated at risk.
The greater the inclusivity of the citizenry the collectively binding decisionmaking body is –increasing the possible oppositional arguments s/he must address– the
greater the need for an individual to deliberate –invent– about how his/her proposal will
be received by those listening. Without a strong version of rhetorical accountability, an
individual would be able to make proposals that favor his/her preferences without much,
if any, consideration of others. With a strong version of rhetorical accountability
individuals who do not make productive or at least honest proposals that are inclusive of
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society’s micro-cultural symbolic orders, are liable to see their ability to rhetorically
engage contextualized particulars curtailed or rejected by the people. Combining the
temporality and inclusivity that rhetorical accountability requires, democratic rhetoric is
fundamentally only truly functional when rhetorical engagements are direct, face-to-face
occurrences.
Necessity of Rhetorical Response for Democratic Rhetoric
Within the framework established by the necessity of rhetorical accountability the
need for rhetorical response for democratic rhetoric becomes apparent. The essence of
rhetorical response is found in the ability to actually speak back during a particular
rhetorical engagement. The value that rhetorical response has for democratic rhetorical
engagements is that individuals making rhetorical claims regarding proposed solutions
have to consider that their proposals will be challenged. When immediate rhetorical
responses originate across the spectrum of society’s micro-cultures individuals cannot
just make claims based solely on their own preferences or contingent knowledge because
oppositional responses will come from not only the area of expertise, but also from those
who have the ability to speak from non-contingent knowledge(s). By allowing the
members of the citizen audience to immediately rhetorically respond –speak back– to
rhetorical claims they do not support, they can filter the rhetorical claims through their
will and judgment in order to render a response that holds the individual accountable in
the moment. When this possibility is denied, then individuals can make rhetorical claims
based on whatever s/he prefers without taking into consideration those s/he are
addressing.
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The implications of not creating a probability for immediate rhetorical response as
related to rhetorical accountability directly affect the obligation for being answerable and
the risk to one’s person. When an individual addresses a present citizen audience that is
not able to respond within the context of that rhetorical engagement then rhetorical
accountability is diminished due to the creation of temporal distance. Without the
likelihood of immediate rhetorical response the risk to the individual making rhetorical
claims is also reduced since the possibility that his/her identity and position being called
into question is lessened. On the other hand, it is the probability of an immediate
rhetorical response that ensure the likelihood of rhetorical accountability, in that
individuals who rhetorical engage contextualized particulars need to consider the entirety
of the citizen audience and their experience. In addition, citizens who have the right and
opportunity to immediately respond to the rhetorical claims of their opponents compels
these citizens to engage in the process of invention to formulate their responses drawing
individuals from society closer together through uptake of the differing symbolic orders
found in society. Both rhetorical response and rhetorical accountability then constrain
democratic rhetoric and its benefits of superior knowledge –inclusion of an empowered
citizenry– and its transformational affects to direct rhetorical engagements.
Conclusion: The Nature of Democratic Rhetoric
Democratic rhetoric is a form of rhetoric –persuasive communication– that is
constrained by the nature of human existence, communication, and the implications and
obligations of living is society together. To govern society authentically, the means of
governance grow out of human characters and their dispositions. If this is true, then
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authentic governance must acknowledge, engage, and achieve human equality, liberty,
power, identification, and public happiness. Democracy as the form of governance that
best enables the achievement of authentic governance must be based upon a collectively
binding decision-making process that realizes these characteristics and dispositions. To
understand what democratic governance should look like –how it should be
institutionalized and practiced– the means through which the citizenry engages one
another that recognizes the characteristics of authentic governance needs to be
established. Democratic rhetoric is that means:


Democratic rhetoric is generative of the sense of the common and societal
identification. Citizens, who construct their persuasive appeals through a
process of invention that explores and incorporates the micro-cultural
symbolic orders of society, transform their understanding of a
contextualized particular. This uptake of meaningful symbols used by
citizens with different perspectives on a public problem has the power to
enable a sense of the common across those differences. This short-term
effect, assisting in the possible development of a common good for a
specific rhetorical engagement of a contextualized particular, can also lead
to a greater sense of the common throughout a society through the
accumulation of ongoing, meaningful rhetorical engagements. When
collectively binding decisions are arrived at through a citizen audience
empowered to legislate policies and laws societal members are likely
drawn together through the necessary uptake of their individuated
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symbolic orders. Through this process then, the citizenry a sense of the
common is dispersed throughout society and identification between
societal members is enhanced.


Democratic rhetoric leads to equality through effective, inclusive
participation that is productive of public happiness. If rhetoric does not
have to specifically address a citizen audience that is inclusive of society’s
micro-cultures and their meaningful symbols, then the effects of rhetorical
accountability are significantly negated. A collectively binding decisionmaking process that does not equally empower the citizenry to speak into
and decide upon solutions to contextualized particulars mitigates the
effectiveness of immediate rhetorical response to compel individuals to be
inclusive throughout the process of invention and engagement.
Consequently, democratic rhetoric requires a functionally inclusive citizen
audience that is empowered to participate and make collectively binding
decisions. In addition, since democratic rhetoric necessitates that an
inclusive citizen audience, which participates through rhetorical
engagements that contested public problems engender, is afforded the
opportunity to individually or collectively act in a way that is productive
of their public happiness.



Democratic rhetoric manifests liberty. Liberty rests upon the notion that
citizens can choose and act in the world in a way that is reflective of their
desired ends. Unlike freedom though, liberty implies a sense of obligation
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in relation to the context of being a citizen. Under natural law the
obligation is to oneself, free to choose and do what one desires, but as a
citizen what one can choose and do is constrained by mutual dependence
necessary to achieve desired ends. To realize liberty as a citizen then
means that collectively binding decisions need to be born out of a process
that empowers citizens through a decision-making process that relies upon
mutual engagement. Through the parameters inherent to democratic
rhetorical engagements societal members can choose which contextualized
particulars –acknowledged or unrecognized– to attend to by setting the
agenda for their engagement in the collectively binding decision-making
process. Being the decision-makers enacts the citizenry’s ability to dictate
the course of cooperative actions taken by societal members. By
necessitating that citizens, across the spectrum of society’s micro-cultures,
are the participants of the collectively binding decision-making process,
democratic rhetoric fosters a decisional space in which the citizenry can
enact their liberty.


Democratic rhetoric fosters a better decision-making through
incorporating difference. In addressing a contextualized particular,
rhetoric is a means to present and develop probable and provisional
responses. When the collectively binding decision-making process is
inclusive of society’s micro-cultures and equally empowers its citizen
participants, that process is enriched through the non-contingent
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knowledge(s) found throughout society. Individuals of differing habitus
and communication communities perceive and experience contextualized
particulars in different ways, which in turn affects their knowledge of
them differently. More diverse knowledge about a public problem can lead
to a more robust contestation over how to satisfactorily resolve the issue in
that multiple standpoints. Through incorporating these different
knowledge bases into the collectively binding decision-making process,
thereby broadening possible points for contestation, the effects of the
arrived at solution will have been imaginatively tested more thoroughly.
While no guarantor of certain outcomes, solutions through democratic
rhetoric have a greater chance at being the best collectively binding
decisions for the particular contexts in which they were made.


Democratic rhetoric creates richer understandings. In constituting an
environment that compels a deep process of invention, applicable to the
entire rhetorical process, which should seek to understand the perspectives
of others, democratic rhetoric opens up a space for learning. The process
of discovery for relevant meaningful symbols employed by other microcultures adds to his/her knowledge about their lived experiences. Through
invention the imaginative deliberation to uncover practical and symbolic
obstacles and clear pathways to a satisfactory solution can develop
creative and critical thinking. Team these benefits, with the nature of a
question that interrupts conceptions of the self, others, what is thought to
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be known, and the contextualized particular, and the possibilities for
enhancing understanding in a multitude of areas can be realized through
democratic rhetorical engagements.


Democratic rhetoric is transformational. As an individual gains
knowledge and familiarity of society’s symbolic orders other than one’s
own primary meaningful symbol system his/her meanings are shifted.
Depending on the level of integration transformation can provide small or
radical changes in how an individual relates to areas that connect to the
specific contextualized particular and others that one is exposed to through
his/her related investigation. Reflexively considering the rôle of the other
is transformative of one’s own meanings, which are applied to
understanding one’s attitude and actions –meanings– toward the self,
others, society, and the contextualized particular. Through its dependency
on the process of invention and the productive constraints of rhetorical
accountability and response, democratic rhetoric shifts a person’s ways of
seeing and being in the world.

Rhetoric, since ancient Athens, has long been associated with democracy.
Athenian democracy and the role of rhetoric were recorded by individuals, either strongly
or mildly adverse, to both. On the other hand, American governance at the time of the
founders and framers, exhibited disdain for democracy and privileged reasoned debate.
Both of these forms of governance, despite their relationships to democracy and rhetoric,
have been strongly associated with the institutionalization and practices of democratic
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governance. In learning from and understanding the ideologies that structure these forms
of governance, their strengths and weaknesses, will provide guidance in how authentic
democratic governance should be structured to best allow democratic rhetoric to be
enacted.
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CHAPTER FOUR: IDEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE: IDEOLOGY OF ATHENIAN
DEMOCRACY

Introduction: Ideological Critique
Authentic governance involves a number of attitudes and actions that spring up
out of the nature of humanity and society. Equality, liberty, empowerment, identification,
and public happiness/engaged participation are not simply concepts and practices to be
held as an ideal, they are also a means for evaluating and justifying if the function and
structure of a government is or is not authentic. Democracy, as it creates spaces for and
calls people into governance, must exhibit the attitudes and actions –meanings– of
authentic governance if it is to satisfy this test of authenticity and thereby be satisfying
for the citizenry. Authentic governance is a symbol that stands for a particular set of ideas
strung together; constructing a particular meaning that is significant for a particular
people group. Such a framework for determining what authentic governance is can be
referred to as an ideology of authentic governance. Ideology is a problematic term often
cast in a negative light for the public and disparaged by many in academia –it is always
that which the them of an us/them binary holds and is blinded by, while the us lives free
of ideology. Rather ideology is simply another layer to the meaning-making process that
entangles all of humanity. The ancient Athenians, as the first formulators of democracy,
developed and honed democratic ideology. Entangled in the webs of democratic
significance more two millennia ago, the Athenians still provide the foundation for
189

understanding the democratic ideal. Therefore, to continue investigating and developing
an understanding of authentic governance as democracy, it is important to first
understand, in many ways re-conceive, what an ideology is, how to conduct a critical
ideological analysis, and then explicate as a foundation the ideology of Athenian
democracy. Through this foundation the American claim to democratic governance will
then be analyzed and evaluated in the subsequent chapter.
The Inevitability of Living through Ideologies: A Means of Sense-Making
Every individual exists entangled in a society’s webs of significance. The macroand micro-cultures’ symbolic orders found in a society prescribe and inscribe upon those
individuals, who ascribe to them, certain ways of seeing and being in the world. The
meaningful symbols of a culture’s symbolic order are not individual and independent;
they form a system of interrelated, interdependent relationships generative of unique
interpretations and understandings. (Re)presenting particular articulations of meanings
that call out and “select certain relationships as meaningful”651 a culture’s symbolic order
affects how its adherents relate and respond to what they perceive to be reality. Due to
the nature of symbols –in that they are arbitrary, human constructions– “these
relationships are not realities, they are interpretations of reality.”652 Through these
“different frameworks of interpretations” members of differing cultural groups come to
“different conclusions as to what reality is,”653 which enhances the significance of “some
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human preferences and [causes] the frustration of others.”654 As such, a symbolic order is
expressive of “a common set of norms” and “deviations”655 that are “loaded with
judgments” and “emotional or moral weightings” that are suggestive of “attitudes and
acts that go with them.”656 What then distinguishes the symbolic orders of the macroculture from that of micro-cultures and of micro-cultures from other micro-cultures are
not necessarily the symbols employed, but the meanings of the individual symbols and
the articulated meanings of the symbols put into relationship with each other. It is at the
level of articulated meanings (re)presentative of the ideologies associated with and
privileged by particular cultures that the distinctions between cultures emerge, become
identifiable, and are consequential.
Working through what is considered to be the most complex system of symbolic
(re)presentation, language, Burke provides a prime starting place from which to
conceptualize ideology. Each symbolic order of a culture coalesces around particular
terminologies. The nature of a particular terminology provides its users with “a reflection
of reality” that also is “a selection of reality,” which “function[s] also as a deflection of
reality.”657 Terminologies as such, act as perceptual screens, or what he refers to as
“terministic screens,” that “necessarily directs the attention into some channels rather
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than others,”658 The implication is that differing terminologies exert “‘terministic
compulsion’,”659 generative of ways to perceive “the same objects” through lens that
“were made with different color filters.”660 Through these filters, attention is not only
directed, but the possibilities associated with the object attended to are also implied.661
Due to the consistency –universality and uniformity– necessary for symbolic orders to be
functional meaning systems, when an individual is embedded in the perceptual screen of
a particular terminology, his or her understandings of and beliefs about the world bends
to what the terminology highlights. “Deliberate or spontaneous” language choices,
according to Burke, reflect, select, and deflect “the kinds of observation[s]”662 one attends
to, as well as how one interprets or gives meaning to those observations. It is through the
perceptual screens instantiated through terminologies that an individual observes,
perceives, relates to, feels, acts, and judges his or her own existence and that of others in
the world. While these insights are consistent with the nature of symbols, meanings, and
language, Burke’s limitation to terminologies and thus terministic screens is too
restrictive for the totality of the meaningful symbolic representations available to
particular cultures. A more productive conceptualization of how each culture chains
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together certain meanings in order to give meaning to a particular emotional, intellectual,
social, and/or material object or context is the idea of ideology.
A set of terminology is productive of a perceptual screen that frames the
experiential and conceptual, the attitudes and actions of the person employing the
terminology. Even though “language and ideology are not the same”; ideologies, like
language, are a means “through which we represent, interpret, understand and ‘make
sense’ of some aspect of social existence.”663 While conceptually ideology eludes a
“single adequate definition” because of its “wide range of historical meanings,”664 its use
here, as I conceive it, will point to a system of meaning relating to a particular contextual
domain for a particular association of people. Ideologies, as systems of meaning, have a
structure and function that shapes its various cultural interpretations, understandings, and
individual and cooperative acts.
The Structure of an Ideology
The structure of an ideology is primarily symbolic. The notion of the symbolic
used here though encompasses materiality, as the division between the symbolic and
material for human beings is an artificial construction. For while materiality, what we
consider real and concrete either preceding the application of human efforts or not, preexists the symbolic, it only meaningfully exists for human beings and society when it is
recognized as being symbolic. Consider Burke’s contention concerning materiality –
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nonverbal– made when discussing persuasion: “For nonverbal conditions or objects can
be considered as signs by reason of persuasive ingredients inherent in the ‘meaning’ they
have for the audience to which they are ‘addressed’.”665 For instance, a common
instrument of citizen participation, a cast ballot, is a material object that involves a
ritualized practice, a performance, infrastructure, institutions, and once acted upon
subsequent concrete consequences. To cast a ballot –to vote– a system of practices needs
to be established that consensually a group of people recognize as being a means for
representing individual judgments. For these practices to be meaningful though,
individuals need to perform them by entering the space designated for the purpose of
casting the ballot. This practice and performance then needs correlated infrastructure that
facilitates the necessary individual and cooperative behaviors. Institutions fostering this
infrastructure and which regulate and maintain the viability of these acts are needed to
allow for the repetition of the practices and performances of voting. In addition, other
sundry institutions, infrastructures, performances, practices, and objects have to emerge if
not already existent and be maintained in order to carry out the consequence of the vote.
The object used to cast the ballot is meaningless in this context without being symbolic
for the people employing it as a means for voting. A ballot and all of its associated
entailments, which are conceptual and concrete, have little value for victors or others if it,
its uses, and its consequences are not symbolically meaningful. What is material then, to
be interpreted as meaningful, has to be rendered and taken up into the symbolic order of a
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particular people group. In other words, no matter if considering what is conceptual or
material for it to become part of a culture it must be a meaningful symbol.
Ideology as symbolic is structured as “a system (with its own logic and rigour) of
… images, myths, ideas or concepts” that Althusser argues is “endowed with a historical
existence and role within a given society.”666 Stuart Hall, “refer[s] to those images,
concepts and premises”667 as “mental frameworks –the languages, the concepts,
categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation–” that structure how
individuals and communities “make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the
way society works.”668 Composed of “practical as well as the theoretical knowledges”669
ideologies are constructs that string together multiple symbols to form “distinctive set(s)
or chain(s) of meanings.”670 The structure of an ideology is found in its linked constructs
–ideas, beliefs, values, attitudes, practices, institutions, and material objects– that
“connote – summon – one another”671 in order to generate particular “schemas of
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interpretation.”672 What distinguishes one ideology from another then are either the links
and/or how the links are articulated.
Ideology as an “ideological chain”673 rests upon Hall’s idea of articulation.
Articulation configures the constructs –links– of an ideology in a particular pattern that
structure its meaning in a unique way. The arrangement of the links of an ideological
chain is productive of and privileges a certain meaning. This imagery of a chain though
can be misleading for two reasons. First, the linkages of a chain are ordered linearly and
therefore typically conjure an image of one link connected to the links before and after it.
The linkages between the constructs are much more dynamic and diverse as they
converge together to influence meaning. Second, it is the weight or significance of a
link’s meaning in relation to the ideology that mark its importance for interpreting,
understanding, and even transforming the ideology. Structurally an ideology is like a
confluence of constructs; with the more significant constructs –stronger interpretative
value– found at the center and those with less significance at the edge. Perhaps a better
visual representation of the relationship and significance of the links then would be a
cluster; with the more meaningful constructs closer to the cluster’s core while those less
significant are found on the fringe. The benefits of the chain imagery is that it is easier to
perceive each link as distinct and to parse out each links’ entailments, while a cluster
provides a better understanding of which links have greater significance for meaning
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construction and their interconnectivity –which effects the meaning of one construct and
the meaning of the ideology is affected.
Since cultures exist concurrently there are multiple ideologies circulating in a
society. In a heterogeneous society, ideologies of one cultural group can be taken up,
“negotiated,”674 or resisted by another cultural group. Each pattern of articulation
generates different ideological meanings and effects even if the core constructs of an
ideology appear to be the same. When authentic governance is conceived of as liberty,
equality, empowerment, identification, and public happiness these conceptions are
representative of core constructs for an ideological chain. The first three links of liberty,
equality, and empowerment are privileged as core constructs for American governance.
Yet, consider the construct of equality. Even though the Declaration of Independence
claimed that all men are created equal, equality as constructed in the Constitution
entailed that not all individuals were considered men or human and therefore its defining
characteristics or entailments narrowly constrained equality. As notions about governance
and human rights shifted culturally modifications to the Constitution enlarged the scope
of equality to incorporate all men and then all women of a certain age. Each construct of
an ideological chain is symbolically meaningful for specific cultures and it is the
entailments of the construct’s meaning that shape the ideology specifically for the
members of that culture.
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Since ideologies are socially constructed “‘chains of meanings’”675 that frame the
way cultural members understand and relate to their social world, ideologies are a site of
societal contestation. As constructions ideologies, like meanings and symbols, can be
(re)defined. An ideological struggle –a way to define what is considered to be real in the
world– occurs:
not only when people try to displace, rupture or contest [an ideology] by
supplanting it with some wholly new alternative set of terms, but also when they
interrupt the ideological field and try to transform its meaning by changing or rearticulating its associations.676
In other words, by reordering, adding or subtracting, and/or transforming the constructs
that comprise an ideological chain or the constructs’ entailments, the way in which social
and political existence is understood and experienced can be reconstituted.677
Reconfiguring the constructs of an ideology “establish[es] a new articulation” that
“produc[es] a different meaning.”678 This holds true as well when the entailments of a
construct(s) is shifted to include different defining characteristics. Consequently, as will
be seen in the subsequent analyses of the ideologies of Athenian democracy and
American governance, even when ideologies employ core constructs that are seemingly
similar, if one or more of the constructs entails different meanings the meaning and the
effects of the ideology will differ as well.
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Ideological Effects – Functions
In essence, since an ideology is structurally a complex meaning system built upon
language, yet also inclusive of all meaningful symbols of a culture, it function also flows
from its attributes as a symbolic system of meaning. To be meaningful then an ideology
must be consensually agreed upon; its strength and scope of agreement is dependent upon
its cultural currency; and just as “meaning cannot be conceptualized outside the field of
play of power relations”679 neither can an ideology. Consensual agreement is necessary in
that ideologies are social constructions that allow cultural members to share the meanings
associated with a particular context. The currency of an ideology is established and
maintained through how it is circulated, the frequency of its circulation, and its
significance. How an ideology is circulated affects its currency through the acceptance of
the medium by the cultural members. During the period prior to and during the American
Revolution the populace of predominately English citizens came to think of themselves
first and foremost as Americans through the messages distributed through the popular
medium of the pamphlet. Highly circulated ideologies can gain importance for cultural
members through their consistent presence in the culture. The construct of equality in the
articulation of the ideology of American governance has been continually conveyed
throughout America’s history and remains as a foundational ideal that is consistently
circulated. Significance is productive of currency, even when an ideology is rarely
circulated, in that its meaning is judged by cultural members as being core to their
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interpretation and understanding of a particular lived context. For instance, while the
significance of knowledge for governing, particularly as exhibited by the founders and
framers of America, though not highly circulated, is still a valued construct that resonates
with Americans when selecting those who rule over them. Currency is also connected to
the power relations in which cultural groups and their ideologies are embedded.
Individuals or collectives that have power within a culture and even society are able to
privilege particular definitions –knowledge– of meaningful symbols over others.
Likewise, cultural members of powerful cultural groups have more influence in defining
which particular ideologies shape society and how its members can demonstrate their
connection to it. With enhanced power the ability of these cultural members to circulate
the ideologies they ascribe to is elevated over the ideologies of other less powerful
cultural members. Consequently, these powerful groups have a greater ability to define
social reality for its own members and those of the macro-culture. The consensual
agreement, currency, and power relations differentiating cultural members provide the
baseline for how meanings of an ideology are functionally conveyed to and disseminated
throughout society. The real functional power of an ideology though is derived from the
“‘material force’”680 it prescribes and inscribes upon those who ascribe to its meanings.
Meanings are constitutive of attitudes and actions for those who accept and
ascribe to them. These meanings are also used to interpret and conceive of others, one’s
self, and the roles each should take up and act out in the world. Similarly, ideologies are
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productive of subject positions that lead to the development and maintenance of related
practices, performances, institutions and infrastructures. Althusser highlights this
function of ideology when he contends that an ideology is productive of “material
existence.”681 Ideologies work by “produc[ing] different forms of social
consciousness.”682 As a meaning system productive of a social consciousness an ideology
posits a reality for the world that influences the way a person should inhabit that reality.
Reflective of the structure and function of an ideology, Hall claims that they “are the
frameworks of thinking and calculation about the world – the ‘ideas’ which people use to
figure out how the social world works, what their place is in it and what they ought to
do.”683 As such ideologies present ideals about how to be in the world. To be in the
world, following the specific social consciousness of an ideology is productive of ideals
that frame how an adherent should be, behave, and construct their world.
At the center of ideological materiality is the ideal subject position an ideological
chain constructs and continually calls people into.684 An ideology provides an ideal
ideological formation of the subject that is a model by which an individual compares
her/himself to in order to distinguish his or her positionality within the people group
adhering to that ideology. When an individual takes up an ideology s/he enters into a
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circular relationship connecting the ideology to an ideal subject position: “the subject is
constitutive of all ideology” only “insofar as all ideology has the function (which defined
it) of constituting concrete individuals as subjects.”685 At the core of this relationship,
according to Althusser, is the dual meaning of the symbol, subject, which he defines as:
“(1) A free subjectivity, a centre of initiatives, author of and responsible for its actions;
(2) a subjected being, who submits to a higher authority, and is therefore stripped of all
freedom except that of freely accepting his submission.”686 So while the ideal “[s]ubject
…subjects the subject to the [ideal] subject”687 position “a subject, free to obey or
disobey the appeal” can embody good or bad individual and collective enactments of the
ideal subject position.688 While not deterministic, in that individuals have the capacity to
select the ideologies they ascribe to, highly accepted ideologies tend to disappear into the
background so that its meanings –called forth attitudes and actions– are “taken-forgranted.”689 “‘Natrualized’” ideologies typically “work unconsciously”690 so that the free
subjectivity Althusser notes is subverted in that an ideology guides the individual in
accepting its (re)presentation of reality as obvious.
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For a person to belong to a culture s/he is called to a subject position that
performs practices supportive of particular forms of institutions and institutional
infrastructure. Hall contends that ideological meanings:
are through and through inscribed in social relations and structures. They function
and operate socially only insofar as they are and can be, by specific cultural and
political practices, articulated to various social positions, and insofar as they
constitute and reconstitute social subjects.691
When an individual is responsive to the call of an ideology s/he enters into a relationship
that is constitutive of a sense of belonging to the ideals of the ideology and other
individuals who subscribe to the reality it constructs. The act of belonging, according to
Kraus, involves a “self-positioning” as well as being “positioned by others.”692 The state
of belonging then is an enactment of a subject position that is “negotiated, tested,
confirmed, rejected or qualified again and again.”693 The symbolic meaning of an
ideological chain moves a person to take up the attitudes and acts the ideological meaning
calls for and entails. In other words, just as the “ideas”694 held by an individual typically
guide a person’s acts, which are material, a people form institutions that empower the
manifestation of their ideas through supportive practices; for as Althusser claims “there is
no practice except by and in an ideology.”695 Or stated differently, an ideology functions
through practices that, as they are taken up, transform individuals into subjects, who in
691
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turn (re)constitute and (re)circulate the ideology symbolically through associated
meaningful symbols and materials.
Ideologies, due to symbolic residual their function in the societal and cultural
context leaves behind, are an effective means to investigate how different associations of
people have governed themselves. There are two historical instantiations of governance
relevant for this inquiry into democracy and democratic governance. The first occurred in
ancient Athens and the later manifested during the period of the founders and framers of
America. To highlight the key differences between these two forms of governance the
core constructs of their ideological chains and their entailments will be established. The
differing ideological effects –functions– of both will also be explicated. Through this
investigation the form of governance that provides the most productive means for the
realization of authentic governance –direct democracy of ancient Athens– will then be
used as a model to generate a system of authentic democratic governance that could be
employed in the contemporary American context.
Athenian Democracy
The day began with the sun rising out of the Aegean Sea, cresting the island of
Salamis before directly shining its light upon Athens’ port city of Piraeus. Rowers,
officers, tack, and minimal supplies were all on board as the rowers slipped their oar
blades into the water to launch the warship, a trireme. The rowing master, keleustês, set
the pace as the ship glided through the protected and fortified harbor that housed the
might of the Athenian people, its navy. With the rhythm of one single beating heart one
hundred and seventy men simultaneously pulled one hundred and seventy oars to power
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the ship through the sea. History greeted the crew as they turned the trireme to the North
and merged with others to form a squadron that would patrol the vital sea routes to the
Hellespont. Mere decades ago, in 480 B.C. the greatest naval battle the Athenians had
ever participated in occurred between the Persians and the Greeks in the narrow slip of
water between Athens and the island of Salamis. Pushed to the brink by the invading
hordes of barbarians, who crushed the Spartan led Greek army at the Battle of
Thermopylae and occupied and burned to the ground an evacuated Athens, the Greeks
routed the vastly numerically superior Persian fleet at Salamis and later vanquished the
Persian army in 479 B.C. at the battle of Plataea.
Athens, with its massive, unparalleled navy, emerged from the war, along with the
Spartans, as a leader of the Greeks. Not only did victory and preeminence crown Athens
but all of its citizens as well. Nearly a quarter of a century before the battle of Salamis the
Athenians had instituted reforms that had firmly established their democratic orientation
and with the success of its navy, populated by all of the classes of free Athenian male
citizens, democracy had also benefitted. As Aristotle would later claim, democracy in
Athens was strengthened through “the victory of Salamis, which was gained by the
common people who served in the fleet.”696 Reflecting back on that history the trierarch
or captain of the trireme, standing upon its deck, looked down into the hull of the ship,
Demokratia,697 to see the power of Athens at its oars: democratic, free citizens.
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Power: Empowered for Self-Rule
Democracy for the Athenians was an emerging phenomenon that centered on a
crucial core construct. In Greek, the word democracy unites, “kratos, a term for power,
and demos, a term for ‘the people’.”698 Josiah Ober notes that while dêmokratia can be
translated as “the power of the people” it was more likely that to the citizens of Athens,
democracy meant “‘the capacity of a public … to accomplish things of value in the public
realm’ – thus ‘the empowered people’.”699 Robert Dahl notes:
“during the first half of the fifth century when ‘the people’ (the demos) steadily
gained acceptance as the sole legitimate authority in ruling, the word ‘democracy’
– rule by the people – also seems to have gained ground as the most appropriate
name for the new system.”700
In other words, as political theorist Sheldon Wolin writes, the citizens of Athens came to
recognize “that the power of the polis was, in large measure, their power.”701 Aristotle’s
own analysis of democracy, “democracy is the form of government in which the free are
rulers,”702 clearly conveyed this notion of the people, deemed citizens, being empowered
for self-rule. It must be remembered that in ancient Athens the empowered citizenry was
narrowly conceived to exclude women, children, foreigners, and slaves. Yet by putting
power into the hands of this narrow band of citizens –Athenian males– Athenian
democracy did something that was up to that point historically and politically
698
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inconceivable; it elevated those who had previously been ruled to a position of
collectively ruling the affairs of their own country.
This core construct of an empowered people, which was positioned at the center
of the Athenians’ ideological cluster for democracy, did not stand alone. Here the
definition of mere definition of democracy fails us and necessitates a more complete
explication of its additional core constructs. This is especially true since democracy
represented more than simply the Athenian way of governance; it defined for many their
way of being in the world.703 As such, the core construct of democracy –an empowered
people– fostered a number of other core constructs or significant ideas and practices.
Knowledge: A Finite Human Capacity
If empowered people is set as the cornerstone of Athenian democracy, then two
significant beliefs about governance and knowledge provided foundation stones which
functioned to justify, in part, the people’s right to rule through self-government. The first
belief, that citizens are sufficiently knowledgeable to govern their public affairs,704 is
implied in Aristotle’s observation that “the many, of whom each individual is but an
ordinary person, when they meet together may very likely be better than the few good, if
regarded not individually but collectively.”705 The citizens of Athens believed that they
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“were competent to make political judgments” about “matters of substance”706 because
they held that “political expertise – or political ‘wisdom’ – belongs to the political
community.”707 Each citizen brought to the political decision-making process knowledge
of their own lives, burdens, and needs. As a result they were in the best position to
ascertain what collectively binding decisions needed to be addressed and which proposals
would likely be the most beneficial to the common good of the political community.
In addition, since the Athenian people were the end users of the collectively
binding decisions, the citizenry was also in the unique position to know the effectiveness
of their decisions.708 Therefore, if a political decision was deemed ineffective, they were
the best entity to bring the decision back to the table for revision. This belief implicates
the second belief that since governance involves decisions about uncertain probable
outcomes for which no one has adequate knowledge to forecast with certainty, then no
one person or group has the right to usurp the citizens’ ability to determine the decisions
that govern their public lives.709 This belief is reflected in Isocrates’ premise “that
foreknowledge of future events is not vouchsafed to our human nature … for mankind
this power lies in the realms of the impossible.”710 Both of these democratic beliefs rest
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upon a claim that the knowledge and ability to rule are not exclusive to any individual or
set of individuals but can be found in each citizen, especially when making decisions
collectively.
Liberty: The Heart of Democracy
The Athenian conception of democracy also received ideological support from
two other ideals. As classical theorist Mogens Hansen argues, “democracy is connected
first of all with liberty, next with equality.”711 In his analysis of democracy, Aristotle
contended that its defining principle712 and its end was eleutheria, or freedom.713 “The
basis of a democratic state,” he claimed, “is liberty.”714 Writing some two hundred years
prior to Aristotle “the Athenian statesman and poet” Solon, linked freedom to the
“prerogatives and rights of Athenian citizens.”715 Even though after Solon freedom could
have represented liberty from tyranny716 it was not until the completion of the Persian
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Wars, in 479 B.C., that freedom was established in Athens as a “political concept.”717
Learning from the war experience, the Greeks witnessed the difference between their
fighting spirit and that of the Persians. While the Persian soldiers served and fought as the
slaves of King Darius, the Greeks were freemen fighting for their homes, families,
livelihood, and lives. This distinction, cemented in the Athenians’ consciousness through
the victory over the Persians, “laid the foundations,” according to classical scholar Martin
Ostwald, “for the later view that democracy is the only ‘free’ form of government.”718
Liberty or eleutheria was the ideal that defined the person, the polis and the political
sphere of Athens.719
Half a century later, Pericles, Athens’ leading politician who led the Athenians
into the Peloponnesian War, summarized the merits of democracy when he claimed that
the citizens of Athens “are open and free in the conduct of [their] public affairs.”720 In
fact, Pericles went on to claim that an Athenian “who takes no part in public affairs,” was
a citizen who leads “a useless life.”721 Addressing Pericles’ comments, Hansen points out
that one of the basic ideals Pericles emphasized in his speech was that “freedom [was] a
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feature of public life.”722 To be free in Athens meant to be a citizen who participated in
the government. Specifically, Athenians held that “the essence of their freedom was the
right of any citizen to speak in the Assembly” which was their governing body.723
Freedom afforded Athenian citizens the ability to decide their collective future. As
Aristotle noted, “all things should be decided by all is characteristic of democracy.”724
This kind of freedom, which entailed and protected the right of participation in the
collectively binding decision-making process, links to the second pivotal construct
necessary for empowering people within a democracy: equality.
Equality: The Functional Realization of a Fundamental Right
The Athenian conception of isotēs, or equality begins with their view of human
nature. Aristotle claimed that “man is by nature a political animal” who “desires to live
together.”725 He insisted that “man is by nature adapted to a social existence.”726 Moving
beyond the narrow constraints of the culture’s androcentric orientation, according to this
view, ontologically human beings share in a fundamental drive to congregate with one
another. To be “fully human,” to manifest “qualities of excellence as human beings”
people have to forge connection with others to fulfill their “nature [as] social beings.”727
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It is through association with one another that humanity is able to exceed its capabilities
as individuals and thereby perform exceptional deeds.
Sophocles points to humanity’s uniqueness among the world’s animals when in
the play, Antigone, he extols the great consequences that arise out of humanity’s generic
nature.728 He proclaims that “numberless wonders, terrible wonders walk the world but
none the match for man … [for] he conquers all, taming with his techniques.”729 Of all
the mortal beings in the world, humanity, according to Sophocles, is an unfathomable and
awe-inspiring wonder who rules over all the other creatures. Beyond their preeminence
among their fellow animals human beings also exhibit a capacity for the political arts in
that they have “speech and thought, quick as the wind and the mood and mind for law
that rules the city – all these he has taught himself.”730 Humanity does not just rule over
the beast of the fields, but they also have the capacity to learn how to meet the need of
their fundamental nature for living in society. From this perspective human beings, share
in a “generic humanity”731 that exhibits a common fundamental human nature, which for
the Athenians was established at the point of creation.
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When it was time for “mortal creatures” to be formed “out of a mixture of earth
and fire”732 according to the creation myth told by Protagoras, the Greek deity,
Epimetheus, convinced his brother, Prometheus to allow him to distribute to each
creature its unique powers and nature. While Epimetheus equipped all of the “brute
beasts,” attending to the “principle of compensation” to guide his distribution of means
for their mutual survival, he forgot “the human race … [leaving it] unprovided for.”733
Consequently, Prometheus found humanity to be “naked, unshod, unbedded, and
unarmed.”734 As the appointed time for the work of Epimetheus and Prometheus to be
inspected by the pantheon of gods and goddesses approached, Prometheus stole fire and
the civilizing arts from Hephaestus and Athena in order to imbue human beings with
“sufficient resources to keep himself alive.”735 Human beings were brought forth from
the earth “into the daylight”736 with a nature to worship, speak, name, and invent, which
allowed people to meet their basic human needs of shelter, clothing, and sustenance.
Constituted as such, individuals emerged on the earth “weaker” than the beasts
since they lacked the means to protect themselves. Even when they gathered in “fortified
cities” for mutual defense they “injured one another” due to their lack of “political
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skill.”737 Unable to live in community with one another they scattered and once more
faced being devoured by the beasts.738 Looking down upon the earth Zeus, “fearing the
total destruction of [the human] race,” decreed that Hermes impart to all the virtues of
“respect for others and a sense of justice.”739 With these further endowments human
beings were now able to “bring order to [their] cities and create a bond of friendship and
union.”740 Humanity then, rooted in a common nature as gifted by the gods, share in a
fundamental or natural equality.
Protagoras related the creation myth as an argument to convince Socrates that
human nature indicated their fundamental equality and that they could be educated in
virtue. This view is also expressed in Sophocles’ Antigone. When Sophocles wrote that in
relation to humanity and the political, all these he has taught himself, Sophocles was
distinguishing a midpoint between a fundamental and a functional equality based in
observation: while humans have the potential for the political arts, the art is something
learned. The connective thread between the political arts and learning as understood by
the Athenians, claims classical philosopher Paul Woodruff, is humanity’s ability for
language acquisition.
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According to Woodruff, the Athenians “knew that language can weave society
together” and “that language is the medium of government.”741 Being the political
animal, driven to live together, society is actualized through our capacity to communicate
with one another. In a particularly illuminating passage, Isocrates claimed that the power
of language and speech or “the art of discourse … belong[s] to the nature of man, is the
source of most of our blessings.”742 Explicating the claim that communication lies at the
heart of humanity’s commendable accomplishments, Isocrates stated:
…because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to
make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of
wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and
invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man
which the power of speech has not helped us to established. For this it is which
has laid down laws concerning things just and unjust, and things honorable and
base: and if it were not for these ordinances we should not be able to live with one
another.743
In this passage Isocrates established that the political arts are dependent on the human
potential for language acquisition and usage. Therefore, as Woodruff argues, the
Athenians reasoned that since, “all humans have the potential for learning and using
languages” humanity is also “capable, by nature”744 to employ language to govern.
Connecting the fundamental equality of human beings and the ability to learn a
language is important in that it highlights a distinction that the Athenians made in relation
to equality. While Protagoras does not link language and the political arts, he does argue
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that there is a bridge between the political arts and learning; that the virtues required for
governing well can be taught. He stated that the Athenians “do not regard it [the political
arts] as innate or automatic, but as acquired by instruction and taking thought.”745 In his
argument, Protagoras, identifies a tension between the gods’ gifts, fundamental equality,
and the development of these capacities.
In analyzing Protagoras’ creation myth and his further dialogue with Socrates,
political theorist Ryan Balot, argues that Protagoras offers “a justification of the
democratic view that all citizens have a (roughly) equal capacity to contribute to political
discussions.”746 In defining capacity, Aristotle claimed that it is an ability inherent to a
species according to its nature: “Capacities we have by nature.”747 In his explication of
capacities a key phrase that Aristotle included is, “we are able.”748 In other words, a
capacity is not a guarantee, but indicates an ability or a potentiality. This conception of
capacity is paramount in understanding that even though every human being, according
to Protagoras, has these capacities, their ability to enact them well or virtuously is not
equal. The notion of “rough equality”749 acknowledges that even though all humans are
equal in their capacity for political wisdom –mutual respect, sense of justice
(Protagoras)– or the mood and mind for law that rules the city (Sophocles) –it also admits
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that “no one believes that these virtues are inborn qualities.”750 Rough equality allows for
“natural differences in ability” and “differential levels of talent.”751 Rough equality
acknowledges the experiential, in that the human social experience demonstrates that
while an individual can be viewed as fundamentally equal he or she is not equal in
relation to the abilities and resources of others within his or her own community.
It appears then, that Athenians considered individuals to be fundamentally equal
in their capacity for the political arts even though life demonstrated that through
fortuitous birth, an abundance of gifts from nature, education, or possession of power,
some did rise above the others. Some people are born into positions of status and wealth,
have greater intellect or knowledge, are gifted with physical prowess, or have more
refined moral virtues and these realities affect how fundamental equality is practiced
functionally within society. These advantages of birth, genetics, and/or privilege can be
parlayed into beneficial social distinctions that result in beneficial power differentials
which then elevate their possessors politically over those less fortunate.752
Fortune becomes a point of distinction only when it is referenced against another.
Capacities and abilities have to be demonstrated in relationship to the capacities and
abilities of others before certain abilities can emerge as being privileged. Consequently, it
is in the realm of politics, the realm of association, that distinctions become apparent,
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evaluated, and certain abilities are valued over others. It is out of the space in between
people –when an individual or an association of individuals decides that in order to
accomplish a certain goal, common effort is necessitated– that the realm of politics
emerges.753 Wolin points out –just as Protagoras indicated in the creation myth– that for
human beings to “survive, meet their needs, and begin to explore their capacities and the
remarkable world into which they have been cast” they must share in a “common life
[that] resides in … cooperation and reciprocity.”754 It is here, in the collective, where the
individual strength of humanity is transformed into power. “The nature of human power”
in the words of political scientist Hannah Arendt, “comes into being only if and when
men join themselves together for the purpose of action.”755 Or as Wolin contends, “the
common life and the political culture emerge to the accompaniment of power.”756 Or
even more succinctly, “politics” according to political theorist David Held, “is about
power.”757
Hannah Arendt contends that “power – which no individual can ever possess ...
arise[s] only out of the cooperative action of many people.”758 Power, is found in the “inbetween space” where people join together to manifest “the capacity of social agents,
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agencies and institutions to maintain or transform their environment, social or
physical.”759 Once human beings live in society, the abilities related to their political
capacities become more significant and endowed with power. Out of the embodied
differences enacted in the political realm, inequalities of power that were individual or
familial become magnified exponentially within the political realm.
It is in the political realm where individuals access their “world-building capacity
… of making and keeping promises.”760 By making and keeping promises with one
another, people instantiate common effort. To address the tension between the
fundamental equality of capacities and the natural inequalities of abilities, the citizens of
Athens constructed and refined a space where power inequalities based on social
distinctions such as, “wealth, birth, and education,”761 could be mitigated. A fundamental
equality that employs language to weave together society might be the gift of the gods,
but a functional or “normative”762 equality in which individuals live as equals would have
to be “conventional and artificial.”763 Arendt, argues that in Athens, this functional
equality was the result “of human effort” within the “political realm, where men met one
another as citizens.”764 In democracy the Athenians created “an artificial institution,”765
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where individuals would be considered equal as citizens who could make and enact their
self-governance. Athenian equality then, acknowledged the fundamental equality of
human capacities and recognized their rough equality as experienced in differing abilities
and power differentials. Therefore the Athenians constructed a space in which, as
citizens, they could enact a functional equality through political participation.
Throughout this explication of Athenian democracy and its justifications, “the
concepts of dēmokratia-eleutheria-isotēs” or democracy-freedom-equality have been
linked together to form “a set of political ideals.”766 These ideals functioned as “the core
of democratic political ideology”767 for the Athenian citizens. In addition, as mentioned at
the outset, Athenian beliefs regarding the nature of knowledge also formed part of their
core constructs of democracy. The ideology of Athenian democracy thus far, includes
empowerment, freedom, equality, and sufficient knowledge to rule. To establish a
complete picture of the Athenian ideology of democracy one more core construct was
considered to be foundational.
Participation: Being a Democratic Citizen
Athenian democracy was not merely a set of concepts or ideals, but it was also “a
political system”768 that was “constituted through institutions, practices”769 and the
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materiality of Athens. The institutions and the practices the Athenians developed enabled
“as far as possible … [the] active involvement of the citizens.”770 Wolin makes this
contention when he states that “the most crucial and revealing element in Athenian
democracy was the system of annual rotation in office, the lot, and the public
subsidization of citizen participation.”771 Aristotle supported the importance of the
institutions of democracy when he clearly articulated its embodied, experiential practices
in two passages from Politics. “For if liberty and equality,” he wrote, “…are chiefly to be
found in democracy, they will be best attained when all persons alike share in the
government to the utmost.”772 To secure the fundamental ideal of democracy –for the
citizenry to be empowered– the Athenians believed that self-governance meant actual,
direct participation in the government. As noted earlier in the discussion on freedom, the
statesman Pericles defined a non-participant in the public affairs of Athens as being
useless. An individual, who did not participate in the process of guiding Athens
politically, did not enact or maintain the ideals of Athenian freedom or equality.
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Later, Aristotle connected the ideals of democracy to the embodied and
experiential practices within Athens’ institutions of governance. That the Athenians also
conceived of their form of governance through a variety of forms of participation is clear
when Aristotle defined democracy’s characteristics as:
…the election of officers by all out of all; and that all should rule over each, and
each in his turn over all; that the appointment to all offices, or to all but those
which require experience and skill, should be made by lot; that no property
qualification should be required for offices, or only a very low one… all men
should sit in judgment....773
Here he clearly indicated that the positions of Athenian governmental power were open
to all citizens – Athenian males. By the mid 400s B.C. any Athenian citizen could be
elected or assigned by lot to political positions. More commonly they could preside over
the courts to adjudicate both private cases and public affairs such as when they
scrutinized the performance of fellow citizens during their terms in political office. To be
an empowered people required that the people rule and as rulers they must act to maintain
their position of power. For the Athenians, to rule obligated their direct participation in
the political realm.
Athenians did not just fill their political posts in an egalitarian fashion, they
participated in formulating the collectively binding decisions they lived under in a like
manner as well. In Athens, the ability to rhetorically engage over the issues that produced
collectively binding decision was believed to be the legitimate domain of the entire
citizenry. “Democratic decision making” for the Athenians, according to Ober, “was
predicated on public speech making, that is, on the public practice of rhetoric.”774 Such
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regard for an egalitarian view of governance and rhetorical engagement was engendered
from their political arrangement of direct democracy. For the Athenians, political activity
was rooted in their understanding of isonomia, or free constitution.775 Isonomia meant
“that all have the same claim to political activity,” which “primarily took the form of
speaking with one another … essentially the equal right to speak.”776 The ability of
Athenians to govern themselves was “based on what Pericles refer[red] to as ‘proper
discussions’, i.e. free and unrestricted discourse,” which were “guaranteed by isegoria, an
equal right speak in the sovereign assembly.”777 Pericles though, did not simply refer to
discussions as one of direct democracy’s characteristics or as a means to achieve
functional equality in the political realm, he lauded the act of discussion or rhetorical
engagement as a means for arriving at wise decisions: “public men have, besides politics,
their private affairs to attend to, and our ordinary citizens, though occupied with the
pursuits of industry, are still fair judges of public matters.”778 He went on to contend that
“instead of looking on discussion as a stumbling block in the way of action, we think it an
indispensable preliminary to any wise action at all.”779 In deciding the course of their
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collective action, their world-building capacities, the Athenians prized the participation of
the entire body politic of citizens, not just that of the rich, privileged, and intelligent. Just
as freedom was enacted through participation in the rhetorical engagements that lead to
collectively binding decisions; so too were equality and empowerment. In ancient
Athenian democracy the right to speak, to have an equal voice in the political decisionmaking process, was essential for fair and authentic democracy.
With the act of rhetorical engagements set as his contextual ground, is it no
wonder that Aristotle is considered to be “the first major theorist to defend”780 political
deliberation. For instance, he argued that “for each individual among many has a share of
excellence and practical wisdom, and when they meet together, just as they become in a
manner one man … the many are better judges than a single man….”781 Athenians
believed that the knowledge of the many, when accessed through the direct participation
of the citizenry, would provide a means for arriving at better collectively binding
decisions. For democratic Athens, it was the democratic rhetorical engagements between
its citizens that drove and sustained its democracy.
Conclusion: Democracy Interrupted
Through the “first democratic transformation”782 the capacity to rule in Athens
was extended from the few to the many. This revolutionary conception of the political
realm and its reification as practices, institutions, and materiality exhibited linkages
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between unique ideals about power, knowledge, freedom, equality, and participation.
While the ideals of freedom and equality strongly resonate with contemporary
associations with democracy, it was the Athenians’ belief about power that distinguished
the center of the Athenians’ core constructs or ideology regarding democracy. First and
foremost, in Athens, democracy related to a particular distribution of power. That is, its
citizens were empowered to rule over their collective efforts and were considered to be
sufficiently knowledgeable to do so. To concretize their notion of power, the Athenians
created a political space where it was possible to experience and enact their knowledge,
freedom, equality, and ultimately their power functionally.
In Athens, the citizenry’s claim to self rule and their democratic ideology evolved
from its rough beginnings with the reforms of Solon in 594/3 B.C., the revolutionary
rupture in 508/7 B.C. that led to Cleisthenes’ reforms, and its “culmination” in 462/1 at
the instigation of Ephialtes.783 While interrupted by brief forays with oligarchic rule in
411-410 B.C. and 404-403 B.C. 784 democracy remained solidly entrenched in Athens.
The classical age of Athenian democracy came to a close when in 322/1 B.C. “a
Macedonian army seized Athens and suppressed [its] democratic institutions”785 and in
317 B.C the Macedonians installed a governor. The spark of democracy did not
substantially reignite until the fires of the American Revolution erupted nearly 2100 years
later.
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CHAPTER FIVE: IDEOLOGY OF AMERICAN GOVERNANCE
… beset with difficulties and dangers, we were fellow laborers in the same cause,
struggling for what is most valuable to man, his right of self-government.
Laboring always at the same oar, with some wave ever ahead threatening to
overwhelm us and yet passing harmless under our bark, we knew not how, we
rode through the storm with heart and hand, and made a happy port.786
–Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson: Writings
Introduction: Ideology of American Governance
Reemerging on the world stage with the American Revolution, democratic
governance, once again placed the empowered people on trial. Thomas Jefferson
repudiated governance of the one or few over the many –“Every government degenerates
when trusted to the rulers of the people alone”– and averred the people as “its only safe
depositories.”787 Such confidence in the “safe depository of the ultimate powers of the
society [in] the people themselves”788 and the recognition that this belief had “not been
fairly and sufficiently tried”789 led Jefferson to acknowledge that “the event of our
experiment is to show whether man can be trusted with self-government.”790 Like,
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Jefferson, George Washington recognized the tenuous nature of the endeavor on which
the nation was embarking. In his First Inaugural Address he exhorted the people to
remember that “the sacred fire of liberty and the destiny of the republican model of
government are … staked on the experiment intrusted to the hands of the American
people.”791 In this trust, the people were deemed to be the “the only legitimate fountain of
power.”792 Stepping out from the shadow of the British Empire the American
revolutionaries were thrust into a necessity; to determine how to best govern themselves
now that they were free of the imposition of the British Parliament and Crown.
Thomas Paine, in Common Sense, recognized the unique situation that
independence would afford the people: “The present time, likewise, is that peculiar time
which never happens to a nation but once, viz. the time of forming into a government.”793
Throughout the history of nation formation, Paine argued that when presented with
similar circumstances, “most nations have let slip the opportunity,” only to find that
government was then thrust upon them. He continued by encouraging the people to “learn
wisdom, and lay hold of the present opportunity – to begin government at the right
end.”794 For Paine the right end of government was its lifeblood, the people.
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How these revolutionaries from thirteen disparate Colonies, who had united to
throw off oppression, engaged in the formation of government was a matter influenced by
their understanding of past political thought, their own experience, and the ongoing
production of literature, practices, and institutions. According to Hans-Georg Gadamer,
“understanding is, essentially, a historically effected event,”795 in which “our historical
consciousness is always filled with a variety of voices in which the echo of the past is
heard.”796 When human beings seek understanding, they are enmeshed in the web of
history. The process of coming to an understanding entails an act of interpretation, which
Gadamer claims is grounded in the choice of highlighting. He argued that “all
understanding is interpretation”797 and “all interpretation is highlighting.”798 As the
framers of the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, and eventually
the Constitution of the United States were working out how to organize the government,
their actions were firmly rooted in their understanding of the past and their experience of
their present conditions.
Democracy: Fears of a Mobocracy
While Athens is admired as the historical fountainhead of democracy now, many
of the leading figures at the time of American independence and nation formation viewed
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Athens and its form of governance unfavorably.799 Functionally, democracy was found to
be limited in that the expanse of the American boundaries and its population precluded its
citizens from gathering together to deliberate and vote on collectively binding decisions.
Thomas Paine articulated this limitation well when he wrote:
Simple democracy was no other than the common hall of the ancients. ... As these
democracies increased in population, and the territory extended, the simple
democratical form became unwieldy and impracticable.800
While this limitation was significant, it was the founders and framers understanding of
Athenian democracy that made it an untenable political solution.
Fears of a pliable, divisive citizenry, as well as the anti-democratic perspective
preserved in original texts from ancient Athens, colored the American interpretation of
Athenian democracy and popular governance in general. Drawing from an array of
historical accounts concerning the republics of ancient Greece, Alexander Hamilton
opined that his contemporaries should experience:
sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they [the Greek
Republics] were continually agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions,
by which they were kept perpetually vibrating between the extremes of tyranny
and anarchy.801
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More specific to the formation of the American government, during the Constitutional
Convention, it was argued that “the evils we experience flow from the excess of
democracy” and that the people “should have as little to do as may be about the
Government” because “they want information and are constantly liable to be misled.”802
Writing in defense of the proposed Constitution, its “master-builder,”803 James Madison
reasoned that “had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly
would still have been a mob.”804 Madison viewed popular governments and democracies
as suffering from “instability, injustice, and confusion”805 and as being “spectacles of
turbulence and contention.”806 Democracy, in his estimation, was fundamentally
“incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property”;807 core concerns for the
framers of the Constitution.
How to negotiate between the right and the power of the people to self-rule and
the limitations of and fears attributed to ancient democracy became the key question in
the formation of the American national government. In answering this question, the
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framers arrived at different conclusions concerning the core ideas and beliefs about
equality, power, and knowledge, which in turn resulted in profound distinctions between
their American ideology of governance and the Athenian ideology of democracy.
Standing upon very similar intellectual ground concerning foundational ideas about the
nature of human beings, the American trajectory of thought highlighted certain human,
societal, and political aspects that lead them ultimately to different conclusions than the
Athenians.
Society: The Inclination of Humanity
Beginning with the nature of human beings from which society and politics
emerge, the Athenians and Americans shared common ground. Much like the Athenians:


John Adams believed that “there is, in the human Breast, a social
Affection, which extends to our whole Species.”808



Thomas Paine held that “there is no period when this love for society
ceases to act. It begins and ends with our being.”809



Thomas Jefferson, “consider[ed] man as formed for society, and endowed
by nature with those dispositions which fit him for society.”810

Across the span of time and space, culture and civilization, human beings had
demonstrated to these thinkers a natural inclination to gather in community.811 “Man,”
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claimed Jefferson, “was destined for society.”812 This love for society within the Breast of
people was not left without the necessary resources to enact the people’s natural need.
Endowed with a nature to live with one another, humanity, it was argued, was
also bequeathed with the dispositions and capacities to succeed in society. Adams
claimed that nature: “has [also] furnished... [individuals] with passions, appetites, and
propensities, as well as a variety of faculties, calculated both for their individual
enjoyment, and to render them useful to each other in their social connections.”813 Gifted
with a social affection and a variety of faculties, in the anthrocentric phrasing of the time,
“man has been created”814 to live in and equipped to function within society. Society in
its own right was not considered to be inert, but due to its very nature and structure made
specific demands on its members, requiring certain capacities, orientations, behaviors,
relationships, and goals.
A fundamental aspect of community, according to Thomas Paine, was that
individuals, driven “by a diversity of wants”, find that they are in a state of “mutual
dependence.”815 It is this dependence, which spawns the essential nature of human
society. In order to attain their various wants, whether abstract or concrete, individuals
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eventually have to rely on an association of others, since “no one … is capable, without
the aid of society, of supplying his own wants.”816 The realization that the “natural
wants” of an individual are beyond one’s own “individual powers,”817 led Paine to argue,
that an individual is compelled to live in society in order to consolidate the necessary
power for the satisfaction of his or her wants and reciprocally the wants of other societal
members. Society oriented individuals to a relationship with others through mutual
dependence, calling on societal members to work together to achieve individual and
common goals.
Capacities: Reason to Limit Self-Rule
Due to human nature and the exigence of society, human beings lived with one
another in order to satisfy their individual and collective wants. To obtain these wants,
each societal member brought to bear his or her various individual powers or capacities.
Capacities, the basis for power and influence in society, were believed to be unequal in
their distribution.818 Consequently, even though “all men are created equal”819 and share
in a fundamental equality of rights, life demonstrated that humanity was not functionally
equal. John Adams provided a clear declaration of this point after visiting a hospital in
France where he observed fifty newborns in a single ward. He noted that “these were all
born to equal rights, but to very different fortunes; to very different success and influence
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in life.”820 As soon as the children departed the hospital the distinctions derived from the
history of their families’ capacities, as well as their own, would significantly impact the
chart of their own lives.
In a succinct summation Melancton Smith, a preeminent Anti-Federalist, claimed
that “the author of nature has bestowed on some greater capacities than on others – birth,
education, talents and wealth, create distinctions among men.”821 The varying capacities
and their differing strengths, when employed by men and women in society, resulted in
“inequalities,” which were undeniably obvious throughout “the natural history of
man.”822 Adams was so insistent on this point that he argued that to teach the people
otherwise, “to teach that all men are born with equal powers and faculties, to equal
influence in society, to equal property and advantages through life is … [a] gross …
fraud.”823 If the people believed that all were equal, in every regard, then Americans
would likely make collectively binding decisions concerning the rule of society and
formation of the government reflecting this unsubstantiated belief. Adams, Smith, and
other leading men –for citizenship was limited to certain class and race of males– who
contended with one another during the formation of the American government, held fast
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to the idea that due to the nature of human beings, people were not functionally equal
even though they were fundamentally equal.824
While the Athenians and Americans arrived at these foundational ideas about the
nature of humanity and society from different sources (i.e. religious traditions), they
shared in a consistency of thought. The importance of these foundational ideas and their
implications is not found in the ideas themselves, but in the conclusions men like Adams,
Madison, and others derived from them. It is here, that the trajectory of prominent
American thinkers and political actors substantially diverged from that of the Athenians.
Power: Containing the Beast
At the most basic level, the Americans’ notions about capacities affected their
conceptions about the regulation of power. Capacities interacted with four essential
characteristics of power, resulting in a deep concern about how a national government
should be composed. To understand their concern, their conceptions of power need to be
explicated further. According to historian Bernard Bailyn, for Adams and his
contemporaries, power “meant the dominion of some men over others, the human control
of human life.”825 As society formed, members, contrary to authentic governance,
“surrendered individual powers”826 to enable the government to act; to propose, enact,
and enforce collectively binding agreements for all the members of society. While power
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meant dominion, it was not conceived as being inherently negative. Power was neutral
and a natural occurring phenomenon that emerged through the formation of society and
which could be used for its good or its detriment.827
The characteristic of power that contributed to the perception that it was
problematic, as Adams noted, was that “[power] naturally grows.”828 Power as dominion
continually pushed its sphere beyond the boundaries set for it.829 Tightly connected to
power’s inclination for expansion and the perception of its dangerous disposition was that
its “natural prey” was “liberty, or law, or right.”830 Indicative of this perspective, Paine
wrote that “freedom hath been hunted round the globe”831 and in her correspondence with
Thomas Jefferson, regarding the political situations in “France Holland and Germany”
Abigail Adams asked, “Will Liberty finally gain the assendency, or arbitrary power strike
her down.”832 In essence it was accepted that, due to the natural dialectical relationship
between power and liberty, where dominion increases the liberty of the people decreases.
Of the four characteristics of power its “essential characteristic”833 was its “encroaching
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nature,”834 which was fueled by and fused with the capacities of individuals. Considered
naturally occurring, morally neutral, fundamentally aggressive, and an enemy to liberty,
it was “the nature of man – his susceptibility to corruption and his lust for selfaggrandizement”835 that transformed power into an evil.
It was the passions of individuals and their desire to increase their own sphere of
dominion that corrupted the use of power. When Adams stated that “[power] naturally
grows” he followed that claim with his explanation as to why: “Why? Because human
passions are insatiable.”836 Or as George Washington stated, the “love of power and
proneness to abuse it … predominates … the human heart.”837 No matter what the
political system “absolute power intoxicates alike despots, monarchs, aristocrats, and
democrats.”838 Teamed with superior capacities, an individual, driven by his or her own
passions, could expand his or her dominion over others in ways that violated the liberty
of the people. This linkage between capacities and domination was clearly articulated
when Centinel wrote “that the love of domination is generally in proportion to talents,
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abilities, and superior acquirements.”839 This love of domination, could lead the best of
leaders into being “instruments of despotism.”840 Therefore, vigilant watch over those in
power by those invested with power was a necessary function to preserve liberty.
This conclusion was a problematic for the political thinkers of the time since they
also believed in the right of societal members to determine how they were to be
governed. The people were held to be “the fountain of all power”841 since it was in the
people that “all power reside[d] originally.”842 Therefore, the right of self-government
was a “natural right,”843 a view clearly articulated by Thomas Jefferson when he wrote:


Every man, and every body of men on earth, possess the right of selfgovernment. They receive it with their being from the hand of nature.844



From the nature of things, every society must at all times possess within
itself the sovereign powers of legislation.845
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Historian Gordon S. Wood summarizes that “the sovereignty of the people … did not just
mean that all government was derived from the people,” but it also “meant that the final,
supreme, and individual lawmaking authority of the society remained with the people
themselves.”846 According to Jefferson, individuals who had, through “the exercise of …
faculties,” “procured a state of society,” also secured the “right to regulate and control”
society “jointly … with all those who have concurred in the procurement.”847 Due to the
exigency of society and the common demands of it upon societal members, each
individual contributing to society had a right to participate in the formation and
regulation of the government.
Not only was the right of self-government a natural right bestowed at birth and
through being a societal member, but it was also a reasonable response to functional
inequality. Adams claimed that “all that men can do, is to modify, organize, and arrange
the powers of human society … in the best manner to protect, secure, and cherish the
moral, which are all the natural rights of mankind.”848 Seemingly this conception of
power and the right of self-government reflected that which was discussed in relation to
Athenian democracy, but in actuality there lies within it a significant distinction.
In contrast to the Athenian ideology of democracy and in opposition to authentic
governance that acknowledges, enables, and achieves a state of political agency for the
people as empowered, the American ideology of governance extended the natural right of
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self-government not to self-rule, but to the power of constituting and dissolving the
chosen means of governance. While it was claimed that America was "a country where
all power is confessed to be derived from the People”;849 the power of the people was
limited to “a right of living under a government of their own choosing.”850 In his
Farewell Address, George Washington echoed the notion that the American government
was established “by the free consent of the People” and “that the People c[ould] change
[the government] at their pleasure”851 when he stated: “The basis of our political systems
is the right of the people to make and to alter their constitutions of government.”852
Consequently, Americans, as well as all of humanity –who are naturally driven to live
together, compelled to social connection for the satisfaction of a variety of needs and
wants– who are imbued with capacities inherent to the individual and/or inherited from
others –capacities that are unequal in their distribution and which lead to distinctions
among individuals and inequalities in society– had an equal right and the power to form a
government in order to mitigate the influence of the inequalities found in society and
dissolve a government that failed to do so.
Founded in the tension between power, passions, rights, and capacities the
American’s aversion to democracy as enacted by the Athenians comes to light. American
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thinkers conceived of democracy as a government in which the “citizens, who assemble
and administer the government in person,”853 ruled over the political affairs of society.
“Sovereignty” was held by the people854 and it was “not delegated to any person or
persons, as supreme rulers.”855 Such a system, because of the influence of capacities and
the nature of power, according to the founders and framers, would result in the rule of the
few over the many.
Due to the unequal distribution of capacities or talents, a few talented individuals
would have the means to rise to political prominence and power. “Talents,” Adams
wrote, “…in fact commands or influences true Votes in Society.”856 Upon the strength of
superior capacities, “Birth Fortune, Figure, Eloquence, Science, learning, Craft Cunning,
or even … Character for good fellowship”857 an individual or a select number would
elevate, through a succession of votes, to dominate a governing assembly. Presiding over
the assembly, the one or few would then dictate the collectively binding decisions of the
assembly thus effectively ruling over the entirety of society. Power in this scenario would
then rest not with the people or the assembly, but with the one or the few who directed
the affairs of both.
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James Madison expressed similar concerns when he argued that the ability to
arrive at reasoned judgments by the public or its representatives was thwarted through
two causes: the power of passions and the influence of superior capacities. First, he
claimed that in making political decisions “the passions … not the reason, of the public,
would sit in judgment”858 and that “in all very numerous assemblies, of whatever
characters composed, passion never fail[ed] to wrest the scepter from reason.”859 Those
with superior capacities could move the passions of the decision-making audience,
whether the public or representatives, and therefore their capacities elevated them to the
position of de facto rulers. Even in “legislative assemblies,” Madison argued, “a single
orator” could come to rule “as if a scepter had been placed in his single hands.”860
Reflective of his thinking about capacities, he also dismissed the democratic oriented
proposal of multiplying the number of representatives beyond what was necessary for
“the purposes of safety, of local information, and of diffusive sympathy with the whole
society.”861 Instead of making the government more democratic, enacting such a
measure, he argued, would actually cause “the soul that animates it” to “be more
oligarchic.”862
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Adams and Madison were not alone in their concern that capacities, passions, and
power would dictate the judgment of the people. In asking “Why has government been
instituted at all?” Alexander Hamilton proclaimed a similar refrain, “because the passions
of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint.”863 Even
more telling, is that noted anti-Federalists also held similar views. For instance,
Melancton Smith argued, “I know that the impulses of the multitude are inconsistent with
systematic government. The people are frequently incompetent to deliberate discussion,
and subject to errors and imprudencies.”864 The influential voices in the debate about the
constitution of a national, American government then, held that the people, or their
representatives, could not be trusted to follow reason when called upon to make sensible
collectively binding decisions since their passions could be elicited or swayed by
individuals with superior capacities.
Due to these considerations about the regulation of power and who it was to be
entrusted too, power for the constitutional framers was the focal point through which the
other ideological links of knowledge, liberty, equality, and property revolved. To resolve
their fears about power –especially “unconstrained centralized power”865– whether
consolidated in the hands of one or the few or even the many, Adams and Madison,
proposed that the governing body should be divided in order to produce a system of
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checks and balances. Both held that when “the power surrendered by the people was
accumulated”866 into “the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective” that system of governance “may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”867 To ensure that tyranny was avoided the
consolidation of the powers of the government –“legislative, executive, and judiciary”868–
had to be “guarded against, by a division of the government into distinct and separate
departments”869 or branches that were for the most part equally balanced in power. These
divisions would create “rivalries”870 between the branches that would check the use of
power by each. Adams argued:
That an equilibrium of those ‘different powers’ was indispensably necessary to
guard and defend the rights, liberties, and happiness of the people against the
deleterious, contagious, and pestilential effects of those passions of vanity, pride,
ambition, envy, rage, lust, and cruelty.871
By structuring the government so that its powers were shared by three branches, the
liberty of the people would be protected872 from the effects of the lust for selfaggrandizement, passions, and the superior capacities of the few.
866

James Madison, “Federalist #51,” in The Federalist (New York: Barnes and
Noble Classics, 2006), 290.
867

James Madison, “Federalist #47,” in The Federalist (New York: Barnes and
Noble Classics, 2006), 268.
868

Madison, Federalist #47, 268.

869

Madison, Federalist #51, 290.

870

Adams, The Portable John Adams, 387.

871

Adams, The Portable John Adams, 432.

872

Madison, Federalist #51, 287.
244

As seen in relation to power, the foundational ideas about capacities had profound
implications on the emerging ideology of American governance. The core ideas of that
ideology –power, knowledge, liberty, equality, and property– began with conclusions
about the influence of capacities. At the fundamental level each societal member had a
natural right to form, regulate, and conclude a government. Therefore, collectively the
ultimate end of political power was deemed to reside in the people. At the functional
level, power was not something held equally by all, but was derived from the embodied
enactment of those capacities valued by societal members. In order to address the power
and influence arising from superior capacities bestowed upon and developed in some to
the exclusion of others, the first solution was for the people to relinquish a portion of
their natural rights in order to empower a select few to rule over them. John DeWitt
claimed that in composing society, individuals had to “surrender such a part of their
natural rights, as shall be necessary for the existence of that society.”873 Likewise,
Melancton Smith argued “what is government itself, but a restraint upon the natural rights
of the people? What constitution was ever devised, that did not operate as a restraint on
their original liberties.”874 Rather than empowering themselves to rule as authentic
governance requires, Americans, drawing upon political traditions founded in English
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roots, elected individuals “that they themselves … deputed”875 to be “trustees”876 or
representatives.
Instead of proposing and composing an artificial field of equality for all
Americans, a more exclusive political domain emerged that limited rule to
representatives: Representatives who provided a “protective barrier against
democracy”877 and its dangerous tendencies. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri point
out, “the essence of representation [is that] it connects the citizens to government and at
the same time separates them from it.”878 They go on to argue that “when … power is
transferred to a group of rulers, then we all [–the people–] no longer rule.”879 This is in
sharp contrast to the Athenian perspective of enacting power equally within a constructed
functional political space. In Athens, the people had the right to participate, to enact their
power upon the collectively binding decision-making process, and therefore they
equalized the opportunity to self-rule. In the America system of governance, self-rule was
denied to the people as their power was to be entrusted to the best individuals of society
who would rule as the people’s representatives.
The principle justification for a representational form of governance addressed the
functional weaknesses of democracy. “The direct action of the citizens” that a democracy
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calls for, Jefferson said, reduces it “to very narrow limits of space and population.”880
Governing through representatives resolved these issues be extending the effective reach
of the government over a “greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country.”881
While these structural limits were of great practical concern they also obscure another
justification for representatives that revealed a radical shift from the Athenian conception
of knowledge.
Knowledge: Dividing Rulers from the Ruled
Certainly like the Athenians, the American framers recognized that individual
knowledge was fallible. During the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin,
acknowledged that throughout his life he had the occasion of “being obliged by better
information, or fuller consideration, to change opinions even on important subjects,
which [he] once thought right, but found to be otherwise.”882 In defending the proposed
Constitution, Madison conceded that because the document was created by, “a body of
men” that the framers “were liable” to have made “errors” due to their “fallibility.”883
The point of difference between the Athenian and American perspectives about
knowledge emerges from how each addressed the functional inequality of human
capacities. According to the American perspective some were bestowed with or had the
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means to accumulate and develop knowledge and therefore were better suited to be
“rulers”884 rather than others.
In the view of the framers and other political actors of consequence, the people
did not possess the necessary knowledge or intellect to arrive at effective and just
collectively binding decisions. This view was expressed during the Constitutional
Convention of 1787 when Roger Sherman claimed that the people “want information and
are constantly liable to be misled.”885 Even Thomas Jefferson felt that they were
“unqualified for the management of affairs requiring intelligence above the common
level.”886 Federal representatives needed capacities that allowed them to procure, store,
retrieve, and employ a vast quantity of information.
This requisite knowledge and intelligence was a condition implied by the idea of a
good government: “first, fidelity to the object of government, which is the happiness of
the people; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best
attained.”887 The knowledge Madison addressed, related to three disparate branches of
knowledge. The first type included “the laws of all the states” and “local knowledge …
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[about] commerce, taxation, and the militia.”888 This knowledge was necessary since
representatives were to compose an assembly that would “be in miniature an exact
portrait of the people at large … think[ing], fee[ing]l, reason[ing], and act[ing] like
them.”889 This was the “ONE MAXIM” claims historian Jack Rakove that “reflected
Americans’ ideas of representation.”890 Melcanton Smith stated that representatives
should “resemble those they represent; they should be a true picture of the people;
possess the knowledge of their circumstances and their wants; sympathize in all their
distresses, and be disposed to seek their true interests.”891 To represent the people,
knowledge of people’s lives, resources, opportunities, and challenges was necessary so
that the representatives could best articulate the sentiments of the people in the
collectively binding decision-making process.
Decisions about domestic policies though, had to also integrate national concerns
with international realities. This involved the second “branch of knowledge,” that
included expertise in “foreign affairs … treaties” and “the law of nations.”892 The Federal
government –members of Congress– would now have to provide legislation that
maximized the economic potential of American resources by considering “the wider
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world in which the commercial and strategic interests of the United States would be
immersed.”893 A representative then also needed to be “a legislator”894 and as such, s/he
would need to navigate the “science of government,” which was considered by Centinel
to be “abstruse.”895 This third and final type of knowledge, “acquaintance with the
objects and principles of legislation”896 could “be acquired to best effect, by practical
attention to the subject, during the period of actual service in the legislature.”897 Members
of Congress in both, the House and Senate, had to serve as representatives of the people
and legislators in their respective assemblies. To fulfill these roles they had to possess
superior capacities related to their intelligence and knowledge.
For Madison, members of Congress would need to “refine and enlarge the public
view” since through their “wisdom [they would] best discern the true interest of their
country.”898 He did not hold the view that representatives needed to have the same level
of intimate knowledge of the people as some of his contemporaries. In fact, in defending
the representative form laid out in the proposed Constitution he stated that “ignorance of
a variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of
legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the
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legislative trust.”899 The relevant knowledge “essential to liberty,” in the view of
Madison, was an affinity with the common interests of the people and an intimate
connection to their sympathies.900 Consequently, the requisite knowledge, actually could
“easily be conveyed by a very few hands”901 as long as it was conveyed by “men who
possess[ed] most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of the
society.”902 John Adams expressed this sentiment when he argued that “the first
necessary step” in forming a good government “is to depute power from the many to a
few of the most wise and good.”903 John Jay argued that the people should assent to the
wisdom of having the best of society rule over them since the Congress of 1774 was
composed of just such “men who pursued the true interests of their country … public
liberty and prosperity.”904 Future members of Congress would rise to positions of power
through the merit of their superior capacities; being “distinguished … by those
qualities”905 they would occupy positions “where they [would] exert all their faculties,
and enjoy all the honors, offices, and commands, both in peace and war, of which they
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are capable.”906 These most wise and good representatives would rule for the people as
delegates, who were entrusted with the power of people to rule over them, in order to
secure the people’s rights to liberty, property, and equality.
Liberty: A Right Undefined, Yet Known When Violated
The belief that “Liberty” was considered to be “the greatest of all earthly
blessings”907 resonates with a common, contemporary understanding of the
Revolutionary and early Constitutional period. Patrick Henry’s proclamation of “Give me
Liberty or Give me Death!” still is firmly ensconced in the public’s consciousness. In
1766, John Adams, writing under the pseudonym of the Earl of Clarendon, argued that
“the end of all government” is “the public good and “that Liberty is essential to the public
good.”908 While the fact that liberty was a core concern of the founders and framers is
clear, what they meant by it is not. Rakove states that “no word was more multivalent
than liberty.”909 Cooke supports this contention claiming that “understanding” liberty “is
extraordinary difficult.”910 To explicate what was meant by liberty, the influence of the
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British political perspectives, which reverberated through the Colonial world at the time,
provides a point from which to begin.
Liberty was an idea that identified the English as freemen, no matter their “social
rank” or their “political persuasion.”911 It was a right and practice that they
“celebrate[d]”912 enthusiastically. For the English and their American brethren the right to
and practice of liberty was rooted in the political philosophy of John Locke.913 As the
colonists moved toward revolution their ideas about liberty reflected the arguments
Locke developed nearly a century before 1776. Locke argued that “a state of liberty” did
not allow for “a state of license” since the “law of nature” –or reason– governed how one
was to “dispose of his person or possessions.”914 Reason dictated that even though
humanity was “equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health,
liberty, or possessions” because as each person was “the workmanship of one
omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker” there could not “be any … subordination.”915
When found “in society,” liberty was bound by those laws the government “enacted
according to the trust put in it … common to every one in that society.”916 The crux of
liberty for Locke was twofold: First, it meant freedom from “the inconstant, uncertain,
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unknown, arbitrary will of another man” and second, liberty enabled one to “follow [his
or her] own will in all things”917 where the law, empowered by the consent of society,
was silent.
These dual characteristics found their way into the American discourse about
liberty. In 1747, liberty was defined in a New York Evening Post article as “a natural
Power of doing, or not doing, whatever we have a Mind, so far as is consistent with the
Rules of Virtue and the established Laws of the Society to which we belong.”918 Nearly a
half century after setting down the enduring words, “life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness” Jefferson claimed that “rightful liberty is unobstructed action according to our
will within limits drawn around us by the equal rights of others.”919 While the bare
essence of liberty was described in these definitions, the nature of liberty was considered
to constitute certain possibilities of thought and behavior. Adams argued that “it is a selfdetermining power in an intellectual agent” since the employment of it “implie[d] thought
and choice and power … [to] elect between objects.”920 Liberty resulted in a “state of
mind” that “enabled citizens to exercise other rights free from the fear of tyrannical
rule.”921 It also was suggestive of obligations and duties on the part of the people.
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Essential for the protection of the people’s liberty, claimed George Washington,
was their ability “to discriminate the spirit of liberty from that of licentiousness –
cherishing the first, avoiding the last.”922 For Washington, liberty obliged the people to
honor the authority of the government, comply “with its laws” and acquiesce to “its
measures.”923 In considering rights, Thomas Paine, argued that “when we speak of right
we ought always to unite with it the idea of duties: rights become duties by
reciprocity.”924 In society, liberty existed under the limitation of the social compact,
being constrained by the laws to which societal members consented. If liberty slipped the
bonds of the law through a free individual’s imposition of his or her will upon another or
another’s property, then that individual would be engaged in an act of power.
The law hemmed in acts of power by placing boundaries within which it could
properly function. The space within the strictures of the law was the domain where power
had dominion over the people. Outside that space individuals were at liberty to pursue
their pleasure. This articulation of liberty is incomplete, just as John Quincy Adams’
declaration that “liberty and law have marched hand in hand”925 falls short of an adequate
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understanding of the relationship between the liberty, law, and power. The law could be a
means of “arbitrary power” in which the “will and pleasure”926 of the one or the few was
enforced or the law could be the expression of a free people and free government. Brutus
argued that “in every free government, the people must give their assent to the laws by
which they are governed.”927 In a similar fashion, Thomas Paine equated “independency”
with the ability to “make our own laws.”928 Liberty and laws walked hand in hand when
the laws were made by or consented to by the people. Found in the space outside of the
law were the people’s rights; rights that indicated –marked off– the extent of the
government’s reach or power.
The American colonists spoke “THE LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS … naturally …
[as] it was … their native tongue.”929 Liberty, according to Rakove, “was one of the great
triad of inalienable natural rights.”930 Life and liberty were joined together by God at
birth931 and therefore liberty was considered to be a natural right “derived from our
Maker.”932 Due to its nature, liberty is not contingent upon historical-cultural-social
factors, but is an unassailable entitlement. It is how this right to liberty is interpreted into
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the specific “alienable”933 or legal rights of a society and its government at a particular
historical moment that is violable. As a means to protect the people from those whom
were entrusted with power, liberty and the legal rights made to secure it were “only for
the governed” since rulers “did not speak for it [or] … naturally serve it.”934 These legal
rights, as human constructions, placed a tremendous obligation on the framers of the
Constitution, as it was their “duty … to frame a government friendly to liberty and the
rights of mankind, which [would] tend to cherish and cultivate a love of liberty among …
[the] citizens.”935 In the process of constructing the Constitution and its ratification, the
legal rights necessary to preserve the people’s right to liberty were debated and defended.
In writing his contribution to The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton,
defended the lack of a bill of rights in the Constitution. In part, he argued that the
protection of liberty was secured by the Constitution through “the establishment of the
writ of habeas corpus, the prohibition of ex post facto laws, and the TITLE OF
NOBILITY.”936 For many though, Hamilton’s defense was inadequate and calls were
made for the inclusion of specific rights. Centinel decried the omission of a “right to
freedom of speech, and of publishing your sentiments” in addition to protection against
the imposition of “general warrants.”937 The neglect of the right to “the FREEDOM OF
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THE PRESS” was particularly disturbing to John DeWitt, as experience had “esteemed
[it as] one of [civil liberty’s] safe guards.”938 In responding to James Madison’s inquiry
about the proposed Constitution, Thomas Jefferson, expressed from his post as Minister
to France, deep reservations. That the proposed article of government for the United
States did not include a bill of rights that provided for “freedom of religion, freedom of
the press, protection against standing armies, restriction against [commercial]
monopolies, …habeas corpus”939 and “trial by juries in all cases”940 was unconscionable.
While all of these various rights and protections were deemed to be significant, it was
representation and trial by jury that were given “preeminent importance” for “shelter[ing]
nearly all the other rights and liberties of the people.”941 Under these rights, liberty, it was
argued, would be secured.
John Adams claimed that “in these two powers consist wholly, the liberty and
security of the people.”942 Through jury trials the people were sheltered from the abuse of
power by the judiciary through denying judges and other influential public and private
individuals the ability to incarcerate indiscriminately people who they had deemed as
problematic. As for representation, it shielded the liberties of the people in two ways. The
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first was expressed well at the Constitutional Convention when Oliver Ellsworth stated
that “taxation and representation ought to go together.”943 Since the government would be
able “to lay and collect taxes”944 the property and possessions of the people could be
confiscated and their wealth distributed to benefit those favored by the nation’s rulers
through an oppressive system of taxation.
In order to hold such an abuse in check members of the House of Representatives,
according to Madison, “should be kept in dependence on the people, by a short duration
of their appointments.”945 In such a system, the rulers would avoid passing laws that they
too would not want to live under; for as Madison astutely argued, “they can make no law
which will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends, as well as the great
mass of the society.”946 By returning rulers to the rank of the ruled the Constitution
provided security against repressive, collectively binding decisions. Consequently,
through the dual protection from unjust trials and non-binding decisions for the rulers,
and the collective passage of the ten amendments or bill of rights, the liberty of the
people was deemed to be made safe.
As the ideation of liberty took hold in the American consciousness, it became
tangible as laws, rights, and duties. This convergence of abstract philosophy with
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concrete practices around one of the core constructs of the American ideology of
governance found its fullest manifestation in its connection to property. Legal historian,
John Phillip Reid, argues “that liberty in the eighteenth century was personal
property.”947 Liberty as a possession was “bequeathed … as an inheritance,” “obtained …
by prescription,” “fought for,” or “earned.”948 It was, according to Rakove, considered to
be their “birthright.”949 Summarizing this perspective well, in 1802 it was argued in the
Fredricktown’s newspaper, The Hornet that “every child can’t inherit a fortune, but every
child ought to inherit liberty.”950 To hold liberty as a tangible object, not just a political
ideal, meant that while it was a possession held by all, it was wielded only by those who
could protect it. “Freedom” according to Nash, was “defined as being secure in one’s
property.”951 The reason that “property must be secured or liberty cannot exist,”952 was
due to the belief that property was the medium through which liberty was realized.
The relationship between property and liberty developed along two key paths.
First, property allowed for people to live free of dependency on others. Adams argued
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that property was only “secure,” when an individual was “at liberty to acquire, use, or
part with it, at his discretion.”953 Jefferson held a similar view, which Cooke summarized
as “a man’s liberty was his property, and his property … guaranteed a minimum of
liberty.”954 Through the ability to pursue economic endeavors, from working land owned
to “any other industry,” an individual was provided with “such compensation as not only
to afford a comfortable subsistence, but … [also] for a cessation from labor in old
age.”955 It was through property and liberty, Jefferson claimed, that every individual had
the means “to reserve to themselves … a degree of freedom.”956 The freedom to use one’s
own property to establish one’s economic independency then, was a precursor to the
political freedom of the individual.
Without economic freedom the votes of dependent individuals could be bought or
manipulated by those who sustained their lives.957 In the debate over suffrage at the
Constitutional Convention, Gouverneur Morris articulated this position when he stated,
“Give the votes to people who have no property, and they will sell them to the rich who
will be able to buy them.”958 Economic dependency would lead to political dependency959
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and ultimately result in the enlargement of the sphere of dominion of those with superior
capacities and subsequently negate the liberty of those with lesser capacities. In these
ways, during the “decades after the Revolution … property ownership was” considered to
be a “necessary” condition “for personal independence.”960 By being able to provide for
one’s self, an individual was able to enact the natural liberty possessed by all and sustain
one’s self in his or her economic and political liberty.961
Property: Securing the Rights of the People
The significance of property was not limited to its relationship to liberty.
Property, along with life and liberty, distinguished “the fundamental trinity of inalienable
rights.”962 Stating “that Property is the principal Cause & Object of Society”963
Gouverneur Morris argued that of the three it is the most dependent on society. Over the
decades leading up to the Revolution, property and the laws that regulated property use
had become a means for the English to impose arbitrary rule over the colonies; thereby
directly interfering in American society. To set the stage for understanding the role of
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property in the American ideology of governance, a discussion of the demographic and
economic exigencies of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries is needed.
There were three forces that shaped the colonists’ perspectives and experiences of
property, prosperity, and power. First, “the colonial population” was “doubling every
twenty years.”964 This population increase was the result of active procreation, as well as
a steady stream of immigrants.965 As people crowded the coastal regions, pressure was
exerted on people to move inward from the coast. “This demographic explosion, this
gigantic movement of people” states Wood, “was the most basic and the most liberating
force working on American society during the latter half of the eighteenth century.”966
Beyond powering growth and movement the influx of people also created economic
tensions that energized economic expansion.
Around the Atlantic rim, the “demand for foodstuffs … began enticing …
American farmers into producing for distant markets.”967 To facilitate the transport of
“wheat and other foodstuffs”968 throughout the colonies and the colonial world, support
services sprang up and infrastructure developed. With the increase in exports, a reciprocal
rise in imports occurred as well. Legal and illegal imports entered into a commercial
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network that benefitted from the improved infrastructure and competed with an emergent
“domestic manufacturing”969 sector.
Domestic enterprise developed alongside the demographic growth and the foray
into foreign trade. As the seaboard population grew local arable land was lost. The family
farmers who remained turned to “manufacturing and trading,” Wood claims, in order to
“bolster their income and raise their living standards.”970 Driving the desire to improve
living standards “was the weakness of the social hierarchy in America.”971 Lacking a
hereditary aristocracy, individuals recognized opportunities for upward social mobility.
Combined with a desire to improve one’s lot in life, the “increased purchasing power
among the ordinary people” assisted “social emulation” through “emulative
consumption” of “luxury goods.”972 The people in the New World were constructing a
new basis for society –consumerism.
Impeding the development into a consumer society was the intervention of British
economic policies. Historian Gary Nash notes that confronting the burgeoning economic
potential of the colonies were certain economic stressors introduced by the British Crown
and Parliament. The English were able to interfere with the American economy,
according to Nash, through several routes: “trade policy … enforcement of custom laws,
the availability of currency, the role of English traders in the American market, and the
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strength of overseas demand for American products.”973 In writing A Summary View of
the Rights of British America, Jefferson addressed a wide range of American concerns
over violations of rights. Of particular interest is his explication of his distress relating to
commerce. Even though the inhabitants of the colonies were English subjects who
enjoyed the right to “the exercise of a free trade with all parts of the world,” Jefferson
noted that Parliament had “assumed upon themselves the power of prohibiting
[American] trade with all other parts of the world, except the island of Great Britain.”974
Their “rights of free commerce,” that provided economic security, became “a victim to
arbitrary power.”975 English policies dictated that the only foreign market open to
American producers and merchants were buyers in Britain. A British merchant would set
the purchase price for American goods and then resell the merchandise to “foreign
markets, where he [would] reap the benefits of making sale of them for full value.”976
Reaching even deeper into the commercial policies of the colonists, Parliament passed
policies regulating the products manufactured in America. Jefferson decried the fact that
“they would prohibit us from manufacturing for our own use the articles we raise on our
own lands with our own labour.”977 Not only were the colonists denied free access to the
markets in the British Empire and beyond, but they were also restricted from producing
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goods that could be consumed locally if those items competed with products sold by
British merchants.
American merchants and landowners came under even more pressure during the
debt crisis of 1772. During this period Americans were called upon to answer for their
debts to “British creditors”978 while the creditors were not held accountable for their own.
If unable to pay their debt the Americans were “hauled into court for settlement of
accounts and committed to debtors prison.”979 The extent of British tampering went
further, when British merchants were allowed to cut out the “colonial middleman”
through “sell[ing] off English goods directly to the public.”980 In bypassing the colonial
merchant, not only were the British merchants able to eliminate the middleman, they
were also able to unload goods at costs that undermined “the interests of the seaboard
merchant and shopkeeper.”981 Nash points to the Tea Act of 1773 as an example of an
attempt to “wrest control of the internal workings of the American economy from the
hands of its own people.”982 The tea was to be sold by the East India Company directly to
the colonists through company agents. American merchants were cut out of the tea
market, diverting profits straight into the hands of a British company. These policies and
practices of the English hurt those with direct commercial interests as well as those who
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worked in industries that provided support services; including laborers who had little
margin room to absorb shifts in prices and wages.983
Throughout the eighteenth-century the colonists recognized the economic
potential of the New World. The opportunities opened the way to population increases
and shifts. As immigrants flooded the seaboard cities a wave of people spread out into the
interior. Additionally, space restrictions encouraged people to creatively engage in
cottage-industrial activity. Wealth through surpluses and new ventures was generated and
consequently the standard of living was raised. People began to emulate the upper
societal classes, including the purchase of luxury goods. The colonists realized they were
primed for success. The irritations that could derail American commercial fortune were
the arbitrary violations of the economic system by the British government. The English
imposed their will upon the colonists through legislation and the threat of force. Faced
with the immense possibilities for economic development and success, the meddlesome
British policymakers’ Acts disrupted the stability of the American commercial enterprise
and subsequently the ability of each colonist to protect their property. In the American
mindset, “the economic regulation[s]” interfered unjustly in the economic affairs of the
colonists and was viewed as “a coordinated attack on their ‘lives, liberties, and
property’.”984 Consequently, as Nash argues, “protection of property was one of the main
incentives for resisting England.”985 American revolutionaries found in the Acts of

983

Nash, The Urban Crucible, 316.

984

Nash, The Urban Crucible, 318.

985

Nash, The Urban Crucible, 349.
267

Parliaments –beginning in 1764 with the American Revenue Act through 1773 with the
Tea Act– that control over property and the economic system directly related to their
ability to live free and equally within society.
While the Declaration of Independence included in its “history of repeated
injuries and usurpations” charges of “cutting off our Trade with all parts of the world”
and “imposing Taxes on us without our Consent” as “Facts [to] be submitted to a candid
world”986 to prove British tyranny over the colonies, it is in the arguments given to solicit
support for the ratification of the proposed Constitution which bring to the foreground the
importance the founders, framers, and the people gave to property. In providing
reasoning to establish a union instead of fracturing into thirteen or less disparate nations
John Jay argued that “the prosperity of the people of American depended on their
continuing firmly united.”987 Even more succinctly he stated that “the prosperity of
America depended on its Union.”988 Hamilton claimed that through “unrestrained
intercourse between the states” there would be an “advance of trade” meeting “not only
… the supply of reciprocal wants, but … [also] exportation to foreign markets.”989 He
went on stating that in each State “the veins of commerce” and “commercial enterprise”
would be invigorated and stabilized through the “greater scope” that “the diversity in the
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productions of different states”990 would supply. A united nation then would supply “a
prosperous commerce” that was held “by all enlightened statesmen” as “a primary object
of their political cares.”991 In order to achieve economic freedom and maintain political
liberty preserving the unification of the States was argued to offer the best road for
success.
The road to a unified nation would come through the ratification of the
Constitution, which would establish an energetic federal government. An energetic
government, while desirable for promoting and protecting American commercial
interests, was also a source for trepidation. If the checks and balances built into the
structure of the government did not work to impede the consolidation of power into the
hands of one or a few a strong centralized government could wrest ultimate power from
the hands of the people. To help ensure that the concentration of power did not fall under
the sway of the one, the few, or the majority, Madison, theorized another contribution of
property in relation to good republican governance.
Where liberty existed, individuals were able to pursue prosperity and property at
their own discretion. When this was the case, Hamilton argued that individual capacities
would elevate some endeavors over the pursuits of others. As some enterprises met with
success, the end result would be an “inequality of property[, which in turn] constituted
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the great and fundamental distinction in Society.”992 Madison succinctly explicated the
linkage between capacities and property. He argued that “the diversity in the faculties of
men” resulted in “different and unequal faculties of acquiring property,” which in turn
produced “the possession of different degrees and kinds of property.”993 Madison
concluded that property inequities and the generative concerns associated with differing
levels of property accumulation form the ground from which “ensues a division of the
society into different interests and parties.”994 To simplify the connections: Capacities
produce property which in turn informs and results in societal and political factions. The
differing interests of society and the positions held by members advocating those interests
in relation to current or proposed collectively binding –political– decisions therefore were
a direct outcome of the enactment of capacities within the economic sphere of society.
For Madison, the sum of this equation –factions– was an absolute necessity in checking
the formation of a ruling majority and mitigating its influence once composed. As such
he argued that “the protection of these faculties, is the first object of government.”995 The
only way for the government to accomplish this goal, was for it to protect the fruition of
capacities in the economic sphere –property– and the interests of property holders.
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In formulating the Constitution, Madison recognized that “persons and property
[were] both essential objects of Government.”996 Neglecting either would not result “in a
just and a free Government” since both needed “to be effectually guarded.”997 Key for the
protection of persons and property was the presumption that both were connected to
representation through suffrage. Debates during the Constitutional Convention raged over
the right to suffrage as each State had established its own qualifications regarding who
could vote.
During this time period most States restricted voting rights to property owners,
with the primary “legal alternative,” according to Williamson, “a tax-paying
qualification.”998 In considering this issue the framers eventually decided that it was best
for the States to determine the necessary qualifications for voting rights, but before they
did they thoroughly explored the issue to see if a national standard could be set through
the Constitution. The framers knew that “there [was] no right of which the people [were]
more jealous than that of suffrage”999 but they also acknowledged that “the regulation” of
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suffrage was “a task of peculiar delicacy.”1000 The delicacy lay in balancing the rights of
those with property against those of people who did not.
Limiting the right to vote to people with property could result in “the rights of
persons … [being] oppressed.”1001 On the other hand, universal male suffrage could leave
those with property at the mercy of the landless majority.1002 In addressing these
alternative positions two significant concerns were expressed in the debates. The
paramount question that framed the first concern asked what guaranteed the affections of
the people toward the good of society. For some, an individual’s attachment was only
assured through ownership of property. The assumption was that when a person shares in
the ownership of an object, then s/he is interested and motivated to ensure that it is
preserved. Those who advocated for property did so because they felt that property
holders –freeholders– were, as Dickinson claimed, “the best guardians of liberty” and “a
necessary defence against the dangerous influence of those multitudes.”1003 People
without property represented a “danger to the holders of property”1004 in that if they could
vote for representation then they might select individuals willing to redistribute the
wealth of the property owners. And yet by limiting the right to suffrage to freeholders,
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the interests of their persons and property would be protected, but the rights or persons of
those without property would be violated. The assumption that property equaled
attachment did face opposition and was challenged when individuals like Colonel Mason
asked:
Does nothing besides property mark a permanent attachment? Ought the
merchant, the monied man, the parent of a number of children whose fortunes are
to be pursued in his own Country, to be viewed as suspicious characters, and
unworthy to be trusted with the common rights of their fellow Citizens.1005
Mason does not deny that ownership of property does produce social attachment, but he
is willing to acknowledge that there are alternative means for producing a solid
connection between a societal member and the governance of that society. Mason’s
question is also informative in that at its foundation lies a hint of the second concern.
When Madison noted that it was a “fundamental principle that men can not be
justly bound by laws in making which they have no part”1006 he provided a clear
articulation of the bases for the second concern: since in society collectively binding
decisions limit the available sphere of liberty by increasing the sphere of power should
not those who are expected to abide by the decision have voice in the making of that law.
When Jefferson declared in 1816, “let every man who fights or pays, exercise his just and
equal right in their election”1007 he was pointing to the idea that those who support
society should have a right to define the limits of their liberty. However a stronger
1005

George Mason, “Qualifications for Suffrage,” in The Anti-Federalist Papers
and the Constitutional Convention Debates, ed. Ralph Ketcham (New York: Signet
Classic, 2003), 147.
1006

Madison, Qualifications for Suffrage, 150.

1007

Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson: Writings, 1397.
273

declaration of this fundamental principle was expressed in an article that appeared in
1802 in The Hornet:
To say that the farmer & Mechanic have nothing to do with government, is to say
that farmers and Mechanics have nothing to do with their own happiness or
misery. We say they are capable of government themselves and ought to enjoy the
right of suffrage.1008
In this article, Every Freeman Ought to Vote, the right to suffrage was the means to
secure, not only the ability to vote, but also one’s own happiness. Societal happiness was
a means to evaluate whether or not a government, according to John Adams, was
achieving its designed end.1009 Those denied a voice in the government, were denied the
opportunity to affect their own individual happiness, which was “the end of man.”1010
The right to suffrage enabled those qualified to have a voice in shaping the directions and
goals of the government, and thereby their own happiness. Consequently, if the right to
vote was tied to a property qualification, then the government for the majority of societal
members would be illegitimate as they would not have the ability to affect the course of
the government and the laws it enacted. Therefore, as the question of suffrage continued
to be a topic of concern for the citizenry, eventually the tax-paying qualification, along
with service in the military were considered to be adequate expressions of attachment to
society.1011
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Even with the eventual popular shift in suffrage to include all men, the role of
property was already firmly inscribed into the Constitution. Property or economic
freedom ensured that individuals were free to pursue their own political goals. Property
distinctions produced factions and factions mitigated the likelihood the majority would
oppress minority groups. Property secured societal attachment. And finally, property was
one of the spheres in which equality was realized.
Equality: A Revolutionary Idea
The idea of equality was firmly established and expected in the American
consciousness prior to the Revolution. For instance, John Adams wrote in 1766:
that the meanest and lowest of the people, are, by the unalterable indefeasible
laws of God and nature, as well intitled to the benefit of the air to breathe, light to
see, food to eat, and clothes to wear, as the nobles or the king. All men are born
equal....1012
In his explication of equality, Wood states that it was “the most radical and most
powerful ideological force let loose in the Revolution.”1013 As was previously discussed
the American conception of equality viewed humanity as being fundamentally equal and
yet functionally unequal due to the effects wrought through the disparity of capacities.
Consequently, even though Thomas Paine argued that while “mankind [was] originally
equals in the order of creation”1014 Wood could claim that “republican equality did not
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mean the elimination of all distinctions.”1015 The first distinction that is relevant is the
narrow scope that equality was limited to for the framers. Equality during this radical
awakening was not for all of humanity in that it was restricted to a particular set of men.
Additionally and more significant for these white males as they were framing what
equality meant and how it was to be applied was their recognition that capacities made
the political sphere dangerous ground for equality. As a result, equality needed another
sphere where individuals could realize what Charles Pinckney, delegate to the
Constitutional Convention, argued was “the leading feature of the U. States.”1016
Equality permeated deep down into the roots of American society and spread
across all facets of its existence. In the political arena, equality influenced the creation of
the Constitution. The popular conception of equality pushed beyond the boundaries that
the limitations of capacities had created for it. Yet during the time of the founders and
framers, it was in the realm of possibility and opportunity where equality was allowed to
find its fullest expression in American society. In other words, politically equality was
the ideal, functionally it was a rallying cry, but in reality it was realized through
opportunity.
The ideal of equality in the political sphere was limited to the principal of equal
representation, equal privileges in voting and equal rights before the law. In regards to the
former, the Federal Farmer argued that it entailed the expression of the interests of “every
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order of men”1017 in the Assembly, as if they were actually there speaking for
themselves. In applying the principle to the Senate, Alexander Hamilton conveyed the
belief that parties –States– involved in the government “ought to have an equal share”1018
no matter the size or power of the party. At its heart though, equal representation was not
possible without the ideal of equality in voting. Thomas Paine declared that “every man
has a right to one vote, and no more in the choice of representatives.”1019 John Adams
concurred in principle when he wrote that “the only practicable method” of establishing
“the equal right of citizens, and their proper weight and influence in society, is by
elections.”1020 Similarly, during the Constitutional Convention debates, Roger Sherman
argued that with “an equal vote” the rich man and the poor man were “equally safe.”1021
The political ideal provided the standard against which the Constitution and future
legislation would be measured. While ultimately it was deemed by the framers that
decisions concerning representation (besides its relation to the Senate) and suffrage were
both best left to the States, they were able to isolate one area in which the ideal of
equality could be written into the Constitution.
The ideal of equality before the law was succinctly expressed when Charles
Pinckney claimed that “every freeman has the right to the same protection &
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security.”1022 This right is found in the Constitution at section one of article fourteen: “All
persons born or naturalized in the United States” cannot be “deprive[d] … of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law” and all people “within its jurisdiction” are to
enjoy “the equal protection of the laws.”1023 This equality before the law was held by
Adams “to be the true and only true definition of a republic.”1024 In his first Inaugural
address, Jefferson, affirmed that “equal and exact justice to all men” was an “essential
principle of our Government.”1025 It was through the judiciary branch of the government
then that equality was extended to all societal members. While the inclusion of the equal
protection clause embedded equality into the Constitution, the strength and vitality of the
ideal was not located in its influence on principles, privileges or portions of the
Constitution, but was fed by and found in the people’s belief in equality.
According to Wood, popular sentimentality favored a far reaching sense of
equality. At one level “the common sense of common people” exhibited the “qualities
that were essential for republican government.”1026 In other words, the moral capacities
necessary for equality were considered widely dispersed among the populace. Exhibiting
this perspective Jefferson claimed, “State a moral case to a ploughman & a professor. The
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former will decide it as well, & often better than the latter.”1027 In relation to the
government, he made a similar argument when he claimed “that the good sense of the
people will always be found to be the best army.”1028 In his perspective, there was
relatively no distinction between the moral character or good sense of a commoner and
those distinguished by superior capacities.
Wood pushes even further though in arguing that revolutionary Americans
actually accepted that everyone was “in a basic down-to-earth and day-in-and-day-out
manner”1029 equal to each other. What caused differences were not inherent capacities
per se, but the distinct realities that nurtured each person.1030 It is likely that these beliefs
led to the advocacy for a robust system of education or dispersal of information to correct
those deleterious environmental effects that could impede the abilities of the people to
regulate society and the government. For instance Melcanton Smith claimed that “the true
policy of constitutions will be to increase the information of the country, and disseminate
the knowledge of government as universally as possible”1031 and Washington argued that
“knowledge is in every country the surest basis of public happiness.”1032 People were
created with “understanding, and a desire to know,” which according Adams, afforded
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them “a right … to knowledge.”1033 The popular sense of equality was based on the
supposition that all people had the “moral sense” to make good decisions and “do
good.”1034 These views of equality certainly circulated throughout the States during the
ratification of the Constitution. However, in the political sphere, due to the intersection of
equality and capacities, the founders and framers favored restricting equality out of a fear
of capacities’ influence.
The people’s perspective of equality and the framers’ fears of capacities created a
paradox. Adams conveyed this paradox well when he claimed that while the people
should have “equal rights” they “cannot, and ought not have equal power”1035 as they
could be swayed by their passion or a personality into making imprudent –politically
unsound– decisions. Consequently the framers limited the political sphere to those who
exhibited superior capacities, but made open the opportunity to rule a right of every
citizen. In composing the requirements indicating who could be a representative, senator,
president or judge “no qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil
profession, [was] permitted to fetter the judgment, or disappoint the inclination of the
people.”1036 Every man had the opportunity to rise to political power as long as the merit
of his capacities enabled him to win the favor of the people.1037 As Madison put it, “Who
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are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him
to the esteem and confidence of his country.”1038 If a citizen could win the favor of the
electors, then that citizen could be one of the few to rule the people. In principle then, it
was this equal opportunity that framed the reality of equality for Americans.
While limited in the political arena, the sphere in which equality was loosed and
flourished was that of economic opportunity. Americans might not be functionally equal,
but they had an equal opportunity to make the most of their lives through an application
of their capacities. Wood claims that “equality … meant most obviously equality of
opportunity”1039 and this opportunity referred primarily to the private lives of the people
and their engagement in civil society. After observing American society in 1832,
Tocqueville, wrote in reference to the American conception and manifestation of equality
that:
[It] can be established in civil society and not reign in the political world. One can
have the right to indulge in the same pleasures, to enter the same professions, to
meet in the same places; in a word, to live in the same manner and pursue wealth
by the same means, without having all take the same part in government.1040
His observations confirmed Jefferson’s claim that “the true foundation of republican
government is the equal right of every citizen, in his person and property, and in their
management.”1041 America was the land of opportunity, of which it was said that while
“no one can obtain wealth without toil and industry; [it is] where each one has an equal
1038

Madison, Federalist #57, 317.

1039

Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution, 233.

1040

Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 479.

1041

Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson: Writings, 1398.
281

chance for riches and honors.”1042 Opportunity to rule in the political sphere or to
advance one’s standing in civil society then defined the limits and reality of equality in
America. American citizens could conceive of themselves as being equal because in their
day-to-day lives, whether in the political sphere or civil society, they all, in principle,
started from a position of equality.
Equality in the American formulation recognized the fundamental equality of all,
created a functional equality in the private and economic spheres of life and restricted it
in the political sphere to those chosen by the people to rule in their stead. This conception
of equality differs substantively from that of the Athenians. The Athenians believed that
they were all fundamentally equal and as such a political sphere in which functional
equality could be realized was a necessity for the enactment of self-rule. Capacities and
the founders and framers’ view of capacities seeped down into the very soil from which
the framers drew out their ideas about not only power, knowledge, liberty, property but
also equality.
In the ideology of American governance the core constructs of even liberty and
equality differ radically from that required for authentic democracy and governance.
Liberty and equality are forever in a dance. Joined together equality necessitates that
liberty is not freedom to do whatever one wants to do. Being equal, liberty is obligated to
respect, preserve, and protect the right of the other to experience the same scope of
choice over his or her life. Without this obligation then liberty tramples over the equality
of another. Yet this is what liberty does under American governance for two reasons.
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First, the citizenry does not participate in collectively deciding the imposition of power –
the required cooperative acts– in their lives as they have given up their power to do so to
representatives; resulting in the citizenry and representatives not being functional
political equals. Second, American governance has not constituted a space of equality;
equal opportunity, while laudable as an ideal, is farcical when certain capacities are
valued and rewarded societally more than others, which allows over time for the
accumulation of power into the hands of those who can maximize their capacities in these
areas or invest and capitalize on the capacities of others. This mirage of equality is
maintained through the examples of the exceptional few who have parlayed their superior
capacities to rise to preeminent societal positions –translatable into economic success–
instead of the majority of the people experiencing near economic equality across the
societal spectrum. While any citizen can be a representative of the people the disparity of
resources this ideology results in makes the possibility of this opportunity highly
unrealistic. Consequently, the American construction of equality as equal opportunity
leads to inauthentic governance as it is not generative of a functional equality in the
private sphere or in the public –political– sphere as it invalidates individual liberty
through denying the great majority of the citizenry participation in the collectively
binding decision-making spaces. In restricting equality in this way American governance
also fails to be authentic because it restricts for the great majority of citizens their pursuit
of happiness only to their private endeavors, when human happiness necessitates a public
expression as well. Disempowered as such the people are denied their full potentiality for
happiness, which as the Declaration of Independence constructs is an inalienable right.
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The founders and framers of the American government established a form of
governance based on a particular ideology composed of conceptions concerning power,
knowledge, liberty, property and equality. This ideology of governance was strongly
influenced by their beliefs about human capacities and society. The outcome was a
substantially different form of governance than the one that functioned in ancient Athens.
Athenian ideology of democracy formed around the concepts of power, knowledge,
liberty, equality and participation. As such the nature of American governance produces
significantly different ideological effects within the structure of society and its members
than what was found in ancient Athenians and what is called for in authentic governance.
Certainly the contemporary view of the conceptions and instantiations of
democracy in America has shifted from the founders and framers’ ideology of
governance. This point is significant but since their ideals were inscribed into the
Constitution, where the people have not acted to revise those conceptions, their voice still
strongly influences how Americans experience the government. Indeed we still accept
that “all authority in [the government] will be derived from, and dependent on the
society,”1043 but the implications of power surrendered, of superior capacities, of the
governing bodies being divided into a system of checks and balances for the preservation
of liberty and protection of property has secured the people from their passions and an
oppressive dominion the few. Consequently, it has also meant that the empowerment
experienced by the citizens of Athens has been lost to all except for the few chosen to
rule.
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Contemporary Scholarly Conception of Democracy
Democracy today is a political framework or “regime”1044 that is defined by
certain ideals. What is conveyed as democracy in America actually emerges out of an
articulation of the Athenian and American ideologies. Democracy as an idea is a
historical, cultural and social construction that “is complex and … marked by conflicting
conceptions.”1045 Liberal and republican traditions1046 have been influential to this
ongoing construction. The modern view of democracy, Chantel Mouffe argues, exhibits a
fusion of “political liberalism (rule of law, separation of powers and individual rights)
and … the democratic tradition of popular sovereignty.”1047 In the convergence of these
two rich and robust streams of thought, liberal discourse appears to have tipped the scale
of balance in its favor, so that currently around the world “liberal democracy seems to be
recognized as the only legitimate form of government.”1048 To map out all of the contours
of how contemporary academia regards democracy is not feasible, since the number of
voices speaking into our understanding of it is immense. A sketch though is possible by
following the prolific and influential work of political theorist Robert Dahl with
supplements provided through the contributions of a few others.
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In considering how democracy is conceived of in contemporary political
scholarship, it is important to note that in a significant way we still live in a world similar
to that of the Athenians and early Americans. When people live in a society they “need a
process for making decisions”1049 about societal life. Robert Dahl argues that societal
“members are expected to conform to these decisions”1050 as the decisions are considered
to be collectively binding. Decisions that are collectively binding are made through a
two-step process that includes participation in the composition of the agenda as well as
deciding its decisive outcomes.1051 In the United States these decisions are arrived at
through a political process known today as representative democracy.
Even though the attributes of liberalism dominate the tradition of democracy, the
influences of democracy are still significant. While the Athenian ideology of democracy
is ancient and thereby far removed from our contemporary world, political
communication scholar John Gastil can still claim that “at its core, democracy means
self-rule, rule by all.”1052 This democratic ideal continues to make legitimate the laws and
policies under which the American people live through their connection to “popular
assent.”1053 Democracy has a legacy, which instantiate an established tradition that
reflects this core belief about the people.
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Following Aristotle’s explication of democracy, Gastil contends that the
fundamental features of a democracy are manifested by “institutions that makes the will
of the majority into the law of the land” through regular elections, the assurance that
citizens have “an equal chance to hold offices,”1054 and minimizing limitations on
citizenship. In other words, Gastil is arguing that democracy empowers people’s decision
for collective effort, requires participation among equals, and is inclusive of the people
under the direct influence of the collectively binding decisions they are obligated to obey.
Democracy’s core construct of an empowered people has fostered a web of related ideals,
beliefs, assumptions, procedures, practices and institutions concerned with constituting
democratic principles and governance. These classical notions of democracy have been
translated into contemporary, popular assumptions about democracy.
Democracy is a political ideology that posits ideals and practices that organize
society in a particular way. A contemporary view of the core constructs of democracy, as
identified by Robert Dahl, includes effective participation or the ability and opportunity
to convey to others one’s own views concerning policies; voting equality or the
opportunity for each member to cast an equally weighted vote when deciding a decisive
outcome; enlightened understanding or the ability within reasonable constraints for
members to learn about proposed policies and their consequences; control of the agenda
or the ability to propose and place items on the political agenda;1055 and the extension of
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the corresponding fundamental rights that secure these democratic ideals1056 in order for
the inclusion of adults to include “all, or … most, adult permanent residents.”1057 These
ideals form the structure of the state and the ground from which people understand what
their positions and levels of participation are within a democratic form of governance.
To deepen this understanding of the basic ideals necessary for democratic rule
within the political sphere and civil society Darrin Hicks adds:
Democracy, in principle, refers to the promise that those who call upon the law
and those whom the law calls upon are also its authors. Democracy, in practice,
refers to a particular institutional arrangement for making binding political
decisions. Given the heterogeneity of “the people,” an institutional arrangement
generating binding decisions is democratic if it is constituted by free and open
participation of all (or at least sufficient representation of those affected by the
decision) and if, from the perspective of the participants, the outcomes of this
process are not known in advance.1058
Democracy from this conception entails institutions that enforce collectively binding
agreements that are arrived at by constituents who have created governing apparatus
through their non-coerced participation in the decision-making process. Again Dahl has
provided a concise list of “basic political institutions” representative of the modern
instantiations of liberal democracy. This includes institutions in which (1) representatives
of the people can “directly or indirectly” decide between proposed policies and are held
accountable for the decisions made; (2) the frequent election of representatives by
citizens, who “are entitled to participate” in the process through voting and (3) as part of
the pool of possible representatives if one decides to stand for an open position s/he can
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do so; (4) the free expression regarding politics and political decision is allowed and
protected; (5) the citizenry can search “independent sources of information” from various
resources that are free of governmental and monopolistic control; and (7) the citizenry
can “form and participate in relatively independent associations and organizations.”1059
Dahl’s list of institutions indicate not only those located in the political sphere but also
includes in the latter half those found in civil society. Between these two spheres of life a
consistent equilibrium needs to be maintained. Balancing the “power and authority” of
the state are the independent “structures and organizations” created and populated by the
citizens “that are strong enough to stand up to the state and serve as a counterbalance to
the authority of the government.”1060 It is through the institutions of civil society that the
state learns of the “active interests”1061 of the public and about public support for
proposed collectively binding decisions. Consequently, instead of constructing a space
for the authentic self-rule of the citizenry, these institutions are meant to convey the
public’s will to representatives who rule in their stead.
How democratic principle and practice are taken up though can vary according to
background beliefs. Jürgen Habermas sketches out two of the more pervasive means of
conceiving of democracy, which exhibit key components noted by Hicks: the liberal and
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republican views.1062 Each view presents an understanding of the state, the individual,
and politics. A liberal view of democracy entails: (1) governing institutions that function
to administer the “interests of society” and “collective goals,” (2) citizens interact and
enact private interests according to the norms of a “market-structure,” and (3) politics that
consolidates private interests in order to counter the power and unresponsiveness of the
governing apparatus.1063 The republican view posits that (1) the state provides the
regulatory arm for a (2) society of “free and equal citizens” who recognize and
acknowledge that “their dependence on one another” necessitates (3) politically oriented
interactions that compose and maintain governing apparatus in ways that benefit the
common good.1064 In the liberal view, Habermas claims that politics has a mediating role
between institutions of governance and the people. Under the republican concept, politics
produces a “reflective form of substantial ethical life”1065 that sustains the solidarity of
citizens.
The republican view as outlined by Habermas, reflects much of the democratic
tradition to which Mouffe alludes, as mentioned above. According to her, it is the liberal
and not the republican view that frames representative democracy. In addition, she
contends that “the defining feature of modern democracy”1066 is pluralism and it is the
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liberal construction of pluralism that shapes liberal democracy. Pluralism, according to
Held, involves “political circumstances constituted by a plurality of identities, cultural
forms and interests”1067 that, in Mouffe’s words, have led to “the end of a substantive
idea of the good life.”1068 Liberalism privileges “individual liberty and … human
rights,”1069 which affects “any attempt to construct a ‘we’, a collective identity.”1070
Through this orientation to pluralism a market-structure influences the formation of the
political sphere and how the democratic ideals outlined by Dahl are realized. One of the
main outcomes of this influence is how the political process is conceptualized. A
citizenry conceived through the democratic tradition is able to partake in deliberation
about differing preferences and interests. Consequently they are able to arrive at a
consensus or majority position that either reduces the difference or incorporates as much
as possible the overlap between the differences, in attempt to produce a common good for
society. The liberal view however, posits that individuals, contrary to living in society
authentically, are “moved” by and seek to promote their preferences and interests in order
to construct an aggregate of their “self-interest”1071 that wins the majority of votes so that
collectively binding decisions represent their particular conception of society.
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While Dahl and others provide a means for a deep conceptualization of
representative, modern, liberal democracy, Mouffe pushes into “a profound
transformation in the symbolic ordering of social relations.”1072 Likewise, Kim and Kim
move beyond “the simple fact that ‘democracy’ refers to both an ideal and an
actuality”1073 by calling attention to the constitutive effects of democracy:
Democracy is not only a way of achieving certain goals but more often than not, it
is also about constructing our goals. Democracy is not only a way of reaching
consensus but also about constructing the fundamental background on which we
can collectively negotiate to achieve a consensus.1074
This position acknowledges democracy’s role in framing how democratic societies
construct their lived worlds in accordance with its endemic principles. Democratic
citizens then are constituted through particular orientations or background beliefs –
ideologies– that inform the goals they should pursue. Such goals then, in turn result in the
production of related subjects, procedures, practices and institutions.
Conclusion: Flourishing Democracy Requires Rhetoric Democracy
Contemporary scholarship on democracy and its construction of what democracy
is posits a system of government that harkens back to the Athenian ideology of
democracy, but still falls short of authentic democracy and governance. The Athenian or
even the republican view, articulated by Habermas, suffers from a “contamination”1075 of
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their principles by liberal values and views. For instance, governance manifesting Dahl’s
recommended institutions in the two spheres of life –political and civil– deprives the
people of their right to self-rule. The same critiques leveled at the founders and framers’
formulation of American governance undercut Dahl’s conception as well. Ultimately,
Dahl’s institutions effectively disempower the people politically, which in turn
compromises their functional equality and their liberty; impedes strong accountability
and response; limits the majority of the citizenry’s participation to institutions outside of
the collectively binding decision-making spaces, thereby severely constraining
opportunities for achieving public happiness to the few; and ultimately devalues the
knowledge and lived experiences of the majority of the citizenry as it is not allowed into
the decision-making spaces unless a proxy –representative– deems it significant for
making the decision or for maintaining his or her public position. The result is not a new
conceptualization and constitution of democracy, but of a liberalism that legitimates its
claim to power through an association with democracy.
Democracy is birthed through the idea of an empowered people and “popular
sovereignty” that in the liberal construction “is deemed to be obsolete.”1076 The outcome
that this form of governance and its deception has produced is “a ‘democratic deficit’.” It
is this deficit that necessitates a popular, democratic proposal to reclaim or privilege
democratic principles within society. For a full flourishing of democracy, citizens need a
political space in which they have the opportunity to engage in democratic rhetoric.
Democracy that acknowledges, enables, and achieves equality, liberty, power,
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identification, and public happiness through participation requires governance to manifest
a rhetorical democracy.
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CHAPTER SIX: DEMOCRATIC RHETORIC AS RHETORICAL
DEMOCRACY: TRANSLATING ATHENIAN DIRECT DEMOCRACY INTO
CONTEMPORARY GOVERNANCE

The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with
their bodies. ... In most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the judgment or
of the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and
stones; and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve the purpose
as well.
–Henry David Thoreau, Walden and Civil Disobedience
Introduction: Democratic Rhetoric as Rhetorical Democracy
Machines perform functions that accomplish ends for purposes determined by
active human beings. Human beings, when they do not engage their inherent capacities
for self-rule in order to constitute their world(s) can be reduced to mere machinery;
performing ends determined by others who do participate in making the world. Yet, as
Henry Thoreau argues, society does not need only one or a few participating and
constituting the in-between spaces that form the social world. Society needs individuals
who are not clay figures, who do not actualize the capacities that distinguish humanity
from inanimate objects. It needs individuals who are not mere subjects or denizens who
only know how to be ruled and do not know how to rule or are not empowered to rule.
Citizens are societal members who understand and participate in the “free exercise … of
… judgment”;1077 embodying their rights of liberty, equality, and self-rule or power. For
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subjects to be transformed into citizens they must be empowered to enact their rights
through meaningful participation within the public sphere in ways that employ their
knowledge of contextualized particulars, in order to constitute identifications that lead to
a collective will productive of collectively binding decisions representative of the
common good. The means through which a societal member is acknowledged as a citizen
involves not only the recognition of being a citizen, but also the ongoing engagement of
becoming a citizen. To be a citizen entails acting out one’s citizenship.
Citizenship, how one is empowered to be a participant in society, can be enacted
through an endless variety of manifestations depending on the ideology of governance
society accepts. For democracy to function as a democracy its citizens have to be
continually empowered to employ their knowledge as active participants in the
collectively binding decision-making process. Through democracy, a space in which the
citizenry is empowered to embody and achieve their natural, innate human rights must be
constructed. Human beings naturally have a right to pursue the ends that they desire and
punish those who interfere with attaining and retaining those ends. They also have a
desire for acting-together politically through identifications that constitute in-between
spaces where individuals realize their liberty. When individuals congregate in order to
accomplish their collective needs and wants through cooperative behaviors –society–
they must decide how their liberties will be limited and to what end. Democracy proposes
that these individuals will be equal collectively binding decision-makers. For a
democracy to even approach accomplishing such ideals societal members must construct
a place for its citizens to enact democratic rhetorical engagements. Consequently,
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democratic rhetoric requires a political space –a rhetorical democracy– in which
empowered participants can produce a strong sense of democratic accountability and
response.
Democratic rhetoric rests upon the nature of human communication. Coming
together, individuals posit meanings for certain objects that they then assign a symbol to
in order to represent the meaning –attitude and action– those individuals consensually
agree upon. These symbols, whether found in the words and phrases of a language or a
culture’s material codes, then act as arousal agents that call forth particular responses
from those who share in that particular meaningful symbolic order. To elicit cooperative
behaviors for the common good through collectively binding decisions, participants in the
decision-making process have to be able to engage each other through one another’s
symbolic orders. This means that those individuals who address the citizen participants
need to invent throughout the preparational phase and during the actual rhetorical
engagement. In doing so, individuals of one micro-culture will take on the role of others
who are from relevant oppositional micro-cultures. Yet, concrete and creative invention
through the symbolic orders of others only becomes necessary when the collectively
binding decision-making space is inclusive of society’s micro-cultures and fosters strong
rhetorical accountability through the possibility of immediate rhetorical response. As
multiple engagements expressive of public wills transpire the citizenry produces a
collective will that is productive of a particular reality. This reality is generated through
the mutual communicative event, as well as the cooperative behavior the collectively
binding decision results in for societal members. In this way, democratic rhetoric creates
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richer understandings across different micro-cultures and is transformational of
individuals and society.
Key to a rhetorical democracy then, is a functional space that brings the citizenry
together in a way that the force of democratic rhetoric moves the participants beyond
their prejudices and personal preferences or will. Gadamer describes a prejudice as “a
judgment that is rendered before all the elements that determine a situation have been
finally examined.”1078 In a sense, a prejudice is formed through expectations in relation to
certain contexts –expectations that are developed through how the individual sees and
relates to their perception of reality; a reality consensually constructed through his or her
symbolic orders. To move individuals beyond their prejudices, a rhetorical democracy
has to constitute a space of political participation in which citizens “enter into the ruling
principle of [their] neighbors’ mind, and suffer him [or her] to enter into [their own].” 1079
For this to occur, a rhetorical democratic space must bring together the full range of
participants from the citizen members of society’s micro-cultures.
A rhetorical democracy also needs to create a place in which the citizen
participants are functionally equal. Even though a human constructed space “in which
every man and every woman shall have equal weight in society, is a chimera,”1080 a
rhetorical democratic place in which people are equal in liberty and power is essentially
possible. Such a functionally equal political space is only possible when participation is
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not restricted according to any criteria based on capacities or determinations –birth,
inheritance, race, or symbolic orders– that individuals are born into or which emerge
throughout the course of life events. To be functionally equal recognizes that each citizen
has the right to participate in agenda setting for those contextualized particulars
considered, the process of determining the collective will, and effectively contributing to
the provisional closure of a collectively binding decision.
In democratic rhetoric the core criteria –those mentioned here and previously– for
the function of a rhetorical democracy have already been established. To manifest these
functions in the governing process certain structures that enable and achieve a political
space need to also be constituted. Just as the Athenian ideology of democracy provides a
productive means for understanding the nature of authentic governance, it also offers a
ground for constructing the structures of a rhetorical democracy. Ideology invites
individuals into supportive individual and collective acts, which in turn most often
necessitates institutional infrastructures that provide spaces conducive for the
performance of those acts. Called into a democratic subject position the Athenians
organized their political spaces so as to be able to enact the ideals, values, and practices
the ideology required for reification. The institutions of Athenian democracy should not
be viewed as separate from their ideology of democracy, in that these institutions are
material manifestations congruent with that ideology. An empowered people, who
considered themselves to be functionally equal, desirous of being able to enact their
liberty and employ their knowledge in order to make collectively binding decisions
concerning contextualized particulars, needed institutions and infrastructures that would
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facilitate their practices and performances of self-rule through rhetorical engagements. In
ancient Athens these institutional structures were developed and honed over time and
therefore it is their governing apparatuses that provide a basis for concretizing rhetorical
democracy into the contemporary societal context. The concerns related to direct
democracy should not be discounted though; it is here where the insights of the founders
and framers of American governance also guide in the projection of the institutions and
institutional infrastructures necessary to bring a rhetorical democracy to fruition.
Direct Democracy in Ancient Athens: A Sketch
We are unique in the way we regard anyone who takes no part in public affairs:
we do not call that a quiet life, we call it a useless life. We are all involved in
either the proper formulation or at least the proper review of policy, thinking that
what cripples action is not talk, but rather the failure to talk through the policy
before proceeding to the required action.
–Pericles, The Peloponnesian War
Ancient Athens and its people produced an ongoing legacy that reaches across the
expanse of time to remain influential for contemporary thought and practices. This is
especially true in relation to democracy, as, contends Lipson, “it was the Athenians who
created democracy … by theorizing about its principles and inventing its institutions.”1081
While ancient Athens is long removed from today’s world, it is not only time that
separates the Athenians from the here and now but also their culture and material
practices and situations. It could be argued that this distance makes it difficult to
incorporate their contributions. While acknowledging this contention, John Rawls argues
that the use of historical examples can be beneficial. A right interpretation, according to
Rawls, of “the conceptions and principles … for the basic historical questions … should
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be widely applicable to our own problems.”1082 To develop a right interpretation of the
answers provided to historical questions by a people of a different time and place a
thorough investigation into their material practices and contexts is warranted. By
examining the practices, instead of just the conceptions and principles, the underlying,
emergent premises can be translated for practical, concrete, contemporary application.
Theory practiced faces the harsh realities of real world situations and therefore, the
enacted manifestation refines the theoretical principles into workable solutions.
The Funeral Orations by Pericles was given decades after the democratic reforms
–the Kleisthenic reforms– of 508/7 B.C. and yet it encapsulates the democratic
sensibilities engendered through those reforms. Democracy in Athens evolved as “the
Athenians improved their system”1083 of governance. For the Athenians “the defining
characteristic of their democracy” was their “capacity to change laws, and generally, to
confront contingency with new institutional solutions.”1084 Even though they had a
propensity for “modifying institutions in light of new information or changing
circumstances,”1085 four institutions formed the relevant foundational institutions and
institutional infrastructures for Athenian democracy: citizenship, the Boule, the
Assembly, and the navy.
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Those Who Ruled Themselves: Athenian Citizenship
Aristotle defined a citizen as a person “who has the power to take part in the
deliberative or judicial administration of any state.”1086 While this definition comes
significantly after the major Athenian reforms shifted their political institutions to
democracy it speaks directly to what Athenian citizenship entailed following the reforms
of Kleisthene.1087 These reforms, which provided for “the orderly and standardized
definition of all shareholders in the community,”1088 are considered the genesis of
Athenian democratic citizenship and institutions.1089
The Athenian polis, “a composition of elements – the citizens”1090 was not
limited to Athens but was inclusive of all of Attica.1091 The boundaries of Attica spanned
1000 square miles, which meant that “people in the farthest corners lived about 30 miles
… from the city.”1092 Athens, as Attica, meant that citizenship was largely constituted as
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“an imagined community, a polity in which most members did not know each other.”1093
The geographical extent of Athens was home to “a total population of around 250,000 to
300,000.”1094 This total included members of the population who were excluded from
citizenship: women, children, slaves, and metics or immigrants conducting business in
Athens.1095 With citizenship restricted to adult males, the number ranged “between
30,000 and 50,000.”1096
The right of Athenian citizenship was carefully regulated through the law and
entailed rights and obligations. An adult male over the age of eighteen, who had his
petition for citizenship accepted by the Assembly of his ancestors’ deme –a
social/political institution based on territorial districts– was protected by the law.1097 A
citizen was afforded a trial in capital cases, he could not be tortured, authorities had to
sanction any intrusion of his home; his property rights were secured, and he had the right
to speak and vote in the Assembly.1098 With these rights came the responsibilities of
citizenship: A citizen was to live in obedience to the law, render military service when
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called upon, pay taxes, and participate in the political institutions.1099 These rights and
obligations “were exercised without any exclusion based on wealth, profession or
appearance” and conjoined the elite as equals in citizenship with those “struggling to
make ends meet.”1100 Reaching beyond the definition of the citizen the reforms of
Kleisthene also reconstituted the political institutions of Athens; two of which are of
particular interest.
The Executive Arm of Athenian Governance: The Boule
The institution that proposed the agenda for the Assembly, the Boule, functioned
as the executive arm of Athenian democracy.1101 It was comprised of fifty members from
each of the ten trittyes –artificially constructed tribes or political districts (totaling 500)–
that incorporated the demos from the three population regions of Attica: the coast, inland,
and Athens proper.1102 Membership in the Boule, according to Thorley, was restricted to
male citizens, thirty years of age or older, who were at the minimum members of the
zeugitai class (landowners with a certain annual income), and had presented themselves
before their deme, which then either could validate or deny their eligibility.1103 If the
number of qualified citizens was greater than the number of citizens allowed from a
particular deme, the representative was selected through the casting of lots. Service in the
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Boule was limited to a one year term and could be held only twice over the course of a
lifetime.1104
In setting the agenda or probouleuma, the Boule provided both specific and
general issues and policies to be addressed by the Assembly. After the Assembly had
reached its decisions on those items the Boule was then responsible for publishing those
decisions and ensuring that they were enacted. In addition, the Boule oversaw duties that
included the state’s financial, administrative, and judicial responsibilities.1105 These
duties included managing the collection of tribute,1106 administration of “public works
and services,”1107 and diplomatic functions.1108 Through the Boule, Kleisthene provided
an institution that afforded the Athenian an instrumental organ of representatives that
acted as a rudder to the state through its oversight and attention to the day-to-day
administrative operations. While Boule served the state through these means, the
Assembly embodying Athens most democratic institution, is where the citizenry engaged
in the collectively binding decision-making process.
“The Assembly,” according to Thorley, “always felt that it was definitely in
charge – and so it was.”1109 It was in the Assembly that every Athenian citizen had the
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privilege and opportunity to engage in the collective rule of the city. The effect of
Kleisthene’s reforms were to make the citizens “accountable for the welfare of [the]
polis”1110 or Athenian state. In the Assembly, citizens produced the collectively binding
agreements for which they “not only voted for … but were also the people who carried
them out.”1111 As such the people were ultimately responsible for those decisions. This
fact of collective accountability for the judgments rendered likely contributed to their
“attachment to the progressive ideology of pragmatic innovations”1112 that guided the
evolving nature of Athenian democracy. Throughout the fifth century this ‘progressive
ideology’ led to slight modifications in the operation of the Assembly and how it was
constituted. With this said though, again it was the reforms of Kleisthene that formed its
foundation as a democratic institution.
Where Citizens Ruled: The Athenian Assembly
Ekklesia involved the citizen’s right to speak in the Assembly and is the most
significant element of Athenian democracy. As Woodruff notes, in Sparta its citizens
were allowed to vote on proposed policies, but they were not able to either propose
policies or address them in the Assembly.1113 In the Athenian Assembly the citizen not
only voted on solutions to contextualized particulars but could also rhetorically engage
each other over which solution should be implemented. As discussed previously the
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Boule would set certain issues for the attention of each Assembly,1114 but in addition the
Assembly could direct the Boule to propose issues that it deemed significant for the next
meeting.1115 The power of the Assembly extended over a broad range of concerns and
interests: religious buildings; sanctioning of new cults; public religious festivals;
expenditure of surplus revenue to beautify public properties; sanctioning of state
approved weights and measures for trade; official currency; areas of foreign policy;
construction of triremes; and appointments to key positions like the generals, the “city
architect, the superintendent of the water supply, and the board of naval architects.”1116
Annually a citizen typically had forty opportunities to take advantage of his right
to practice ekklesia in Assembly.1117 While citizenship could be registered for at the age
of eighteen, to participate in the Assembly a citizen had to be twenty years of age or
older. Another restriction on a citizen’s participation in the Assembly that impacted a
citizen’s ability to speak encompassed two factors. First, the holding capacity for each
Assembly was limited to six thousand, which meant that not all of the citizens in Attica
could attend at one time.1118 With this many people, even though all had the right to
address the Assembly, there was not enough time for everyone to speak. Due to this
limitation, members of the Assembly regulated those who spoke, through their attention
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to and even interruptions of the speeches given. If a speaker was not considered as having
specific knowledge in regards to the issue under review, the audience could heckle the
speaker until he gave up the podium.1119 On the other hand, speakers, who had specific
knowledge or had developed trust with the citizenry through past participation, were
given latitude as long as they held to the general norms governing speakers. Aeschines
provided a synopsis of these norms:
[The speaker] must keep to the matter at hand, must not deal with two separate
matters together, and must not speak twice on the same matter at any one meeting.
He must not engage in slanders or scurrility, or interrupt others. He must speak
only from the platform, and must not assault the presiding officer….1120
After the speakers had addressed a specific topic the Assembly was then called upon to
vote. The process, especially when the issue was complex, could span more than one
Assembly meeting. When the process had been completed and the vote rendered, the
decision was then “recorded and published.”1121 Thus, the democratically arrived at
collectively binding decision could be publically reviewed by the rest of the citizenry.
This completed the democratic circle: the citizenry could propose the contextualized
particulars to consider, the citizens would rhetorically engage the Assembly, the citizens
voted on the proposed solutions, and then the people were publically informed of the
decision so that they could review the decision.
One other important factor contributing to participation in the Assembly was that
the Athenians eventually instituted pay to “ensure a high degree of popular
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participation.”1122 Citizens for whom a day of service in the Assembly meant an
economic hardship received a financial stimulant to attend the Assembly and maintain the
vitality of their democracy. The significance of citizenship is demonstrated in that the
Athenians chose to increase the pay for participating in the Assembly throughout the
fourth century, while no pay was granted for service in the army and the pay for manning
the triremes of the navy was considered inadequate.1123
The effect of these democratic reforms for Athenian citizens was a broadening of
the distribution of power. Thus with Pericles, each citizen could echo the claims that he
made during his famous funeral oration commemorating the fallen soldiers of Athens:
[The] administration [of the Athenian constitution] favours the many instead of
the few; this is why it is called a democracy. If we look to the laws, they afford
equal justice to all in their private differences; if to social standing, advancement
in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being
allowed to interfere with merit; while as to poverty, if a man is able to the state,
he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition.1124
Every Athenian citizen had the right to participate in the decision process of the
government. As a consequence, these reforms also dictated that each citizen was now
“accountable for the welfare of [the] polis”1125 or Athenian state. At times this meant that
Athenians had no one truly to blame for policies that lead to disaster as was the case
when the Assembly approved the catastrophic Sicilian Expedition of 411 B.C.1126 On the
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other hand, it also meant that the collectively binding decisions they lived by were those
that they had the ability to propose, shape, decide upon, and enact.
Democracy’s Training Ground: The Athenian Navy
…the victory of Salamis, which was gained by the common people who served in
the fleet, and won for the Athenians the empire due to command of the sea,
strengthened democracy.
–Aristotle, Politics
Athens’ transformation to democratic rule, in part, also emerged when their
method of waging war transitioned from protecting their lands to dominating the seas.
With this change the thete –lower– class was elevated socially and politically due to the
role they played in Athens’ emergence as a dominant, imperial sea power. When
Themistocles recognized that “becoming a seafaring nation was the key to the [Athenian]
acquisition of power”1127 he persuaded the Athenian citizens to use public funds, which
were initially to be distributed equally among them, to build a fleet of one hundred
triremes –warships.1128 Upon the completion of this new fleet, the Athenian navy
numbered one hundred and seventy ships, a number to which Athens continued to add
until at the height of its power it had some three hundred triremes in its armada.1129 With
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a crew of two hundred “sailors, officers, and marines,”1130 one hundred and seventy of
which were rowers,1131 the manpower requirements were in the tens of thousands.1132
Since the Athenians manned their ships with free men and primarily with citizens these
numbers necessitated that the “citizens of the lowest class, the thetes”1133 had to be
engaged in military service.
The sailor’s experience on a trireme was intense, all encompassing, and educative.
A trireme was a unique ship that inaugurated “a new era of warfare.”1134 While there
were different positions on the ship that commanded higher rank, it was the rowers who
were the heart of the trireme. The majority of oarsmen were positioned within the hull of
the ship and therefore they had to row blindly.1135 In battle an opponent was defeated
through maneuvering the trireme into position and then driving its forward ram into the
side of an enemy ship. “Raw courage counted less,” according to John Hale, “than
technique and the orderly execution of mechanical maneuvers.”1136 Success in an
engagement involved precision and power that was provided through the efforts of the

1130

Hanson, A War Like No Other, 237.

1131

Barry S. Strauss, “The Athenian Trireme, School of Democracy,” in
Demokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern, eds. Josiah Ober and
Charles Hedrick (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 317.
1132

Strauss, “The Athenian Trireme, School of Democracy, 317.

1133

Hale, Lords of the Sea, 13.

1134

Hale, Lords of the Sea, xxxi.

1135

Hanson, A War Like No Other, 242

1136

Hale, Lords of the Sea, xxxi.
311

rowers. To master the skills necessary for a successful engagement, the crews had to
“learn how to row in synchronization … [and] become accustomed to the crash and roar
of battle.”1137 “Order and unity,” according to Hanson, “were critical on board ships amid
the distractions of the loud swishing and the piper’s tune to guarantee good rowing
time.”1138 Seasoned rowers then, were “premium military assets who took months to
train.”1139 The form and function of the trireme dictated training, execution, and
experiences that demanded precision, cohesion, camaraderie, and community. Upon the
quality of their training and the training of the fleet rested not only their lives, but the
success and prestige of Athens as well.
As the extent of the Athenian empire grew, its reach throughout the
Mediterranean Sea included places that the thetes had only heard about through stories.
The crew members saw where the Trojan War was fought and won by the Greeks. They
journeyed to the shores of Egypt and traveled up the Nile. They “would follow the sea
routes hallowed by the legends of Odysseus, Theseus, Jason, and Cadmus.”1140 These
voyages brought a knowledge of the world to which only the elites of Athens previously
had access. The shift to the sea then “provided Athens with [a] unifying principle and
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cohesive spirit”1141 that was vital to its success on the seas and ultimately for its
democratic institutions.
The connection between serving in the Athenian navy and democracy is found in
the development of the thetes’ confidence as societal and political members. “The navy
was,” according to Hale, “the origin of Athens’ extreme … democracy,”1142 The thetes,
after the Kleisthenic reforms, did not exhibit a belief in themselves, nor did they have the
knowledge to capitalize on their new found political position as citizens.1143 To truly be
empowered citizens, the thetes needed to develop “self-confidence, a knowledge of the
world, and less tangibly, the ability to imagine themselves as part of an active political
community.”1144 Through their experience on the trireme the thetes formed a “social
imaginary”1145 that informed their political consciousness and awoke them to their critical
role in the maintenance and advancement of Athens. Now as an essential member of
Athens’ military, Strauss argues: “Athenian thetes gained a new outlet of prestige, a new
way to fight for their country, a way to make a military contribution as important, if not
more so, than that of their wealthier neighbors.”1146 Due to this new military orientation
many of the successes and the failures of the policies voted on in the Assembly largely
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depended on the thetes. As a member of a ship that was part of a coordinated and ordered
fleet, a thete learned the importance of working in unison through “a communitarian and
egalitarian effort.”1147 The trireme then acted as a school where the thetes “forged a thetic
ideology”1148 that included equality, order, freedom, and solidarity: all of which were
imperative for the development of their political consciousness. In other words, service
on a trireme fostered the indispensable belief that provided the impetus for their
sensibilities and practices within Athens’ political institutions as democratic citizens.1149
Application to the American Political Landscape
While the Athenian structures of democratic governance evolved over time to
meet their conceptual and material needs and strengths and limitations their answers,
practices, institutions, and institutional infrastructures have to be transformed to provide
the same in a contemporary societal context. Their structure and procedures for the
Assembly clearly provided for strong rhetorical accountability and response, but what
about the other factors; like how the Athenian Assembly would incorporate the mass
populations of large scale cities and what institution would perform the role of the
Athenians’ Boule. Additionally, the Athenians gained valuable training in the ways of
cooperative behaviors, constructing shared symbolic orders through their experiences at
sea. How would the average contemporary citizen procure this type of democratic
instruction? The answers are not simple, but the proposals made here should provide for
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productive possibilities where typically, instead of seeking solutions to these concerns,
past and current political theorists have sought alternatives that either dismiss direct
democracy as a necessary and viable collectively binding making space or negate its
benefits.
Answering the Critique of Structure: Assembly Boundaries and Adding Forums
A structural critique of direct democracy holds that its requirement for meeting in
person makes it untenable due to the citizenry’s numbers and their dispersal over great
distances.1150 As a city-state, even the furthest inhabitants of Attica –Athens– could
feasibly attend the Assembly. Today’s nation-states generally incorporate territorial
distances that would make travel to and from a national or state Assembly highly
problematic. In addition, due to high urban density and large populations, the act of
bringing together people to participate in an Assembly would also be highly difficult;1151
made more difficult “the larger the scale.”1152 These practical concerns lead Young to
claim: “Democratic politics must respond to this scale, and thus must involve millions of
people related to one another through democratic institutions.”1153 Yet, even though
political theorists typically present these critiques to dismiss direct democracy, they also
acknowledge the contexts in which it does work. For instance, Gutmann and Thompson
state that “the advantages of direct democracy can be realized only in local units or
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subunits in the political system.”1154 Young, when advocating that “regional governance
institutions … should, be designed so as to preserve or create neighbourhood and town
voice and participation” warns against “metropolitan fragmentation”1155 in which certain
individuals constitute exclusive political enclaves in the midst of interdependent, closely
associated, yet different others. For direct democracy to be a viable form that structures
the functions of governance in order to foster and facilitate democratic rhetoric –to
realize authentic governance– these questions regarding scope, size, and infrastructure
need to be addressed.
Limiting the scope of a direct democracy to the boundaries of a metropolis would
provide a means for addressing the concern of distance. Young describes the boundaries
of a metropolis as “include[ing] all those who dwell together within structural relations
generated by processes of interaction, exchange, and movement that create unavoidable
conditions of action for all of them.”1156 Obviously, Young’s notion is the ideal and as
such while it should be pursued, if the citizens of a city incorporated in a metropolitan
area decided to employ the structures outlined here the ideal should not constrain their
decision to do so. In limiting the political jurisdiction to the metropolis or even a city the
citizenry would attend an Assembly associated with their place of residence; in which the
results of their self-rule, productive of collectively binding decisions, would be practical
and contextually situated to the citizenry’s primary lived spaces. Practically, this would
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limit the number of possible participants, but it also would constrain the scope of the
Assembly’s political jurisdiction to the affairs of a particular polity. Even this restriction
of political jurisdiction though, could eventually be lifted for key State and National
contextualized particulars. For instance, one reason for “the self-discovered democratic
consciousness” of the Athenians, according to Manville, was that “once the dēmos saw
the power of its own judgments, its desire to take on more and more authority and to
implement changes that promoted its rule grew stronger.”1157 Likewise, after
demonstrating their ability to rhetorically engage in collectively binding decision-making
processes generative of quality judgments for their own polities, Assemblies across
contemporary states or the nation could be employed to express the will and judgment of
the citizenry. While this expansion is an imaginative possibility, the following discussion
will be restricted to the political jurisdiction of a metropolis or city.
The problem of size –too many citizens to meet together at one time and at one
place– that is inherent in a major metropolitan context certainly seems to create a
significant problem for participation in direct democracy. This is true only when the
Assembly’s forum is considered as a singular entity. In Athens, the Assembly functioned
fruitfully for a total population of 250,000 to 300,000, with 30,000 to 50,000 of those
being citizens. These numbers allowed for the full functioning of Athenian democratic
institutions. Therefore, when the citizen population exceeds these numbers, the answer is
not to expand the capacity of an Assembly, but to multiply its forums. For example, in a
city of one million citizens, twenty forums for twenty different citizen districts –like the
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Kleisthenes’ trittyes– would provide today’s citizenry with equivalent opportunities to
participate in self-governance. While twenty forums in a city with one million citizens
correspond to the Athenian model of six thousand participants, it is an arbitrary number.
For instance, an alternative could be to reduce the number of participants assigned from
each citizen district to their forum. Or the number of citizen participants could be
reduced, while the number of forums increased. Another possible solution would be to
alternate the days on which the forums met. As a result, this proposal and alternatives
would not necessarily necessitate huge public works initiatives in order to build each
citizen district a meeting place.
Just imagine six thousand citizens gathering together to rhetorically engage others
over contextualized particulars in order to collectively decide upon issues important to
the vitality of where they live forty times a year. Such a structure would shake up the
contemporary political imaginary in fascinating ways. The solution to scope, size, and
infrastructures concern simply lies in limiting the scope of participants to the boundaries
of a city and increasing the number of forums associated with an Assembly.
The Boule in the Modern Context
When collectively binding decisions are made they need to be enacted. Every
decision-making body is mirrored by an administrative arm that carries out the decisionmaking body’s desires. In ancient Athens the Boule was its administrative arm, executing
the policies sanctioned by the Assembly, overseeing the day-to-day operations of the
polis, and composing the Assembly’s agenda. To oversee the day-to-day operations the
Boule was managed by five hundred administrators. In executing the policies of the
318

Assembly the Boule had to bring to concrete fruition what was dictated in abstract terms
by the Assembly. It also provided the Assembly with a president, who “convened and
presided over the … assembly” and “received messengers, envoys, and applicants who
wished to address the dēmos”1158 in the Assembly. By composing the Assembly’s agenda
it ensured that the issues it viewed as significant, as well as those dictated by the
Assembly, would be addressed in a timely manner. The Boule, or council of 500, was a
powerful entity that is not unlike the representative leadership of a contemporary
metropolis.
Elected city officials today are in the position of the Athenian Boule, with two
important differences. In addition to seeing that laws and policies are enacted, they
largely set the agenda without authoritative input by the citizenry and then they deliberate
and decide how to address those agenda items. These are important distinctions,
identifying key differences, but there are also noteworthy similarities. The selection of
these officials predominately originated from a similar class as those who filled the
Athenian Boule. In addition, city council members typically represent particular districts
of a city much as a Boule member represented his deme –administrative centers of the ten
trittyes.1159 Consequently, the functions of the Boule could be enacted by the elected
officials of today. The significant differences would be that their agenda-setting function
would be shared with the Assembly and the decision-making capacity they have now
would be shifted to the forums of the local Assembly.
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Assembly Procedures: Structuring Self-Rule
It is not feasible to reach back in time to the functions and structures of ancient
Athens’ direct democracy in order to lift them out of their cultural and material context to
insert them into the contemporary world of governance. Athens’ Assembly allowed for
the self-rule of the Athenians over all of the affairs of their city-state and empire. Just the
extensive boundaries of the nation-state’s political jurisdiction negates the ability of the
citizenry to meet face-to-face; the core structural characteristic of Athenian direct
democracy. Yet for authentic governance, which is only actualized through democracy, to
be realized in a nation-state it is the face-to-face self-rule of the citizenry that must
actualized. To bring Athenian direct democracy into the contemporary context of
governance involves an act of translation, which highlights certain structures in order to
transform them in ways that allow for democratic rhetoric to flourish. To empower the
citizenry for self-rule, so that they experience liberty and functional equality and employ
their non-contingent knowledge, a rhetorical democracy must first facilitate the face-toface participation in the collectively binding decision-making process.
Assembly Procedures: Populating the Assembly with Citizen Participants
To populate the Assembly, the contemporary system of filling juries, provides a
feasible system for selecting a diverse citizen audience. Following the model of the
current jury system, those selected to fill the Assembly would be required to participate
in their citizen district’s forum. Notifications would be sent out to registered voters
according to membership in the designated citizen districts. If necessary, just as jurors are
paid to offset their loss of pay for their service, so could the citizen participants. Even if
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participation is voluntary –in essence violating the obligation of citizenship– once the
citizenry realized that involvement was a means for self-rule –that they could be a part of
the collectively binding decision-making process productive of society’s laws and
policies and was generative of public happiness– the interest of the citizenry would be
provoked so that the forums would be filled. Either way, required or voluntary
participation would be structured in the similar manner for selection and notification for
each citizen district.
One possible area of concern related to populating multiple forums of an
Assembly in large metropolitan areas would be the diversity of each citizen district and
their related forums. It is plausible that entire citizen districts could be composed of
individuals coming from a particular ethnic, racial, or economic background. Such
forums could become individually polarized and cause discord along these ethnic, racial,
and economic lines. Such homogeneity of forums would negate the citizen participants
need to employ the full range of the inventional process for their rhetorical engagements
and would also lessen the vitality of rhetorical accountability and response. To offset this
possibility Kleisthenes’s formulation of arbitrary tribes –trittyes– that pulled citizens
from the city, coastland, and inland populations provides a solution. Instead of simply
blocking off sections of the city to draw participants from the constitution of each citizen
district could be intentionally formed in order to ensure that each forum was populated by
participants from the breadth of micro-cultures inhabiting the polity. The guiding
principle for the formation of these citizen districts would be to ensure that they
incorporated the heterogeneity found within the bounds of the metropolitan area. In this
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way, the citizen districts and forums would constitute spaces for contestation, but even
more importantly spaces in which citizens are brought face-to-face with member of the
various micro-cultures that make up their community.
Assembly Procedures: Range of Assembly Authority
Another real practical concern would be the range of issues over which a modern
day Assembly would have authority for self-rule. What areas would an Assembly be able
to set policy and declare laws for? Starr claims that “the issues [the Athenians] faced, to
be sure, were much simpler than those in the modern world, and in the marketplace they
could gain information and misinformation on which to base their judgments….”1160 Starr
presents two concerns here; one about the range of issues and the second regarding the
quality of information used to make decisions about those issues. Perhaps his first
concern would a true assessment if the political jurisdiction was not limited to the city,
but at the level of local polities it is incorrect. In fact, while the Athenian Assembly did
not address the full range of issues a nation-state does today it did set laws and policies
for an extensive empire. Issues of national defense, foreign policy, currency, and
approved weights and measures for trade that the Athenians attended to would not be
under the purview of a local Assembly, as national and state entities would still retain
authority in these areas. Moreover, even though contemporary politics is unconcerned
with public religion, the maintenance and performance of religious rituals, and the
construction of religious buildings it is concerned with civic events that are conducted on
public premises and the construction of new public buildings and spaces. Like the
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Athenian Assembly, local Assemblies in a contemporary context would have authority
over areas of civic events, civic spaces, policing, local transportation, welfare,
development and redevelopment of economic areas and endeavors, waste, and a number
of other interesting issues.
In addition, whether the decision-making body of a metropolis is composed of
better (wo)men or of the citizenry there is no control over the quality of the information
they take up and employ in the collectively binding decision-making process. The true
hedge against the influence of misinformation is the strong versions of rhetorical
accountability and response only available through a rhetorical democracy. Just like the
Athenians, the citizen participants of these local Assemblies would be empowered to
bring to bear their non-contingent knowledge relevant to contextualized particulars in
order to envision and constitute their lived worlds through their collectively binding
decisions.
Assembly Procedures: Norms for Speaking
The procedures or norms for speaking to the citizen audiences of the Assembly
should adhere to one absolute principle: that how a citizen addresses the forum should not
favor a particular communication code or symbolic order of a micro-culture. Beyond this
principle, the norms that the forums of an Assembly could follow are open to the
imagination and need of the citizenry. A practical starting place for these norms, are those
that guided the Athenian Assembly as articulated by Aeschines. Aeschines’ claimed, as
previous explicated, that to address the forum an Athenian had to stay on topic, focus on
one matter at a time, and speak no more than twice on the same subject. The speaker also
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could only speak from the designated speaking platform, be civil, and respect the
authority of the presiding official –a mayor?– who conveyed and facilitated the rhetorical
engagements.
The key norm that the Athenians employed was that each individual could speak
only twice regarding an issue. This is a powerful motivating norm, because it compels an
individual to carefully reflect on –invent– what s/he would say. Definitely, it is difficult
to imagine a functioning Assembly of this type, but that difficulty points to a true
deficiency in the contemporary political imaginary. For the Athenians though, decade
after decade, their Assembly followed these norms to effectively rule their community
and empire. What is lacking in today’s political imaginary is the belief and will that the
people can rule themselves –a trust in their knowledge and capacities for making
judgments that will instantiate the common good. What truly hinders the political
imaginary from conceiving of, constituting, and enacting self-rule is the power of those
who rule now and their resistance to relinquishing that power.
Assembly Procedures: Transparency through Prior, Concurrent, and Post Publicity
In setting the agenda for Assembly meetings, members of the Boule would decide
on the issues, in addition to those the Assembly directed the Boule to include, that needed
to be addressed. After setting the agenda, the Boule was then responsible for publicizing
the agenda four days prior to the meeting. Today, elected officials would serve a similar,
but expanded role. In addition to composing and publicizing the agenda, elected
representatives would compile and distribute prior to the Assembly relevant and
necessary information –contingent knowledge– for the citizen decision-makers.
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Information distributed to those citizens selected for participation in a particular
Assembly –or even better to all members of the metropolis– would offer the citizenry
access to the contingent knowledge germane for addressing the contextualized particulars
on the agenda. This official information could be augmented by other public or private
entities that desired to emphasize competing perspectives that they believed were not
fully conveyed or developed. In addition, communicating the agenda and these various
informative sources would be enhanced in today’s context because, even though the
current major metropolitan centers are much larger than ancient Athens, current
communication channels collapse this space, allowing for more efficient conveyance of
information throughout the populace. In performance of these roles, both the official and
alternative sources of information would enrich the knowledge base, concerning the
issues, of societal members in general and specifically for the citizens participating in the
Assembly.
Prior publicity and distribution of contingent knowledge in today’s context would
facilitate and enhance the societal benefits of a rhetorical democracy far beyond that
achieved by the Athenians. For instance, a meeting of the Assembly would become a
local news event, providing the various news outlets with multiple stories to investigate
and publicize. Besides running stories about the contextualized particulars under
consideration for an Assembly, the media could also serve as a check on the issues that
the elected officials placed on the agenda. If the elected officials were not addressing a
certain public problem, then the news media could inform the citizenry, so that if the next
Assembly deemed it of value they could instruct the elected officials to place it on the
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next Assembly’s agenda. As a result, the impetus the Assembly would provide the news
media would acknowledge, attend to, and enact Jefferson’s admonishment “to give [the
people] full information of their affairs thro’ the channel of the public papers, & to
contrive that those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people.”1161 In addition,
publicity of the actual meetings of the Assembly, as they were being conducted, would be
a newsworthy event that local media could cover. Local rhetorical democracy would
then, not only empower the citizenry for self-rule and foster their identification and
public happiness; it would also reinvigorate the fourth estate.
When it is the citizenry who rules, it is especially imperative that collectively
binding decisions are publicized so that those citizens not part of the Assembly can judge
if the decisions made reflect the common good, know the cooperative behaviors the
public has been committed to enact, and hold the administrative body accountable for the
implementation of those decisions. Certainly these roles are important for any form of
governance, but become even more significant when the decisions made by the Assembly
are the means by which the viability of rhetorical democracy will be judged. In Athens,
the Assembly’s collectively binding decisions were formalized and then publicized in
order for all societal members –citizens, metics, subjects, and slaves– to know what was
required of them and of their administrative representatives. In the contemporary context
post-publicity would serve the same purpose.
Concurrent and post-publicity also contributes to the legitimacy of the collectively
binding decision-making process. Young argues that legitimate collectively binding
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decisions “cannot take place in closed fora from which potentially affected parties are
excluded.”1162 The Assembly itself opens up the process significantly. Concurrent
publicity further extends the transparency of the decision-making process. By opening up
the forums to local coverage, the people –citizens, denizens, and subjects– would have
complete access to their proceedings. Post-publicity would then serve to convey the
Assembly’s outcomes to those who did not have the opportunity to participate or watch
the concurrent coverage. Consequently, through the structure and functions of the
Assembly and concurrent and post-publicity, the collectively binding decision-making
process and decisions would be fully transparent. Through this transparency a rhetorical
democracy meets practically Young’s necessary, yet insufficient, qualification for
legitimate governance.
The Assembly: Educating the Democratic Consciousness
A democratic consciousness does not inherently reside in the minds of human
beings. As argued previously, consciousness is a result of the symbolic orders a person
ascribes to in that how one conceives of one’s self is a product of the meanings –attitudes
and actions– s/he accepts about him/herself. As ideologies are systems of meaning, the
ideology of rhetorical democracy, just like all other ideologies, must inculcate a particular
subject position within societal members and instantiate material practices reflective of
its core constructs. In ancient Athens the experience in the navy, the ideology developed
and learned from the practices necessary for success in warfare, fostered the thetes’
uptake and belief in their abilities for self-rule as empowered, democratic citizens. In the
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contemporary functions and structures, resultant from the American ideology of
governance, the contemporary citizen lacks a similar democratic institution, in which
democratic practices call him or her to a democratic consciousness and subject position.
This is not to say that there are not established current institutions that can in part perform
this role. For instance, a reorientation of the education system that reinvigorates its role in
teaching democratic principles and practices could serve to inculcate future citizens to be
prepared for self-rule. Learning about the core constructs and practices of rhetorical
democracy are rendered impotent though without a space in which the citizenry is
empowered to actualize them. Without an Assembly that provides future citizens with the
opportunity to observe the positive consequences of participating in self-rule –functional
equality, liberty, public happiness, and identification– there is little impetus to invest in
learning about how to participate in functions and structures that are generative of
rhetorical democratic collectively binding decision-making processes. Therefore, while
the institutions of the education system would be valuable, necessary contributors to a
rhetorical democratic consciousness and subject position, it would not be sufficient. As
John Stuart Mill argues, individuals need opportunities that are productive of “the
practical discipline which the character obtains, from the occasional demand made upon
the citizens to exercise, for a time and in their turn, some social function.”1163 In other
words, to constitute a rhetorical democratic citizenry that can participate in democratic
rhetorical engagements, citizens do not need to just learn about core constructs and
practices; they need to be empowered to enact them. When “circumstances allow the
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amount of public duty assigned [to a citizen] to be considerable, it makes [that person] an
educated [citizen].”1164 In the Federalist Papers, Madison made a similar claim when he
contended that to “be a competent legislator” required that the knowledge necessary to
rule, in part could “only be attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience
in the station which requires the use of it.”1165 It is then, in the contemporary context,
only the Assembly that can provide the necessary and sufficient conditions through which
the citizenry is sufficiently educated and called into being rhetorically democratic citizen
empowered for self-rule.
The Far Reaching Benefits of a Rhetorical Democracy
The results of such a system would be dramatic and not only at the local level.
The most important possibility would be the transformation of the political imaginary of
the people. Cohen discusses a relevant concept that pertains to the political imaginary: the
“accommodationalist preferences.”1166 To explicate this concept Cohen refers to Stoic
slaves who matched their political imagination to their existing power relations.1167
Expected to be good slaves these individuals conceived how to be good slaves instead of
imagining and working toward being free. In general then, it could be argued that
individual and societal preferences are accommodated to the power relations in which
they exist. This concept reflects the argument concerning the training ground that service
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on the triremes for the thete class of Athenian citizens was educative of a democratic
consciousness. Therefore, conditions in which individuals practice citizenship shape their
constitution as political beings.
If Cohen is correct about accommodationalist preferences then by empowering
the citizenry through participation in a rhetorical democracy they would not only become
more involved in their own metropolitan contextual particulars, but also the public
problems addressed and decided upon at the state and national levels. Motivated through
their empowered involvement in an Assembly the political imagination of the citizenry
would be accommodated to the preferences of self-rule. In experiencing authentic
governance through enacting democratic rhetoric in a rhetorical democracy the citizenry
would come to see that they could collectively decide –rule– how to constitute their
social and material world(s). This would affect the citizenry’s interests and involvement
in local governance, as well as their attention to the governing of state and national
representatives. For instance, the citizenry’s desire to hear their state and national leaders’
reasoning for collectively binding decisions would be inculcated and enhanced. Another
possibility is that citizens, with expectations for rhetorical accountability, response, and
forum transparency, would push for more open collectively binding decision-making
processes at these levels as well.
Participation in the Assembly or even as elected officials of a rhetorical
democracy could also have additional, real aleatory ideological effects on state and
national governance. The ideological effects of a rhetorical democracy would call its
citizens into a democratic subject position for their lived experiences at home. State and
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national representative As such, local governance would become a breeding ground for
shaping participation in all forms for ruling society. Through participation in the
Assembly, citizens who were selected to rule over society as state and national
representatives would identify more strongly with a rhetorical democratic ideology.
There are a number of possible beneficial results: potential candidates for state and
national office would find it difficult to secure these positions without first being
successful in an Assembly; a candidate’s exposure to the voting public would be
enhanced through their participation in the Assembly, which could offset in part the cost
of campaigning; and a representative, who could not adequately defend and justify his or
her position, would find it difficult to remain an elected official. Local elected officials,
even if they had not participated in an Assembly could also become more democratically
minded. If such an elected official attained a state or national position, s/he would likely
bring with him or her a strong belief that as a representative s/he was accountable to the
citizenry and to be responsive to their collective will.
Conclusion: The Most Humanizing Endeavor
Call democracy a dream, if you will, but keep dreaming democracy.
–Paul Woodruff, First Democracy: The Challenge of an Ancient Idea
Society is a space in which individual acts that flow out of a person’s capacities
are conjoined to that of other individuals in order to realize a social and material world
that is only feasible through cooperative acts. When individuals give up their liberty,
found in the state of nature, they submit to the imposition of a collective power over their
lived endeavors. How this power is constituted for ruling is dependent in large part by
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what is seen as possible through the symbolic orders of a particular society’s culture. If
that culture’s webs of significance are undergirded with ideologies –a particular people’s
systems of meaning that articulate core symbolic constructs pertaining to certain
contexts– that do not foster democratic governance the power of the people for self-rule
is given over to some other(s). On the other hand, if the ideology associated with
governance empowers the citizenry to rule –to propose the contextualized particulars for
agenda items that the citizenry rhetorically engage over within a functionally equal space
so as to generate collectively binding decisions that determine society’s cooperative
behaviors– then the people enjoy authentic governance through the only legitimate means
for ruling societal members, rhetorical democracy. Authentic governance and democratic
rhetoric rises up from the most human and humanizing endeavor, meaning construction.
When a meaning is ascribed to an object, whether physical, social, or abstract, it
only is rendered powerful when other societal members consensually agree with that
meaning. These meanings form the purpose of communication, thereby shaping a
perceptual screen through which one’s being and seeing the world is constituted. To offer
up and negotiate the meaning of some object with others is then the most humanizing
endeavor in which a person can engage in the construction of the lived world. When an
individual endeavors with another over what something should mean or through acts that
are demonstrative of a particular attitude toward an object that meaning has to be
accepted outright or negotiated over before it is incorporated into their shared symbolic
order. In many ways, then meaning construction that is humanizing –recognizing the
participants’ capacities of knowledge, equality, liberty, and power as conceived by the
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Athenians– is a democratic process. Such a process is a rhetorical engagement with the
participants attempting to convince each other that their meaning or particular nuance of
the meaning best fits the object. In this microcosm of self-rule over the collective good of
a meaning construct also employs weak and strong versions of rhetorical accountability
and response. Individuals present at the meaning’s inception, negotiation, or uptake are
able to employ a strong version of both, while those removed from the process
experience little or no ability for either.
On the other hand, when meaning is dictated by one or the few its effects can be
one of the most dehumanizing endeavors in which humanity can engage. For instance,
one of the most dehumanizing cooperative acts of meaning construction in American
history was a result of the rule of a few. When the white, male, state representatives at the
Constitutional Convention decided that “all other Persons” –slaves– were to be counted
as only “three fifths” of a human being, in order to determine the number of
“representatives and direct Taxes … apportioned among the several States,”1168 the
original Constitution of the United States constituted a portion of the population as less
than human. In doing so, the attitude and acts of the national government and many of its
citizens and subjects were shaped to allow for dehumanizing, reprehensible collective and
individual behaviors towards subject who were denied their inalienable right for self-rule.
If the Constitutional Convention was conducted as a rhetorical democratic Assembly,
slaves would have been functionally equal participants with the liberty and power to
rhetorically engage in the meaning construction of their personhood. These individuals
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would have been able to hold those who desired to dehumanize them accountable in the
moment by responding to –rhetorically confronting– the construction of their humanity as
being less than human. To get at the heart of this problem though, one step back in
meaning construction is warranted. Citizenship is a symbol that was narrowly defined
prior to the Constitutional Convention by similar representatives, thereby excluding the
majority of any members of micro-cultures living within the boundaries of the
Confederated States. This means that the space of the Constitutional Convention was one
that excluded not only women and slaves, but also any other habitus or communication
community that would have compelled the representatives to rhetorically invent through
their private wills in order to generate public wills that would have been meaningful to
the members of those micro-cultures. Due to this lack of democratic rhetoric in a
rhetorical democratic context these men were able to justify the privileging of the union
of the few over the denial of human rights to the many. And as the analysis of the
ideology of American governance has demonstrated their denial was not constrained to
the slaves or Native Americans who were not incorporated into the established system of
taxation,1169 it included those whose power deputized better men to rule over them.
Rhetorical democracy as meaning construction is not only the most authentic
form of governance, it is the most humanizing. When governance distorts one or more of
the core constructs in the ideological chain of meaning for authentic democracy, that
government is no longer functionally a democracy. How the core constructs, entailments,
institutions, and material practices are articulated together is indicative of the meanings
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of power, liberty, equality, public happiness participation, and knowledge through
identification that structure the ways in which that particular government is conducted.
When governance is conducted by individuals who are viewed as having superior
knowledge and the collective knowledge of the citizenry is dismissed that government is
not democratic. When a government does not allow a citizen the liberty to speak into the
collectively binding decision-making process that governance is not democratic. When
the space in which governance is conducted does not constitute the citizenry as
functionally equal that government is not democratic. When the entire citizenry is not
empowered to participate in self-rule, then that government is not democratic.
Democratic governance entails the citizenry being able to apply their capacities to
governing through empowered, active participation in the collectively binding decisionmaking process. For a government to claim to be democratic, while not creating a
political space in which the citizenry can engage each other through democratic rhetoric
that fosters rhetorical accountability and rhetorical response is merely a mirage of
democracy. Like the mirage in the desert when the ideals of democracy are employed by
such a government to construe itself as democratic; what one finds when examining this
type of government is that its governance is not for the elevation and empowerment of
the citizenry, but to preserve the power of the one or the few over the many. The people –
all people– thirst for democracy, dream of democracy and it is only through their
participation in a rhetorical democracy that their longing for authentic governance –
empowered, equal self-rule through which what divides individuals from each other is
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bridged together for their collective, common good– is constituted and experienced as
their reality.
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